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Summary
This research evaluates the impact of political variables on 
local policy outputs.
Chapter I analyses two political theories of local policy
variation. The party government model suggests that policies are
the product of the ideological disposition of ruling parties. 
Rational choice models suggest that policies are the result of 
the pursuit of narrow self interest by policy makers. The 
practical problems of testing these theories are analysed, and
the methodological implications of previous tests of the impact 
of politics in the U.K. are evaluated.
Chapter II critically reviews the 'output studies' literature on 
local policy variation. The central issue in this field has been 
the relative importance of environmental and political effects on 
policies. It is argued that evidence on this issue reveals more 
about the methods of output studies than about the substance of 
local policy making.
The relative validity of rational choice and party government 
models is evaluated empirically in chapters III to VII. The
impact of median voter preferences on local tax policies is 
measured in chapter III, and the impact of bureaucratic power on
local staffing policies is measured in chapter IV. The 
statistical results do not support the hypotheses for either of 
these rational choice variables.
Chapters V to VII investigate various aspects of the party 
government model. In chapter V the 'output disaggregation' 
hypothesis is tested. The evidence indicates that party effects 
on aggregate and sub-service outputs are not significantly 
different. Chapter VI tests the impact of party control on local 
economic policies and shows that party effects in this policy 
area are significant. Chapter VII tests the impact of local 
politics and central grants on changes in total expenditure. The 
impact of both of these political variables is significant.
Chapter VIII evaluates the quality of the empirical evidence, the 
validity of political theories of local policies, and the utility 
of the output studies approach. Two main conclusions are drawn. 
First, local policies are better explained by the party 
government model than by rational choice models. Second, the 
output studies approach is capable of providing explanations of 
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This research examines the reasons why different local 
authorities adopt different policies. More specifically, 
the aim is to measure the impact of political variables on 
local policy outputs. The main focus is on the theoretical 
and empirical effects of four political variables: median
voters, bureaucrats, political parties and 
inter-governmental grants.
The focus on the politics of local policy variation means 
that the analysis is located in the 'output studies' 
tradition in political science. However, a comprehensive 
approach to the explanation of local policy outputs requires 
a recognition of the importance of variables emphasised by 
other disciplines. Therefore, while the general theoretical 
perspective is political, the specific models which are 
tested are multidisciplinary.
The discussion in this chapter is divided into four 
sections. First, political theories of local policy 
variation are analysed. Second, the nature of the research 
problem is outlined. Third, the empirical evidence on the 
impact of political variables on local policies in the U.K. 
is evaluated. The final section provides an overview of the 
issues addressed in Chapters II-VIII.
Political Theories Of Local Policy Outputs
Public policies are generally viewed as the product of
two sets of forces. First, the political choices of
groups and organisations involved in the policy
process, for example voters, party politicians and
public officials. Second, constraints on political
choice, for example economic, social and demographic
conditions. The presence of political and constraint
variables in models of policy outputs is pervasive, not
only in analyses of local governments but also in time
series and cross sectional analyses of national
(1)
governments.
The conceptualisation of local policies as the result
of C-flnS-traliie.d-P.ttIitical. choice is closely related to
Easton's systems model, which has served as a paradigm
(2)
for political analyses of public policies.
According to this model, all influences on policy 
outputs are by definition in the environment of a 
political system or within the political system. This 
implies that if all local political systems were 
confronted by the same environmental constraints, then 
variations in policies would be entirely attributable
3to variations in political choice. In this context, 
the key problem for political theory concerns the 
specification of the political variables which 
influence the choice of local policies.
Two broad theoretical perspectives on this issue can be 
identified. First, policies may be determined largely 
by the ideological disposition of the ruling political 
party. Second, policies may be a consequence of 
'rational choice' in the pursuit of narrow self 
interest by policy makers. These theories are analysed 
in detail in the context of the empirical analyses in 
chapters III to VII. The main features of the theories 
are outlined in this section.
(a) Party Government
The view that policy outputs are influenced by 
the disposition of the governing party is 
widespread in both theoretical and empirical 
analyses of public policies. However, there is 
little in the way of a 'positive' theory of 
party government in the public policy 
literature. Instead, the hypothetical role of
4party government seems to stem largely from a 
normative model of representative democracy.
The rationale for representative government is 
that the electorate can secure a broad pattern 
of policies by choosing between alternative sets 
of political leaders. In principle, the 
» electoral process bestows on the governing party 
unique formal authority to make public 
policies. The resource of 'legitimacy' can be 
used by party politicians to impose a 
distinctive pattern on the activities of 
government.
The translation of this normative model into a 
positive theory of policy outputs depends on the 
validity of two key assumptions. The first is 
that differences between parties are more than 
mere rhetoric. In the absence of genuine 
ideological differences, parties are likely to 
adopt much the same policies when faced by 
similar external constraints. There are good 
reasons for accepting the validity of this first 
assumption in the context of local policy 
variation in contemporary Britain. Ideological
5differences between the major parties are
generally considered to have become more
(3)
pronounced in the last decade. In local
government in particular, party conflict has
become more severe. While many Conservative
councils have espoused privatisation and
spending cuts, Labour councils have been
pursuing new and more vigorous forms of 'local
(4)
socialism'.
The second assumption which underpins the party 
government model is that political leaders have 
some autonomy from external constraints. If the 
behaviour of ruling parties is dictated by force 
of circumstance, then distinctive policy 
preferences will find no expression in policy 
outputs. It is important to note that the party 
government model does not imply that politicians 
are 'free agents'. It simply implies that, in 
the context of given external constraints, 
different parties will produce different 
policies.
Thus the validity of the party government model 
requires that elected politicians have both the 
desire and the capacity to influence policy
6outputs. If the impact of parties on policies 
is significant in practice, then it may be 
inferred that politicians have some autonomy 
from external constraints. If, further, the 
policies of ruling parties are consistent with 
their stated ideological preferences, then it 
may be concluded that the behaviour of 
governments bears some resemblance to the 
normative model of representative democracy.
Two aspects of the application of the party 
government model to local policy variation 
require elaboration at this point. First, most 
empirical analyses of local authority policies 
have considered only local party politics. 
However, the party government model is also 
relevant to the influence of central government 
on policy outputs. Explanations of local policy 
variation have usually treated central 
government policies as 'constants'. The 
supposed spatial uniformity of central 
government constraints implies that central 
policies cannot be a source of local policy 
diversity. However, not all central policies 
are properly considered as constants. Some
7policies are applied selectively, at the
discretion of the ruling party in central
government. The allocation of
inter-governmental grants is foremost amongst
such policies. It has been shown that the
value, type and distribution of grants is partly
dependent on party control in central
(5)
government. The party political influence
on grant distribution has been especially marked 
in the 1980's as grant penalties have been used 
to punish local authorities which fail to 
cooperate with central policies. Therefore, a 
full examination of the party government model 
must encompass the role of both national and 
local political systems.
Another important aspect of the application of 
the party government model concerns the 
difference between the 'additive' and 
'mediative' roles of local parties. An additive 
role implies that, whatever the circumstances, 
ruling parties are able to pursue distinctive 
policies. For example, Labour councils may 
spend consistently more than Conservative
8councils, regardless of the level of service 
needs. A mediative role implies that the ruling 
party modifies the impact of external 
constraints on policy outputs. For example, the 
relationship between service needs and spending 
may be more strongly positive in Labour 
controlled authorities than in Conservative 
controlled authorities.
The distinction between the additive and
mediative roles of local parties was first
(6)
highlighted by Stonecash and by
(7)
Hansen. The distinction is illustrated in
diagrams I.A and I.B in a format adapted from 
Stonecash. In diagram I.A the role of party 
politics is additive. The size of the 
additive effect is shown by the gap, G, between 
the spending of Labour and Conservative 
councils. At all levels of need, Labour 
spending is higher than Conservative spending by 
the same amount. In addition, the response of 
each party to extra units of need is the same, 
as indicated in diagram I.A by the identical 
slopes of the LAB and CON lines. In diagram










In both diagrams, LAB shows the relationship between need and spending 
in Labour controlled authorities; and CON shows the relationship 
between need and spending in Conservative controlled authorities.
9I.B, the role of party politics is mediative. 
Party politics literally 'mediates' between 
service needs and spending. In contrast to the 
additive situation, the difference between 
Labour and Conservative spending is not uniform 
but depends on the level of need. The impact of 
extra units of need on spending is higher in 
Labour authorities, as shown in diagram I.B by 
the difference in the slopes of the LAB and CON 
lines.
Both Stonecash and Hansen stress the mediative
role of local party politics at the expense of
the additive role. Stonecash argues that the
primary role of politics is to facilitate or
inhibit the impact of other variables on
policies. Thus political variables should not
"be viewed as sufficient ... to cause policy or
as being independent, additive causes of
(8)
policy". Similarly, in Hansen's
formulation of the role of parties, "political
effects are no longer expressed as variables,
(9)
but as transformation effects". Thus in
Hansen's empirical analysis only the mediative
10
role of politics is estimated. However, there 
are no general theoretical grounds for 
emphasising either additive or mediative 
effects. Therefore the potential relevance of 
both effects should be considered in the context 
of particular policies.
To summarise, the party government model 
suggests that the key political influence on 
local policy outputs is the disposition of 
ruling parties. This theoretical perspective 
suggests that the impact of parties should be 
examined at both national and local levels, and 
that the role of politics may be either additive 
or mediative.
(b) Rational Choice
Since the 1970's 'rational' or 'public' choice
models have made major inroads into political
(10)
science. The key characteristic of this
perspective is that public policies are the 
product of self-interested behaviour by policy 
makers. Unlike the party government model, the 
rational choice approach is explicitly based on
11
a formal positive theoretical framework.
Rational choice models stem from the "economic
study of nonmarket decision making", which
assumes that "man is an egoistic, rational
(1 1)
utility maximiser".
The emphasis on narrow self interest implies 
that there is little place in rational choice 
theory for the broad ideological goals which are 
central to the party government model.
All theories of policy outputs necessarily 
involve an abstraction from the complexity of 
political systems. This applies as much to the 
party government model as to rational choice 
theory. However, the rational choice approach 
is more than a simplification of 'political 
reality'. It implies that political systems are 
analagous to economic systems, and that the same 
assumptions and modes of analysis apply to 
both. The outputs of economic systems can be 
explained by the operation of demand and 
supply. Correspondingly, the outputs of 
political systems can be explained by the self 
interested behaviour of the consumers and 
producers of public policies.
12
Rational choice theory contains two main models
which can be applied to the explanation of local
policy outputs. The first is the median voter
model, which is associated principally with
(12)
Downs. This model implies that policy
variations across local authorities are 
attributable to variations in median voter 
preferences. The political system is treated as 
analagous to a perfectly competitive market in 
which the consumer is sovereign. Parties must 
either meet median voter demands or face 
political bankruptcy.
In the median voter model parties do not play an 
additive role. Ruling parties are not assumed 
to follow consistently distinctive policies. 
Instead, the median voter approach assumes that 
politicans' self interest consists of gaining 
and keeping office. It is the pursuit of this 
goal which ensures that policies reflect median 
voter preferences. Political entrepreneurs 
adopt policies which correspond to median voter 
interests because this course of action serves 
their own self interests. Thus Downs argues
13
that "parties formulate policies in order to win
elections, rather than win elections in order to
(13)
formulate policies". This view contrasts
sharply with the party government model which 
emphasises the policy impact of broad 
ideological programmes.
The median voter model also precludes a
mediative role for political parties. The
median voter approach may be viewed as a
specific version of the general 'transmission'
(14)
model of policy outputs. The transmission
model implies that political institutions are 
simply mechanisms for converting public 
preferences into governmental decisions. 
Similarly, according to the median voter model, 
parties are neutral channels for the conversion 
of consumer demands into public policies. No 
mediation occurs, and no distinctive party bias 
is impressed upon the relationship between 
median voter interests and policy outputs.
14
The second rational choice explanation of policy
outputs concentrates on the role of the
producers rather than the consumers of public
policies. The 'bureaucratic power' model is
(15)
principally associated with Niskanen. It
suggests that local policy variations are the
product of variations in the capacity of public
officials to pursue their self interest.
Niskanen argues that most of the literature on
bureaucracy “has represented the bureaucrat
either as an automaton or as maximising some
concept of general welfare". However, "a
bureaucrat, like anyone else, maximises his
(16)
personal utility".
The bureaucratic power model portrays political
systems as analagous to an economic market which
is controlled by a monopolist. In this market,
bureaucrats have "overwhelmingly dominant
(17)
monopoly power" over the political
'sponsors' who provide them with funds. Thus 
the potential impact of party ideology is 
blocked by bureaucratic self interest. Niskanen 
argues that "the primary reason for the
15
differential bargaining power of a monopoly
bureau is the sponsor's lack of a significant
alternative and its unwillingness to forego the
(18)
services supplied by the bureau". In such
circumstances it makes little difference which 
party is in office. The ruling party has no 
option but to buy the policy package on offer 
from bureaucrats.
In sum, whereas the party government model 
emphasises the dispostion of ruling parties, 
rational choice models emphasise the selfish 
behaviour of participants in the policy 
process. Rational choice theory suggests that 
the key political influence on policies is 
either the self interest of voters as policy 
consumers, or the self interest of bureaucrats 
as policy producers.
16
The Research Problem; Identifying The Impact Of 
Poli tics
The previous section analysed the theoretical impact on 
policies of several political variables. This section 
considers the general problems of identifying the 
empirical impact of these variables. The focus at this 
stage is on the main conceptual issues in the 
measurement of political effects. Specific technical 
issues are discussed in the context of the empirical 
analyses in later chapters.
The framework of 'constrained political choice' 
suggests that political variables would be the sole 
source of policy variation if all local authorities 
faced the same external constraints. In other words, 
the general hypothesis is that politics is a 
significant influence on policy outputs, ceteris 
paribus proviso. For example, the party government 
model implies that if all other things are equal, then 
Labour councils will spend more than Conservative 
councils. The problem of testing such hypotheses in 
practice is precisely that all other things are not 
equal. External constraints on policies also vary
17
across local authorities. For example, some of the 
variation in policies may be the result of differences 
in service needs and financial resources. In addition, 
such constraints are not randomly distributed across 
local authorities, but tend to be systematically 
related to political variables. For example, Labour 
representation on councils tends to be high in areas of 
high needs and low resources.
Therefore, to obtain valid measures of the impact of
politics it is necessary to 'control' for other
influences on policies. If political variables are
tested without proper controls then their effect may be
(19)
either overestimated or underestimated. The
following discussion illustrates the potential sources of 
bias for the case of local party politics. However, the 
same arguments apply to central grants, median voters and 
bureaucrats.
The first form of bias to be considered is where
political effects are overestimated. This can arise if a
political and constraint variable are positively related
and, further, both variables are positively related to
(20)
policy outputs. A hypothetical example of this
18
situation is shown in table 1.1(a). Labour 
representation and service needs are positively related, 
and both variables are positively related to spending. 
Case (i) shows the apparent relationship between politics 
and spending in the absence of a control for needs. The 
figures suggest that Labour spending exceeds Conservative 
spending by £50 per capita. Case (ii) shows the 
relationship between politics and spending when a simple 
control for need is introduced, by separating councils 
into 'high need' and 'low need' groups. Most Labour 
councils are in the high need category and most 
Conservative councils are in the low need category. The 
figures still indicate that spending is higher in Labour 
than in Conservative councils, but now by only £20 
per capita. Thus when councils at the same level of 
need are examined the measured impact of politics is 
reduced. In the absence of the control for need, the 
figures in case (i) mistakenly attributed some of the 
influence of needs to politics.
The second form of bias to be considered is where
political effects are underestimated. This can arise
if a political and constraint variable are negatively
related and, further, both variables are positively
(21)
related to policy outputs. In this situation a






1(a) Politics. Needs and Spending
LABOUR
( i) Spending per capita, 
no control for needs
All (n = 100)
£100
CONSERVATIVE 
Ail (n = 100) 
£50
High Need Low Need H igh..Need Low, Need 
(n = 80) (n = 20) (n = 20) (n = 80)
(ii) Spending per capita,
controlling for needs £110 £60 £90 £40
1(b) Politics, Resources and .Spending
LABOUR 
All (n = 100)
( i) Spending per capita, 
no control for 
resources £75
CONSERVATIVE 
All (n = 100)
£75
High Low High Low
Resources Resources Resources Resources 
(n = 20) (n = 80) (n = 80) (n = 20)
(ii) Spending per capita, 
controlling for 
resources £95 £70 £80 £55
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measure of the impact of either explanatory variable in 
isolation will be contaminated by the countervailing 
effect of the other. The influence of the two 
variables will tend to 'cancel out' and their estimated 
effect on policies will be biased downwards. A 
hypothetical example of this situation is shown in 
table 1.1(b). Labour representation and financial 
resources are negatively related, and both variables 
are positively related to spending. Case (i) shows the 
apparent relationship between politics and spending in 
the absence of a control for resources. The figures 
suggest that there is no difference in the spending 
policies of Labour and Conservative councils. Case
(ii) shows the relationship between politics and 
spending when a simple control for resources is 
introduced. The figures now indicate that Labour 
councils are higher spenders than Conservative 
councils. When councils with equal resources are 
examined the measured impact of politics is shown to be 
signif icant.
In the absence of the control for resources, the 
figures in case (i) were distorted by the opposing 
effects of the political and resource characteristics 
of individual authorities.
20
Thus, to identify the impact of politics, a methodology
which controls for other relevant variables must be
adopted. If the research design does not hold other
variables constant, then the separate effect of
politics cannot be isolated. It may be argued that to
achieve 'genuine' control it would be necessary to use
(22)
an experimental method. This would require a
research design in which two groups of local 
authorities, alike in all relevant respects, were given 
different political characteristics. For example, one 
group might be assigned Labour majorities and the other 
group assigned Conservative majorities. The effects of 
the 'treatment' variable, party control, could then be 
investigated. In this situation all characteristics, 
except the variable of interest, would literally be 
held constant. However, such an experimental*, method is 
both inappropriate and impractical in the context of 
the analysis of local policy variation. It is 
inappropriate because the objective is to measure the 
impact of politics under 'real' rather than 
'laboratory' conditions. It is impractical because the 
characteristics of local authorities cannot be 
manipulated for experimental purposes.
21
A practical solution to the problem of control is to
(23)
use multivariate statistical analysis. This
permits relevant variables to be held constant, albeit 
'artificially'. Multivariate techniques involve the 
statistical manipulation of the data on local 
characteristics, rather than the experimental 
manipulation of the actual characteristics. This 
approach allows the impact of politics to be tested 'as 
if' all other things were equal.
The success of this solution to the problem of control 
is dependent upon the identification of the relevant 
variables which should be held constant. The only 
available criteria of 'relevance' are theories of the 
relationship between constraint variables and 
policies. Thus, by necessity, the quest for the impact 
of politics must be pursued within the context of wider 
theoretical and statistical models. Otherwise it will 
be impossible to identify accurately the effect of 
politics on policy outputs.
22
3. Research on The Politics of Local Policy Variation In 
The U . K .
The reasons why different local authorities adopt
different policies have been widely analysed in the
U.K. for over 20 years. Suggestions that this field of
(24)
research is moribund are decidedly mistaken.
The volume of published work in the 1980's confirms
that for many researchers the problem remains
(25)
intriguing. This section evaluates the
substantive and methodological implications of tests 
for the impact of politics in the U.K.
The explanation of policy variations across local 
authorities has attracted interest from the academic 
disciplines of political science, economics, geography 
and social administration. The various disciplines 
have approached the problem of local policy variation 
with a common general aim and methodology. All are 
ultimately concerned to uncover the 'causes' of policy 
outputs, and all use statistical methods to produce 
evidence and draw conclusions. Within this common 
framework each of the disciplines has concentrated on 
particular explanatory variables. In political science 
the focus has been on aspects of local political
23
systems, particularly the party political
(26)
characteristics of councils. Other disciplines
have emphasised the impact of various constraints on
local policy outputs. Economists have analysed the
influence of unit costs and financial resources on the
(27)
production of local services. In social
administration the emphasis has been on the need for
services, as indicated by the characteristics of the
(28)
local population. Geographers have devoted
attention to the influence of location and space on
(29)
local public policies.
There is increasing evidence of an exchange of
concepts, measures and results between the various
disciplines concerned with identifying the determinants
of local policies. For example, political scientists
have recently drawn heavily upon geographical
(30)
concepts and geographers have paid considerable
(31)
attention to service needs. However, while in
principle such interchanges promise benefits, in 
practice there have been substantial costs because the 
transfer of measures has been largely ad-hoc. It is 
common for variables to be 'borrowed' from other 
disciplines and used as if their importance is so well
24
established that little discussion is necessary. For 
example, in political science there is a tendency to 
grab a standard set of need and resource measures and 
plug these into statistical models where the main focus 
is on politics. However, none of the disciplines has 
yet identified an explanatory variable of sufficient 
status to merit an automatic place in a model of policy 
variation.
Political variables have probably been the main
casualty of the ad-hoc exchange of measures between
disciplines. This is because there is a general
recognition that the creation of public policies is an
inescapably political process. Therefore most studies
of local policy variation in the U.K. have included
measures of politics amongst their explanatory
variables. However the specific political measures
employed in economics, geography and social
(32)
administration are seldom justified. This defect
is compounded in studies by political scientists which 
'trawl' for political effects on policies. The 
implications of these problems can be explored through 
an analysis of the existing evidence on the impact of
politics on local policies.
25
The statistical evidence produced by analyses of local
(33)
policy variation is summarised in table 1.2. The
figure on the left of each column shows the percentage 
of tests in each study which yielded a statistically 
significant relationship between measures of politics 
and policies. Most of the figures for the percentage 
of significant results are based on the impact of 
politics when other variables are controlled. The 
figure in brackets in each column shows the total 
number of tests for political effects in each study.
The results of the various studies cannot be compared 
directly because of differences in the policy measures, 
control variables, groups of authorities and time 
periods. Therefore the focus here is on the overall 
pattern of the results.
The bulk of the evidence refers to the proportion of
total council seats held by the Labour party or to the
control of the council by the Labour party. The 
preponderance of these variables reflects their use in 
early studies by political scientists and subsequent 
transfer to analyses of local policy variation in other 
disciplines. Overall, the evidence indicates that the 
Labour party measures have been reasonably 





































Labour Labour Conservative Conservative Other
Seats Control Seats Control Parties
Boaden and Alford, 1969 100 (2)
Oliver & Stanyer, 1969 33 (3)
Alt, 1971 50 (12)
Boaden, 1971 55 (11)
Davies et al, 1971 19 (58)
Nicholson and Topham, 1971 0 (1) 0 (1)
Davies et al, 1972 40 (10)
Ashford, 1975 25 (12) 8 (12) 0 (12) 45 (11)
Nicholson and Topham, 1975 0 (2) 0 (2)
Ashford et al, 1976 100 (2) 100 (2)
Danziger, 1978 25 (24)
Jackman and Sellars, 1978 100 (2)
Pinch, 1978 66 (3)
Schofield, 1978 100 (2)
Foster et al, 1980 60 (5) 0 (3)
Page, 1980 50 (2)
Pinch, 1980 78 (9)
Storey, 1980 63 (16)
Cuthbertson et al, 1981 100 (1)
Jackman and Papadachi, 1981 50 (2)
Bebbington and Davies, 1982 50 (2)
Bennett, 1982 94 (10) 0 (16) 0 (16)
Davies and Ferlie, 1982 10 (10)
Gibson, 1982 100 (2)
Karran, 1982
Lamont, 1982 4 (25) 0 (7)
Rickets, 1982 1 (2) 0 (2)
Bennett, 1984 0 (6)
Davies and Ferlie, 1984 0 (8)
Hoggart, 1984 27 (26) 7 (14) 14 (14) 14 (22) 14 (28)
Sharpe and Newton, 1984 24 (93) 12 (51) 8 (51) 12 (42)
Hoggart, 1985(a) 83 (18) 0 (12)
Hoggart, 1985(b) 0 (2) 0 (2)
Jesson et al, 1985 0 (1)
Barnett, 1986 0 (2) 50 (2)









Note: full references for these studies are contained in the Appendix to this chapter
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Labour seats and Labour control have produced 
statistically significant results. The results for the 
other political variables are more patchy. The 
quantity of significant results is often little more 
than might occur by chance. However it is 
inappropriate to place much weight on these results 
because there are important weaknesses in the 
measurement of both the political and the policy 
variables.
(a) Political Variables
In many studies political variables have been
inserted into statistical models in a fairly
casual manner. Two salient symptoms of this
malaise can be noted. First, reasoned
hypotheses for the expected relationship between
specific political and policy measures are
rare. The problem is particularly pronounced in
studies which apply a single model to the
explanation of a wide range of policy
(34)
outputs. In most tests in these studies
political variables turn out to be 
insignificant. However, in the absence of 
hypotheses, there was no reason to expect any 
other result.
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A closely related problem is that some studies
build multivariate models on the basis of
statistical rather than theoretical
(35)
criteria. In these studies political
variables are discarded from further analysis if 
their bivariate relationship with policies is 
insignificant. However, as argued in section 2 
above, the bivariate result by itself may be 
misleading. The significance of such political 
variables might have emerged once other 
variables had been controlled.
A second symptom of the casual specification of
political variables is the neglect of lag
structures. For example, in studies which apply
the same model to various outputs a single lag
structure is used, which implies that all
policies are affected just as quickly or just as
slowly by the political variables. In addition,
in some studies political variables are measured
(36)
later than the policy variables. It has
often been argued that the 'black box' of the 
policy making process is mysterious, but if 
causal effects flow backwards in time then it
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must also be magical. Where such lag structures 
nevertheless produce significant results, it may 
simply be that measures of politics in an 
irrelevant time period are acting as proxies for 
politics in the relevant time period.
Another deficiency in the measurement of the 
impact of politics concerns the general failure 
to distinguish between the additive and 
mediative effects of political variables. The 
distinction between the two potential roles of 
politics is crucial to the interpretation of the 
existing evidence.
Most studies have estimated only the additive 
effect of party politics. These effects often 
prove to be insignificant, but it is possible 
that the analysis of the mediative role of party 
politics would have produced significant 
results. However, the mere possibility of 
mediation in principle is an insufficient basis 
for testing the mediative effect of politics on 
all policies. The theoretical basis of 
mediation in particular cases must be carefully
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specified. The few tests of mediation which
have been conducted show a tendency towards
(37)
trawling. Thus there is a danger that the
quest for the mediative effect of party politics 
will appear to fail because a large proportion 
of insignificant results will be generated.
The distinction between additive and mediative 
effects also sheds important new light on the 
generally insignificant results for variables 
such as competition and turnout. It is 
increasingly recognised that some political 
variables can play both additive and mediative 
roles. However it has not been recognised that 
there are some variables which can play only a 
mediative role. Competition and turnout fall 
into this category. Taken in isolation such 
variables have no inherent positive or negative 
influence on policy outputs. Rather their role 
is to reinforce or weaken the influence of other 
variables, such as public opinion. Thus it is 
unsurprising that most tests of the additive 




In one respect the policy measures which have
been used are well suited to testing political
models of policy formulation. The strength of
the policy measures is that they usually focus
on the relevant dimension of the concept of
policy. Three aspects of policy can be
(38)
identified. First, policy 'outputs',
which refers to formal policy commitments such 
as the allocation of resources to service 
provision. Second, policy 'outcomes', which 
refers to the standard of service produced with 
the resources allocated. Third, policy 
'impact', which refers to the consequences of 
providing a particular standard of service. The 
aim of political models of policy formulation is 
to explain formal policy commitments, not 
service standards or effects. These are, after 
all, output studies not outcome studies or 
impact studies.
Almost all studies of local policy variation 
have analysed the formal commitment of
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resources, for example through measures of 
spending or staffing. The use of such measures 
seems to owe more to data availability than to 
theoretical arguments that outputs are the 
relevant dimension of policy. Nevertheless, in 
this case the easy option has also been the 
appropriate option.
A second characteristic of the measurement of
policies has been much less fortunate. Most of
the policy variables refer to the level of
spending or to the level of other local
authority activities. However, such variables
are largely historically determined and
therefore do not reflect current choices
concerning the commitment of resources. For
example, the tremendous stability over time in
levels of total spending is well
(39)
documented. In this context the
appropriate measure of policy is the short-run 
change in spending rather than the long-run 
level of spending. Short-run changes are also 
the relevant measure for other aggregate aspects 
of local authority activity which have been
32
built up over many years, such as taxation and
staffing. The level of expenditure may be an
appropriate measure only for small services or
service 'sub-functions' which have been shown to




The existing empirical evidence suggests that 
the relationship between politics and policies 
is generally insignificant. However, the 
conceptualisation and measurement of both 
political and policy variables has often been 
weak. This suggests that many of the 
statistical results, whether significant or 
insignificant, should be set aside. The 
empirical analyses contain too many deficiencies 
to constitute a fair test of whether 'politics 
matters'.
The empirical analyses in chapters III to VII 
aim to overcome these deficiencies and thereby 
to provide better evidence on the impact of 
politics. First, the impact of all the
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political variables is tested only on policy 
outputs where there are strong theoretical 
reasons to expect a significant relationship. 
Thus, in these tests, political variables should 
have a better than random chance of producing 
significant results. Second, the assumed 
temporal sequences of 'cause' and 'effect' are 
specified through explicit lag structures.
Third, where policy measures concern aggregate 
aspects of local authority activity the focus is 
on short-run changes rather than long-run 
levels. And finally, while the major focus is 
on political variables, all other explanatory 
variables are also tested on the basis of 
explicit hypotheses. Thus each political 
variable is tested in the context of a wider 
model which holds other relevant variables 
constant.
None of these characteristics of the evidence 
logically imply that political variables will be 
more significant than in previous studies. Nor 
is it the case that the models will necessarily 
produce better levels of statistical 
explanation.
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However it is the case that more weight should 
be placed on evidence with these characteristics 
than the evidence m  many previous studies.
The Structure of Chapters II to VIII
The output studies literature in the U.S.A. and U.K. is 
critically reviewed in Chapter II. Initial studies in 
the U.S.A. found that political variables had little 
effect on local policy variation. Subsequent output 
studies have been characterised by a virtual obsession 
with the question of the 'relative importance' of 
political systems and their environment. The question 
has been posed most sharply as 'does politics matter?' 
It is therefore necessary to deal with this issue prior 
to the empirical analysis of the impact of median 
voters, bureaucrats, political parties and central 
grants.
In general, output studies in the U.S.A. display
similar problems to studies in the U.K. There is scant
theoretical justification of the empirical tests or of
the specific measures of politics, the environment and
policies. Therefore, the focus on the relative
importance of political variables has been a little
(41)
premature. Chapter II argues that the results
for the relative impact of the environment and politics 
reveal more about the methods of output studies than
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the substance of local policy variation. To a large 
extent, the results simply depend on the ratio of 
political to environmental variables in each study.
In one sense the answer to the question 'does politics
matter?' is straightforward. Public policies literally
cannot be produced in the absence of politics. The
outcomes and impact of resource allocation may be
produced by either market systems or political
(42)
syterns. However, only political systems can
produce policy outputs. It is the authoritative 
allocation of resources by political institutions which 
gives public policies their distinctive character.
Thus the conceptualisation of policy outputs as the 
product of a political process implies that 'politics 
matters' in the most fundamental sense.
However, the inherently political nature of the 
production of policy outputs does not mean that only 
politics matters. Therefore, it may be possible to 
investigate the relative importance of specific 
political and environmental variables within a general 
political model. Chapter II outlines a framework which 
may ultimately be applied to this issue, if political
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variables are tested in a comprehensive model of local 
policy variation which also incorporates economic, 
geographic and social variables. Thus, valid estimates 
of the relative importance of specific variables 
depends on developments in several disciplines. The 
potential contribution of political variables to a more 
comprehensive explanation*of policy outputs is explored 
in chapters III to VII. In particular, the relative 
validity of rational choice and party government 
theories of local policy making is investigated.
Chapters III and IV examine the validity of rational 
choice models of local policy variation. The analyses 
in these chapters constitute the first empirical 
application of rational choice theory in the field of 
output studies. In the light of the discussion of 
rational choice theory in the first section of this 
chapter, the roles of both median voters and 
bureaucrats are examined.
In chapter III the impact of median voters on local 
policy outputs is evaluated. The concept of median 
voter interests is operationalised and tested within 
the context of a model of variations in local tax
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decisions. The specific hypothesis tested is that the 
tax payments of median voters are negatively related to 
the increase in local rate levels. The empirical 
analysis in chapter III also incorporates a test of the 
mediative effect of inter-party competition. The 
particular issue which is considered is whether party 
competition strengthens the relationship between median 
voter interests and policy outputs.
In chapter IV the validity of the bureaucratic power 
model is evaluated. Two operationalisations of the 
concept of bureaucratic power are derived and tested 
within the context of a model of variations in local 
staffing policies. The specific hypothesis tested is 
that bureaucratic power is positively related to the 
increase in local staffing levels.
Chapters V to VII assess the impact of party government 
on local policy variation.
Following the discussion of the party government model 
in section 1 above, the roles of both national and 
local political systems are examined, and both the 
additive and mediative effects of local politics are
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evaluated.
In chapter V the validity of the 'output 
disaggregation' hypothesis is investigated. This 
hypothesis suggests that local party politics has more 
impact on sub-service expenditures than on aggregate 
service expenditures. The rationale for this view is 
that total spending on a service is an 'accounting 
abstraction' rather than a substantive political 
issue. The real focus of political conflict, it is 
argued, is at the concrete level of particular 
components of services.
In chapters VI and VII the impact of local party 
control is measured. Both the additive and mediative 
effects of party politics are examined in these 
chapters. The impact of party control on local 
economic policies is tested in chapter VI. The 
specific hypotheses tested are that the scale of 
economic intervention is influenced positively by 
Labour control and negatively by Conservative control. 
In chapter VII the impact of party control on changes 
in total spending is measured. The empirical analysis 
in this chapter tests the effect of both current party 
control and recent changes in party control.
40
The test of the party government model in chapter VII 
encompasses not only local but also central 
government. The relationship between central 
government grants and local policy outputs is 
investigated. The impact of different types of grants 
is measured within the context of a simultaneous 
equations model of local expenditure change. The 
specific hypotheses tested are that matching grants 
stimulate local spending and that lump sum grants 
substitute for local spending.
Chapter VIII analyses the implications of the empirical 
evidence. The overall quality of the evidence is 
assessed and then conclusions are drawn on the validity 
of the party government and rational choice models. 
Finally, the utility of the output studies approach to 
the explanation of local policy variation is 
reappraised.
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Review Article: Theory, Methodology and Results 
in Political Science -  The Case of Output Studies
G E O R G E  A . B O Y N E *
This review evaluates the success of output studies in explaining intra­
national variation in the policies of local governments. Output studies address 
the central question of political science: why do different governments adopt 
different policies? It is therefore important to examine the contribution of 
output studies to our understanding of the reasons for policy variation and the 
role of politics within the relevant causal processes.
The review has three specific objectives. The first is to map the develop­
ment of output studies research, the broad approach of which has been to 
explain local output variation in terms of the characteristics of political 
systems and their environment. The relative importance of environmental 
and political effects may be considered to fall between two positions. Firstly, 
it may be that members of the political system are so constrained by 
environmental conditions that no capacity to influence outputs remains. Such 
environmental determinism states that ‘force of circumstance’ dictates policy 
content. Secondly, it may be that members of the political system possess 
total autonomy to translate their preferences into policy outputs. Such 
political determinism states that dominant values dictate policy content 
regardless of environmental conditions. The results of most output studies 
support models of policy making which resemble environmental determinism 
rather than political determinism. In  particular, early research in the United 
States found that output variation was largely the product of environmental 
rather than political conditions, as measured by the strength of statistical 
relationships.1 The relatively weak effects established for political variables 
provoked controversy within American political science over issues such as 
‘politics versus economics’ and ‘does politics matter?’ However, if the results 
of early output studies struck American political scientists with ‘near panic’2 
then British political scientists have been ‘struck’ by near apathy. The first 
two such studies of British local government outputs were published in 1969 
and since then only a further seventeen have appeared.3
The second objective of this review is to analyse the relationship between
* Department of Business and Administrative Studies, Polytechnic of Wales, Pontypridd. I  
am grateful to Rudolf Klein and to the Journal’s two anonymous referees for comments which 
improved an earlier version of this article.
1 For details of these results see Table 3.
2 T . R. Dye, Policy Analysis (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1978).
3 See Appendix B. O f this total of nineteen studies, nine stem from discipline bases other than 
political science -  five from economics, two from geography and two from social administration. 
O f the remaining ten studies, four are by American political scientists.
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theory, methodology and results in output studies. Critiques of British work 
mirror their American counterparts' concern with the ‘improvement’ of 
results for political variables.4 However, the concern to operationalize 
political variables in a form which ‘captures their full effect’ has been at the 
expense of a broader concern with issues of theory and methodology. In these 
respects output studies are light on ideas and heavy on numbers which add up 
to very little. Most of the statistical results are unreliable because they are the 
product of testing models which are inconsistent with the underlying political 
theory. The critical dependence of results on the methodology used is not, of 
course, an issue unique to output studies5 and this element of the review 
therefore has broader relevance to other areas of political science. Output 
studies research provides a particularly useful context for the analysis of the 
relationship between theory, methodology and results because of the large 
number of studies and the sustained use of the approach over three decades.
The third objective of the review is to indicate how output studies can be 
developed and applied more effectively as a method of explaining variations 
in local government policies. In order to improve the theory and methodology 
of output studies a more fundamental change is required than the simple 
respecification of political variables within the traditional framework. It is 
necessary to step outside the ‘environment versus politics’ paradigm by 
adopting a theoretical framework based on the causal p r io r ity  o f  p o litics . It  
has been argued that ‘there is an urgent need for developing a general 
theoretical framework in which future output research can be undertaken’.6 
The need is urgent, but it is not necessary to d evelop  such a framework. 
Rather it is necessary to return to an existing  framework: the systems model 
of David Easton.7 The return to Easton’s model involves ‘drawing back to
4 The major American critiques which show this concern are P. B. Coulter, ‘Comparative 
Community Politics and Public Policy’, Polity, in (1968), 22-43; J. H . Fenton and D . 
Chamberlayne, ‘The Literature Dealing with the Relationships Between Political Processes, 
Socio-Economic Conditions and Public Policies in the American States: A  Bibliographic Essay’, 
Polity, iv (1969), 1388-404; J. Jacob and K. Lipsky, ‘Outputs, Structure and Power: An 
Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics’, Journal o f  Politics, xxx (1968), 
61-82; S. Rakoff and G. Schaeffer, ‘Politics, Policy and Political Science: Theoretical Alterna­
tives’, Politics and Society, 1 (1970), 51-77; J. M. Munns, ‘The Environment, Politics and Policy 
Literature: A  Critique and Reformulation’, Western Political Quarterly, xxvm (1975), 646-67. 
British critiques which show the same concern are D . N. King ‘Why Do Local Authority Rate 
Poundages Differ’, Public Administration, l i  (1973), 165-73; J. E. A lt, ‘Politics and Expenditure 
Models’, Policy and Politics, v (1977), 83-92; K. Newton and L. J. Sharpe, ‘Local Outputs 
Research: Some Reflections and Proposals’, Policy and Politics, v (1977), 61-82. The most recent 
British work states that an ‘overriding objective has been to restore in output research the status 
of the political party’ (Sharpe and Newton, see Appendix B).
5 See J. P. Geise, ‘Theory Construction and Political Inquiry’, Canadian Journal o f  Political 
Science, ix (1976), 626-53.
6 Newton and Sharpe, ‘Local Outputs Research’, p. 79.
7 D . Easton, The Political System (New York: A . Knopf, 1953); ‘An Approach to the Analysis 
of Political Systems’, World Politics, ix (1957), 383-400; A Framework for Political Analysis 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); A Systems Analysis o f  Political Life (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1979).
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leap forward’ which, it has been argued, is characteristic of both scientific and 
biological evolution: ‘in certain circumstances evolution can retrace its steps, 
as it were, along the path which led to the dead end, and make a fresh start in 
a new, more promising direction’.* In this case the ‘drawing back’ is to the 
principles of Easton's model which clearly assert the causal priority of 
politics. The ‘leap forward' is to a methodology which directly applies 
Easton’s model to the explanation of policy outputs.
The structure of the review is as follows:
Section I examines Dawson and Robinson’s landmark study of the determi­
nants of variations in welfare policies in the American states.9 This merits 
close attention as the first published10 study of intra-national policy variation 
from a political science perspective which evaluated statistically the relative 
importance of environmental and political variables. The Dawson and 
Robinson article is used as a reference point for the next four sections which 
examine subsequent developments in output studies in the United States and 
Britain.11 Section I I  examines Easton’s systems framework which forms the 
implicit theoretical base of many output studies. Those elements of Easton’s 
framework which are of particular importance for the causal modelling of 
policy outputs are highlighted. Section I I I  examines the conceptualization 
and measurement of political, environmental and policy variables. Section IV  
examines the form of the models specified in output studies and the statistical 
techniques used to estimate the relative importance of environmental and 
political variables and their combined explanatory power. Section V  
examines the results of output studies in the context of the theoretical 
and methodological issues raised in previous sections.
Only studies which test the effect of both  environmental and political 
variables are considered in this discussion. A  large number of econometric 
analyses of expenditure variation have been undertaken, both prior and 
subsequent to the advent of output studies in political science.12 The omission
8 A. Koestler, The Ghost in the Machine (London: Pan, 1975).
9 Dawson and Robinson, see Appendix A .
10 J. H . Fenton claims that he is the unheralded pathbreaker in this field. See Fenton and 
Chamberlayne, ‘The Literature Dealing with the Relationships Between Political Processes’ , 
p. 389. Others could claim to have been performing output studies without knowing it -  see, for 
example, Hawley, Appendix A.
11 On output studies in Europe see M. Aiken and R. Depre, ‘The Urban System, Politics and 
Policies in Belgian Cities’, in K. Newton, ed., Urban Political Economy (London: Frances Pinter, 
1981). On Canada see D . Falcone and W . Mishler, ‘Legislative Determinants of Provincial 
Health Policy in Canada’ , Journal o f Politics, ixl (1977), 345-67; D. H. Poel, ‘The Diffusion of 
Legislation among the Canadian Provinces: A  Statistical Analysis’, Canadian Journal o f  Political 
Science, ix (1976), 604-26. On Israel see E. Torgovnik, ‘Local Policy Determinants in a Centrist 
System’, Publius, vn (1977), 61-84, and ‘Central Aid and Local Policy’, Public Finance 
Quarterly, vi (1978), 211-39.
12 See J. W. Foley, A Comparative Study o f the Determinants o f Public Policies (Cornell 
University, Program in Urban and Regional Studies, Occasional Paper 9.) For a discussion of 
studies of output variation in Britain which do not include political variables see K. Newton, 
‘Community Performance in Britain’, Current Sociology, xxiv (1976), 49-86.
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of political variables means that this econometric literature is of little 
theoretical interest. However several methodological points of relevance to 
the politometric13 analysis of output variation are contained within it and are 
noted where appropriate.
I .  D A W S O N  A N D  R OB I N S O N
Dawson and Robinson's analysis of influences on state welfare expenditures is 
frequently cited as a ‘pathbreaker’ in output studies. Hofferbert argues that 
the article had three major effects.14 Firstly, it demonstrated the potential for 
hypotheses to be tested on a comparative basis across sub-national units of 
government. Secondly, it questioned the relevance of variables traditionally 
believed to be important within political science. Thirdly, it increased 
awareness of the importance of the socio-economic context of the policy 
process. In sum, Dawson and Robinson not only established local output 
variation as an issue for political science research but also set the tone in the 
field by raising the question of the relative importance of environmental and 
political variables. It is therefore important to examine their theory, meth­
odology and results.
T h eo ry
Dawson and Robinson's analysis was prefaced by a brief discussion of 
Easton’s systems framework. However the application of the framework was 
not an explicit concern and did not inform their analysis. Rather their initial 
concern was to test the ‘Key/Lockard’ hypothesis that inter-party competi­
tion (IPC ) is positively related to policies which are favourable to lower 
income groups. The hypothesis is based on the argument that in competitive 
party systems politicians must seek the lower class vote in order to gain/keep 
office.I? Dawson and Robinson tested this hypothesis statistically on a cross 
sectional basis. However this was not the most novel aspect of their analysis. 
Rather their major innovation was to take the additional step of testing 
whether the relationship between IPC and outputs is spurious by controlling 
for environmental conditions which might cause both.
P o lit ic a l, e n v iro n m e n ta l a n d  p o lic y  variab les. To operationalize the political 
system the level of IPC within each state was measured.16 To operationalize 
the environment Dawson and Robinson measured per capita income, indus-
13 The term is from G. Hilton, Intermediate Politometrics (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1976).
14 R. I. Hofferbert. ‘State and Community Policy Studies’, in J. A. Robinson, ed.. Political 
Science Annual Volume III (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1972) •
15 The hypothesis rests on a number of assumptions about the composition and values of the 
electorate and the behaviour of politicians. These assumptions have been given detailed 
consideration in the rational choice literature. See Brian Barry, Sociologists, Economists and 
Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). ,
16 IPC is specified by averaging three measures of majority party success over a 21-year period: 
percentage of votes for the governor, percentage of state senate seats and percentage of state 
house seats.
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trialization and urbanization in each state. They noted that each environmen­
tal variable measures ‘a complex of factors’17 and is, in effect, not a single 
indicator but a ‘background variable’ which picks up elements of a variety of 
conditions. Only per capita income was used in the test of the relative 
importance of the environment and politics. However, given Dawson and 
Robinson’s argument that per capita income reflects a number of dimensions 
of the environment the dice already seem to be loaded against the single 
dimension of the political system, IPC. To operationalize ‘policy’ four tax and 
five expenditure levels were used to measure ‘welfare policies which redistri­
bute wealth’ . Only three of these were used as dependent variables in testing 
the relative importance of the environment and politics: education expendi­
ture per pupil, unemployment benefit per recipient and old age assistance per 
recipient.
M o d e l specification  a n d  statistical technique. No explicit formal model of the 
relationship between the variables was specified prior to the statistical tests. 
The statistical technique used to evaluate the relative importance of the 
environment and politics was partial correlation of the rank order scores of 
the states on each variable. Partial correlations were computed between IPC  
and expenditures controlling for per capita income and between per capita 
income and expenditures controlling for IPC.
Cnudde and McCrone18 have argued that these partial correlations may be 
interpreted as intending to distinguish between three formal models. The first 
is the ‘development sequence’ model:
In this model the environment shapes the political system but has no direct or 
independent effect on outputs. The political system, however, has such a 
direct and independent effect. The statistical criterion of support for this 
model is that a control for IPC eradicates the effect of per capita income, 
yielding a partial correlation between per capita income and expenditures 
which is insignificant.
The second model is the ‘spurious’ model:
In this model the environment both shapes the political system and directly 
affects outputs while the political system has no independent effect. The 
statistical criterion of support for this model is that a control for per capita
17 Dawson and Robinson, p. 280, Appendix A . Problems of employing such background 
variables in statistical analysis are discussed in H . M . Blalock, Causal Inferences in Non- 
Experimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964).










income eradicates the effect of IPC, yielding a partial correlation between 
IPC and expenditures, which is insignificant.




Environment------------------------------------  ► outputs
In this model the environment both shapes the political system and directly 
affects outputs while the political system also has a direct effect on outputs. 
The statistical criterion of support for this model is that a control for either 
independent variable does not eradicate the effect of the other.
Results. Dawson and Robinson found strong zero-order correlations between 
per capita income and IPC, per capita income and expenditures, and IPC and 
expenditures. The control for per capita income greatly reduced, but did not 
eradicate, the correlation between IPC and expenditures. The control for IPC  
slightly reduced the correlation between per capita income and expenditures. 
Thus the results indicate that the effect of per capita income outweighs that of 
IPC. Dawson and Robinson draw a suitably circumspect conclusion: ‘the 
evidence points to the relatively greater influence of certain external condi­
tions over one aspect of the political process in the formulation of selected 
policies’ .19
Other early studies are careful to note that their results simply indicate that 
environmental variables are more important than political variables for 
specific outputs. However subsequent interpretations of these early studies 
have mistakenly stated that controls for environmental variables caused 
political effects to d is a p p e a r.20 This has added unnecessary heat to the 
‘environment versus politics’ issue in output studies and has drawn attention 
away from more fundamental questions of theory and methodology.
Dawson and Robinson’s results are consistent with the ‘hybrid’ model 
because they show that both the environment and politics affect outputs. 
However the basis of their evaluation of the relative importance of the 
environment and politics means that it is yet a fourth model which underlies 






It is this model which is implicit in their conclusions because they evaluate the 
relative importance of IPC and per capita income on the basis only of their
19 Dawson and Robinson, p. 289, Appendix A.
20 For example Cowart, Fry and Winters, Baer and Jaros, Appendix A .
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direct effects on expenditures. The in d ire c t effect of the environment on 
outputs, which operates through the political system in the hybrid model, is 
ignored.
It is essential in discussing output studies to make the implicit direct effects 
model explicit. For this model underlies most of the results which indicate the 
relative importance of environmental and political variables, and their com­
bined explanatory power, both in the United States and Britain. However 
the model is quite inconsistent with Easton’s systems theory, not only because 
it omits the indirect effect of the environment but also because it includes 
a direct effect of the environment on outputs. It is argued below that the 
use of this implicit model is a primary cause of the invalidity of the statistical 
results in output studies.
I I .  T H E O R Y
Many output studies are, at least implicitly, intended to operationalize 
Easton’s systems framework. However it has often been noted that the 
framework does not properly underpin the statistical analyses but is ‘merely 
an appendage’.21 No other ‘general’ theory has been used in place of Easton’s 
as a base in output studies. While a number of ‘partial’ theories have 
underpinned the use of particular political variables in specific studies22 the 
atheoretical nature of most studies is reflected in ad  h oc  hypotheses or in a 
complete absence of hypotheses and explanations of results. There may be 
advantages in testing hypotheses on an a d  h o c  or even on a ‘counterinductive’ 
basis.23 However to test for relationships between variables on n o  basis 
w hatsoever is indefensible. In the absence of a theoretical context the results 
are literally meaningless.
The general characteristics of Easton’s model are so well known that a 
lengthy discussion here is unnecessary.24 The basic form of the model is shown • 




Decis ions  
or policies
D politicalQ.
S u pports system
Feedback -------------------
Fig. i. The basic systems model
21 See American critiques in footnote 4.
22 See discussion of political variables in Section I I I  below.
23 P. Feyerabend, Against Method (London: Verso, 1975).
24 A  useful summary of the concepts and their inter-relationship is provided in P. Hall, H. 
Land, R. Parker and A . Webb, Change, Choice and Conflict in Social Policy (London: Heinemann, 
1976). For more critical discussion see J. D. Astin, ‘Easton I and Easton I I ’ , Western Political
Quarterly, iv (1972), 726-38; P. Leslie, ‘General Theory in Political Science: A  Critique of
Easton’s Systems Theory’, British Journal o f  Political Science, n (1972), 155-72; J. S. Sozarno, 
‘David Easton and The Invisible Hand’, American Political Science Review, lxix (1975), 91-106.
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The following five elements of the model as initially outlined and subsequent­
ly developed are of particular relevance to output studies.
(1 ) A  T h e o ry  o f  P o lic y  D e te rm in a tio n ?
Easton states that the model is not ‘a theory in the full blown sense of the 
term’ but simply a ‘conceptual structure’.25 Therefore the model ‘will not help 
us to understand why any specific  policies are adopted’.26 The general form in 
which Easton presents this ‘conceptual structure’ reflects his concern with a 
question which is more fundamental than the outputs of particular systems: 
‘How does it come about that any kind of system can persist at all, even under 
the pressure of frequent or constant crises?’27 This he regards as the ‘central 
problem of empirical political theory’.28 However, while the model yields no 
testable hypotheses in its general form it does posit causal relationships 
between three categories of variable: the environment, the political system 
and policies. The model thereby indicates that the sources of public policy are 
the characteristics of the environment and the internal characteristics of the 
political system. If  the relevant environmental and political characteristics are 
located and measured then the model can be operationalized to test hypoth­
eses concerning the determinants of specific policies. Further, the very 
generality of Easton’s model allows great flexibility in the type of variables 
used in output studies. A  major advantage of the systems framework is that 
while it provides a theoretical ordering for general categories of variable, it 
does not precondition the selection of independent variables towards any 
specific environmental or political influences. This flexibility can be con­
trasted favourably with ‘partial’ theories of policy determination which test 
specific variables in isolation (e.g. incrementalism, rational choice theories of 
party and bureaucratic behaviour). When the systems framework is specified 
in an appropriate statistical model the variables assumed to be important by 
these partial theories can be tested while controlling for other influences on 
policies.
(2 ) T h e  B o u n d a ry  B etw een  the E n v iro n m e n t a n d  the P o lit ic a l System
I f  the environmental and political determinants of policies are to be identified 
and their relative importance evaluated then it is necessary to distinguish 
clearly between the two categories of variable. However, there is some 
ambiguity in Easton’s work concerning the distinction between the environ­
ment and the political system. Without entering a discussion of ‘What Easton 
Really Said’, it is important to clarify this point so that effects may be 
attributed to the appropriate category of variable.
25 A Systems Analysis o f  Political Life, Preface xiv.
26 A  Framework for Political Analysis, p. 89 (emphasis added).
27 A  Systems Analysis o f  Political Life, Preface xiv.
28 A  Systems Analysis o f  Political Life, Preface xiv.
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Firstly, Easton’s diagrammatic presentation of the model (Figure 1) and 
some written passages29 imply that demands and supports are outside the 
system and, by definition, in the environment.
Secondly, however, Easton’s definition of politics states that demands and 
supports are w ith in  the system. Easton defines politics as activity directed 
towards influencing public policy ( ‘the authoritative allocation of values’). A  
political system therefore consists of all those activities which ‘bear some 
relevance to the way in which policy for a society is created and effectuated’.30
Under this definition demands and supports are clearly part of the system 
itself.
Passages which imply that demands and supports are external to the system 
may simply be the result of imprecision in the use of terms in the course of 
Easton’s lengthy elaboration of the model. Since the definition of politics 
provides the more precise interpretation of the location of demands and 
supports it seems more appropriate to attribute their effects to the political 
rather than the environmental category.
(3 ) T he  R e la tio n s h ip  B etw een  the E n v iro n m e n t a n d  P o lic y  O utp uts
In Easton’s model the effect of all environmental conditions or ‘events’ is 
mediated by the political system. Information about the environment is 
communicated to policy makers through the two ‘summary variables’ of 
demands and supports.31 Thus in order to influence outputs environmental 
conditions must first be incorporated within inputs. It  is inputs which ‘bridge 
the gap between the political and non-political sectors of life and . . .  are 
therefore also vital for helping us to understand the way in which transforma­
tions in one affect the other’.32
(4 ) T h e  A  u to n o m y  o f  the System  f r o m  the E n v iro n m e n t
Easton argues that the political system is an ‘open’ system and that environ­
mental events therefore ‘shape the conditions under which the members of 
the system must act’.33 However, the political mediation of environmental 
conditions noted in Section (3) above indicates that members of the system 
are autonomous from their environment. ‘Members of a political system need 
not sit back . . .  to accept stress supinely, through some mechanistically 
conceived way of adapting to changes taking place in the environment.’34
Therefore, while the environment may provide constraints and opportuni­
ties there is no necessary direct connection between environmental conditions
29 See, for example, the passage quoted from A  Systems Analysis o f  Political Life, p. 133, in the 
discussion of ‘The Autonomy of the Authorities’ below.
30 The Political System, p. 158.
31 A Systems Analysis o f Political Life, pp. 25-7.
32 A  Systems Analysis o f  Political Life, p. 53.
33 A  Systems Analysis o f  Political Life, p. 18.
34 A  Framework for Political Analysis, p. 99.
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and the behaviour of members of the system. By extension, there is no 
necessary indirect connection between environmental conditions and policy 
outputs through the behaviour of members of the system.
(5 ) T he  A u to n o m y  o f  the A u th o ritie s  f ro m  D e m a n d s  a n d  Supports
In a manner similar to that in which environmental conditions are mediated 
by the political system, inputs are mediated by the authorities. Easton argues 
that ‘Demands and Supports can be moulded to the purposes and desires of 
members of the system to the extent that knowledge, resources and inclina­
tion permit’.35 Thus policy makers can be autonomous from demands and 
supports. This autonomy is revealed in the ‘conversion process’ during which 
‘Demands just do not suddenly become transformed into outputs nor are they 
just inexplicably blocked’.36 In addition to their capacity to ‘mould’ inputs 
policy makers possess further autonomy. This stems from their capacity to 
influence policies in d epen den tly  of the characteristics of demands and sup­
ports. Easton refers to this independent activity of policy makers as 
‘withinputs’ .37
Properties 3-5 noted above are taken here as untestable assumptions or 
‘axioms’.38 For example, the assumption that environmental conditions 
cannot of themselves produce policies is not directly testable. However, from 
these axioms specific testable hypotheses may be deduced, for example:
(a )  political systems which possess similar internal characteristics but face 
different environmental conditions will produce different policies;
(b )  political systems which possess different internal characteristics but face 
similar environmental conditions will produce different policies;
(c) political systems which possess similar internal characteristics and face 
similar environmental conditions will produce similar policies.
Such testable hypotheses which can be deduced from Easton’s theory are at 
the heart of output studies. However, elements of this theory have often been
35 A Framework for Political Analysis, p. 133.
36 A Systems Analysis o f  Political Life, p. 72.
37 A Systems Analysis o f Political Life, p. 389. It is important to note that the ‘relative 
autonomy’ variant of Marxist theory refers to a conception of autonomy which is different from 
that outlined here. Relative autonomy concerns freedom of state action only from the short-term 
political constraints imposed by ‘fractions of capital’ who fail, unlike state policy makers, to see 
the long-term interests of capital as a whole. (To the extent that state policy makers are not 
consciously omniscient then some ‘true unconsciousness’ must presumably be at work.) However, 
the state possesses no such relative autonomy from the long-term ‘structural requirements’ of 
capital. For a discussion of state autonomy in general and the Marxist concept of relative 
autonomy in particular see A . E. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy o f  the Democratic State 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981). For a crude Marxist application of the 
relative autonomy concept at the local level see C. Cockburn, The Local State (London: Pluto 
Press, 1977).
38 On the role of axioms in the development of theories see H . M . Blalock, Theory 
Construction (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1969).
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omitted or badly distorted when it has been operationalized in empirical 
analyses of policy determinants.
Echoes of the discordant relationship between theory and methodology in 
output studies are loudest in the repeated criticisms of studies, such as 
Dawson and Robinson, which claim to find a direct effect of the environment 
on policies. As noted in Section I, Dawson and Robinson’s analysis includes a 
brief discussion of Easton’s model. However their interpretation of the results 
from the implicit ‘direct effects’ model is inconsistent with Easton’s model 
which states that the influence of environmental conditions is only indirect, 
through the medium of political actions which interpret and respond to such 
conditions.39 In short, environmental reality is politically constructed;40 there 
are no environmental ‘facts’ which inexorably determine policy outputs.
In interpreting their statistical result which shows a direct effect Dawson 
and Robinson simply state that in addition to an indirect effect through the 
political system, environmental variables ‘might also affect policy directly, 
w ith o u t be in g  m e d ia te d  by process variab les ' .41 This is an unfortunate phrase 
which expresses an idea that is not tenable in the context of Easton’s model. It  
is also an idea which has been seized upon repeatedly by critics who berate 
output studies for failing to explain h o w  environmental conditions effect 
outputs.42 However, these critics have simultaneously overemphasized this 
point while offering no practical suggestion for the construction of statistical 
models which omit the direct effect.
Too much has been made of the point because, in contrast to Dawson and 
Robinson, many studies offer some substantive political explanation for the 
direct statistical relationship between the environment and policies. For 
example it has been argued that the apparent direct link indicates that the 
‘conversion process’ operates to a similar effect in all systems.43 Dye argues
39 Similar arguments are contained in other areas of political theory. For example, Schatt- 
schneider argues that the definition of conditions as ‘issues' of legitimate relevance to political 
action is ‘the supreme instrument of power’. See E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign 
People (New York: Holt, Rinehart &  Winston, 1964). This argument has also been prominent 
in the recent boom in ‘values’ literature. See, for example, K. Young, ‘Values in the Policy 
Process’, Policy and Politics, v (1977), 1-22. An early application of the values perspective in 
output studies is Elau and Eyestone, Appendix A . The perspective has been developed most 
explicitly in the context of output studies by T. Hansen, ‘Transforming Needs into Expenditure 
Decisions’ in Newton, ed., Urban Political Economy.
However, while Hansen departs from this point he arrives at very different conclusions from 
this discussion. Hansen specifies a model analogous to that considered in the discussion of the 
estimation of interaction effects through sub-groups in Section IV  below.
40 The phrase is adapted from T. Berger and K. Luckman, The Social Construction o f  Reality 
(New York: Doubleday, 1966). For a more specific application of their argument to the 
relationship between organizations and their environment see D. Silverman, The Theory o f  
Organisations (London: Heinemann, 1970).
41 Dawson and Robinson, p. 266, Appendix A  (emphasis added).
42 See American critiques in footnote 4.
43 Dye (b), Appendix A; Grumm, Appendix A ; R. I. Hofferbert, ‘Ecological Development 
and Policy Change in the American States’, Mid-Western Journal o f  Political Science, x (1966), 
464-83; and ‘Elite Influence in State Policy Formation’, Polity, u (1970), 316-44.
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that even where the statistical results indicate that the direct environment- 
policy link is more important than the politics-policy link ‘public policy is still 
formulated through the political system, but . . .  the character of that system 
does not independently influence policy outcomes’.44 An alternative inter­
pretation of the direct statistical relationship which has been offered is that 
the environmental variables are proxy measures of inputs.45 This interpreta­
tion removes the whole basis of the environment versus politics controversy 
because all variables are designated as political. When environmental vari­
ables are conceptualized in this way it is inputs which are interpreted as being 
mediated in a uniform way across all political systems. However studies which 
advocate46 or adopt47 this formulation imply an ‘input determinism’ which is 
as unacceptable as the environmental determinism which they seek to 
displace. A  direct effect for inputs is no more consistent with Easton’s theory 
than is a direct effect for the environment.
Both of the above interpretations of the direct effect of the environment on 
outputs seek to rationalize the statistical results. In effect, the statistical 
results have been taken to imply that there m ust be some substantive 
interpretation consistent with the conclusion that environmental variables are 
more important than political variables. It  is a nice example of the tail chasing 
which follows if statistical techniques lead theory rather than vice versa. 
Several critiques have sought to re-establish the primacy of theory in output 
studies. However they have failed to suggest how the direct effect of the 
environment can be dealt with in practical model building in a way which is 
theoretically intelligible. For example Rackoff and Schaeffer and Munns48 
expend considerable effort in discussing the theoretical relationships between 
concepts in a format which is remarkably reminiscent of Easton. However, 
both are silent on how their ideas can be converted into a formal statistical 
model. Had they proceeded along this route they might have recognized that 
the direct environment-policy link is a product of specification error. Only 
Cnudde and McCrone and Swant have hinted that the direct effect in 
statistical results is nonsense and that post h o c  rationalizations of its existence
44 Dye (b), p. 5, Appendix A.
45 Dye (c). Appendix A. This approach is also used by O. A . Davies, ‘Empirical Evidence of 
Political Influences upon the Expenditure Policies of Public Schools’ , in J. Margolis, ed., The 
Public Economy o f  Urban Communities (Washington, D.C.: Resources of the Future Inc., 1965) 
and O. A . Davies and C. H. Haines, ‘A  Political Approach to a Theory of Public Expenditure: 
The Case of Municipalities', National Tax Journal. xix (1966), 259-75. O n *he dangers of 
inferring attitudinal and behavioural characteristics from socio-economic data see J. Obler, ‘The 
Dubious Link Between Democratic Politics and Redistributive Fiscal Policies' in T. R. Dye and 
V. Gray, eds. The Determinants o f Public Policy (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington, 1980).
^See R. K. Godwin and W. B. Shepard, ‘Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A  
Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government’, American Political Science 
Review, lx x (i9 7 6 ), 1127-35;!. Stonecash,'Assessing the Roles of Politics and Wealth for Public 
Policy', Political Methodology, vi (1979), 463-83.
47 Stonecash and Hayes, Appendix A.
48 Rackoff and Schaeffer, ‘Politics, Policy and Political Science: Theoretical Alternatives’; 
Munns. ‘The Environment, Politics and Policy Literature: A  Critique and Reformulation’.
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evade the fundamental issue of how to specify a model which is consistent 
with theory and therefore does not include this direct effect.49 The form of 
statistical model which is required to reflect Easton’s theory is shown in 
Section IV .
I I I .  P O L I T I C A L ,  E N V I R O N M E N T A L  A N D  P OL I CY V A R I A B L E S
Developments in variable selection and specification following Dawson and 
Robinson can be seen in part as a quest for the impact of politics. While Dye’s 
argument concerning ‘panic responses’ is overstated there was certainly some 
embarrassing floundering in the wake of results suggesting that environmental 
effects outweighed political effects. For example, Lockard first attempted to 
refute output studies results by reference to isolated case studies and finally 
resorted to anecdotal evidence from his ‘own intermittent [political] activity 
in Connecticut’.50 Researchers operating within the output studies approach 
have concentrated their efforts on the operationalization of politics and 
policies. By contrast the operationalization of the environment and questions 
of model specification and statistical techniques have received little attention.
P o lit ic a l V ariab les
Early criticisms of output studies51 attacked the use of a narrow range of 
political variables which measured only formal aspects of the political system. 
Subsequent studies have used a vast array of variables, drawing on many 
areas within political science. These variables are compressed into ten general 
and twenty-eight specific categories in Table 1. The symbol (* )  indicates in 
which studies variables have been used. The range of political variables in 
output studies is a monument to the ingenuity of American political scientists 
in quantifying political concepts. Many American output studies have either 
tested an additional political variable or respecified a political variable used 
previously. By contrast the range of political variables in British output 
studies is quite narrow. Most fall into the ‘parties and elections’ category, 
with an emphasis on aspects of Labour party power in particular.52 This 
restricted range of political variables is more reflective of research interests 
and resources in British political science than of the difficulty of applying the 
measures used in American studies to British local government. The empty 
column spaces in the British section of Table 1 constitute a research agenda in 
themselves.
49 C. F. Cnudde and D. J. McCrone, Appendix A; F. Swant, ‘Linking Theory and Method in 
Urban Policy Analysis: Problems of Test Interpretation’ , Political Methodology, iv (1977), 
333- 46.
50 D. Lockard, p. 212, Appendix A.
51 Coulter, ‘Comparative Community Politics and Public Policy’; Jacob and Lipsky, ‘Outputs, 
Structure and Power: An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics’.
52 The case for testing for a ‘party of the right’ effect has been argued by F. G. Castles and 
R. D . McKinlay, ‘Public Welfare Provision, Scandinavia and the Sheer Futility of the Sociological 
Approach to Politics’, British Journal of Political Science, ix (1979), 157-71. For tests of the effect 
of Conservative/Independent variables in Britain see Sharpe and Newton, Appendix B.
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Sharpe and Newton 1984
While the quantification of political concepts in output studies is impres­
sive, the way in which the variables specified have been used is much less so. 
It is unusual to find a discussion of why any particular political variable is 
expected to be related to a specific output. For example, the most commonly 
used variable in American output studies, IPC, is tested without considera­
tion of whether parties actually compete on the policy area under 
consideration.53 A similar a d  hoc  approach is evident in ‘fishing expeditions’
53 The best critiques o f the use o f IPC in output studies are D. R iley, 'Party Competition and 
State Policy Making: The Need for a Re-examination’ , Western Political Quarterly, xx iv  ( 1971), 
510-13, and E. T. Jennings (a). Appendix A . Debates concerning the conceptualization and 
measurement o f other political variables are few. Readers interested in particular variables 
should refer to the studies indicated under the variable headings in Table I.
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which cast a wide net of political variables in the hope of catching some 
outputs. For example, Cho and Frederickson54 begin with forty-two political 
variables, ultimately selecting the ‘best’ six on the basis of a statistical 
criterion. Unhappily, this approach has recently spread to Britain.55 More 
broadly, the atheoretical basis of the selection of political variables is 
reflected in the absence of consideration of the structure of relationships 
amongst them. Measures of inputs, the structure of the political system, and 
policy makers’ behaviour have all been crammed in alongside one another, all 
competing for a significant place in the direct effects model.
E n v iro n m e n ta l V ariab les
The range of environmental variables in output studies is even wider than the 
range of political variables. Dimensions of the environment operationalized 
in American studies include geographic conditions (e.g. region,56 land area), 
demographic conditions (e.g. size and age composition of population), 
economic conditions (e.g. size and composition of tax base, employment, 
type of local economy, income inequality) and social conditions (e.g. class, 
race, religion,57 education). The range of environmental variables in British 
studies has been only slightly narrower, culled largely from census data.
The use of environmental variables has been even more a d  h oc  than the use 
of political variables. Presence in an official publication almost guarantees 
output studies status for a measure of an environmental condition. Again, 
fishing expeditions are not uncommon and.it is normal to see the same 
environmental variables tested regardless of the output. For example, Dye 
tests the same four environmental variables on f i f ty - fo u r  different outputs.58 
This approach has also been used in British studies.59 However there is some 
tendency for more recent American studies to be more specific in their 
variable selection and more explicit in their hypotheses, for example, testing 
pollution level on anti-pollution expenditures and energy consumption on 
energy conservation policies.60
The selection of appropriate environmental variables is an aspect of output 
studies which has been badly neglected. It  seems likely that more careful
54 Y . H . Cho and G. Frederickson (a), Appendix A .
55 L. J. Sharpe and K. Newton, Appendix B.
56 There has been some debate about whether region should be used as an environmental or as 
a political variable. See I. Sharkansky, ‘Regionalism, Economic Status and the Public Policies of 
American States’, Southwestern Social Science Quarterly (1968), 9-26. Two recent examples of 
the explicit use of region as a political variable are R. Hanson ‘The Content of Welfare Policy: 
The States and Aid to Familes with Dependent Children’, Journal o f  Politics, x l v  (1983), 771-85; 
L. Sigelman, D . Lowery and R. Smith, ‘The Tax Revolt: A  Comparative State Analysis’, Western 
Political Quarterly, xxxvi (1983), 30-51.
57 Religion has also been used as a measure of political culture. See Hutcheson and Taylor, 
Fairbanks (a) and (b), Appendix A .
58 Dye (b), Appendix A .
59 See Danziger, Sharpe and Newton, Appendix B.
60 Lester, Regens, Perry, Appendix A .
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identification of environmental variables re levan t to specific outputs  would 
boost the explanatory power of the models. The blunderbuss technique of 
firing any available official statistic at every policy variable should be 
abandoned.
P o lic ies
Criticisms of the policy variables in output studies have concerned the focus 
on financial outputs61 and the absence of “multidimensional’ measures of 
policies.62
It has been frequently argued that the use of financial measures as 
dependent variables preconditions output studies results in favour of environ­
mental variables. In particular the use of total expenditure and aggregate 
functional expenditures (education, roads, welfare, etc.) as policy measures 
favours economic variables because resources are a necessary condition of 
expenditure. It has been argued that stronger political effects should be 
expected where outputs are less tied to resource availability, such as 
expenditure on sub-functions,63 redistribution of resources between social 
groups64 and ‘symbolic’ policies.6-' However, while a variety of non-financial 
outputs have been analysed, financial outputs remain the most frequently 
used dependent variables (see Table 3 below). Non-financial outputs in 
American output studies include redistribution, responsiveness, innovative­
ness and the presence or extent of particular policies, for example, anti­
pollution and energy conservation measures, employment of minorities, 
de-institutionalization of young offenders and the mentally handicapped.66 
British studies have concentrated on aggregate functional expenditures, the 
only exceptions being some sub-function expenditures, staffing levels and 
non-financial measures of housing and education outputs.67 Again, the 
restricted range of dependent variables in British output studies constitutes a 
research agenda in itself.
61 See American critiques, footnote 4.
62 E. Ostrom. ’The Need for Multiple Indicators in Measuring the Output of Public Agencies’, 
Policy Studies Journal, 11 (1973). 85-92; Munns, The Environment, Politics and Policy 
Literature: A Critique and Reformulation'. For a general review of problems in the measurement 
of'policy', see D. G. Greenberg, J. A . Miller, L. B. Mohr and B. C. Vladeck, ‘Developing Public 
Policy Theory: Perspectives from Empirical Research’, American Political Science Review, lxxi 
( 1977). >532- 43-
 ^ 63 See Ashford, Danziger, Sharpe and Newton, Appendix B; G. C. Edwards, ‘Disaggregation
in Public Policy Research’, in Dye and Gray, The Determinants o f Public Policy.
64 Fry and Winters, Appendix A.
65 J. W. Clarke, Appendix A. For a broader discussion of the importance of symbolic policies 
see M. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses o f Politics (Illinois: University of Illinois, 1964).
66 See Lester, Perry, Dye and Renick, Eisinger, Downs, Sigelman et al., Appendix A.
67 These sub-function results are analysed in G. A . Boyne, ‘Output Disaggregation and The 
Quest for the Impact of Local Politics’, Political Studies, xxxn (1984), 451-58. On staffing levels 
see Storey, Appendix B; on housing see Boaden, A lt, Appendix B; on Education see Boaden 
and Alford, Boaden, Appendix B.
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Part of the argument in favour of multidimensional measures of policy is 
that output studies should analyse the impact of policies ( ‘outcomes’). While 
several studies have included such measures amongst their dependent 
variables68 they are not to be commended for this. It has been shown that the 
correlation between outputs (measured as expenditure levels) and impact 
(measured as service quality) is very weak.69 This indicates that we are dealing 
with two quite separate dependent variables which reflect very different 
dimensions of policy. Therefore it must be emphasized that the type of 
independent variables and models necessary to explain policy impact may be 
quite different from that necessary to explain the formal policy commitments 
indicated by output measures.
In modelling policy outputs the task is to operationalize theories of policy 
formulation. By contrast, in modelling policy impact the task is to oper­
ationalize theories of implementation.70 In these latter models the outputs 
themselves constitute an element of the set of independent variables. 
Therefore it is important to specify separate models for outputs and impact. 
The inappropriate selection of measures of policy impact as dependent 
variables unnecessarily confuses the question of the utility of output studies 
models.
I V .  M O D E L  S P E C I F I C A T I O N  A N D  S T A T I S T I C A L  T E C H N I Q U E S
The most serious deficiencies in output studies concern the closely related 
problems of the absence of explicit model specification and the presence of 
inappropriate statistical techniques. Even where the above noted difficulties 
concerning political, environmental and policy variables are overcome, the 
use of inappropriate models and techniques invalidates the results obtained. 
An appreciation of these problems is therefore crucial to the interpretation of 
the statistical results discussed in Section V  below.
The analysis in this section is in three stages. The first stage discusses the 
model specification necessary to reflect Easton’s theory and the statistical 
techniques necessary to provide optimal estimates of the relative importance 
of environmental and political variables and their combined explanatory 
power. In  the second stage the implicit models which follow from the 
statistical techniques which have actually been used in output studies are 
made explicit and the implications for the validity of the statistical results are 
considered. Finally the extent to which these results can legitimately be used 
to infer causa l relationships is analysed.
68 For example, Dye (b) and (f); Thompson, Appendix A .
69 See I. Sharkansky, ‘Governmental Expenditures and Public Services in the American 
States’, American Political Science Review , lxi (1967), 1066-77; J- Christensen and G. Taylor, 
‘Determinants, Expenditures and Performance of Common Public Services’, Rural Sociology, 
XLVII (1982), 147-63.
70 Such as they are. For a review of the literature see S. Barret and C. Fudge, Policy and 
Action (London: Methuen, 1981).
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( i )  S p ec ify in g  a n d  Testing E aston 's  M o d e l
A  model which is isomorphic to Easton’s theory must be specified in a precise 
form. This form is shown in Model I where it is expressed both as a path 
diagram and as a multiple equation system.71 The political system stage in the 
causal chain is separated into 'inputs', ‘formal structure' and ‘policy makers’ . 
The model states that the effect of the environment on policies is in d ire c t, 
through inputs, formal structure and policy makers; that the effect of inputs is 
in d ire c t  through formal structure and policy makers; that the effect of formal 
structure is in d ire c t through policy makers; and that only policy makers have a 
d irec t effect (see Model I,  p. 494).
In order to derive optimal estimates of the relative importance of environ­
mental and political variables a multiple equation system must be employed. 
The coefficients within a multiple equation system can be used to estimate the 
total effect of each variable based on its indirect effects and (if present) its 
direct effect. However, even where the appropriate form of model is 
specified, as in Model I ,  two problems arise in the evaluation of the relative 
importance of environmental and political variables. The first problem is that 
unstandardized regression coefficients of independent variables are not 
comparable because they are expressed in different units of measurement 
(e.g. percentage of Labour seats, pounds of rateable value.) Therefore it is 
necessary to standardize the regression coefficients in order to compare the 
importance of independent variables.72 Standardization is not only essential 
for calculating comparable total effects but also facilitates the calculations 
which involve multiplying the regression coefficients for each link in each path 
between the independent and dependent variable. The result of applying this 
procedure to Models I—I I I  is shown in Table 2.
The second problem which arises in the evaluation of the relative import­
ance of independent variables is collinearity between two variables or 
multicollinearity amongst a set of variables. Where this is high73 existing 
statistical techniques cannot produce reliable estimates of the relative import­
ance of the variables, either in terms of their standardized regression 
coefficients or in terms of their unique contribution to R 2. Such collinearity 
has been viewed as an inconvenience in output studies. However, when 
viewed within the context of a model which is isomorphic to Easton’s theory 
relationships previously interpreted as collinear may be reinterpreted as
71 On path diagrams, path analysis and multiple equation models see O. D . Duncan, An 
Introduction to Structural Equation Models (New York: Academic Press, 1975); H. B. Asher, 
Causal Modelling (Beverley Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976).
72 Standardization is achieved by expressing the coefficient of each variable in units of standard 
deviation or ‘beta weights’ . Where models are presented in path diagrams the beta weights are 
termed ‘path coefficients’ . See Asher, Causal Modelling.
73 Two ‘rules of thumb’ which have been suggested is to consider zero-order coefficients above 
o-8 or above the coefficient of determination for the whole model as constituting ‘high’ 
collinearity. See D . E. Farrar and R. R. Glauber, ‘Multicollinearity in Regression Analysis: The 
Problem Revisited’, Review o f  Economics and Statistics, il (1967), 92-107.
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causal. The presence of causal relationships between independent variables 
means that multicollinearity is em b edd ed  w ith in  the s tructure o f  the m o d e l (see 
for example links ‘a’ ‘e’ and ‘/ ’ in the path diagram for Model I and Equations 
i to 3). However, just as these causal relationships are an inherent property 
of the model so multicollinearity is an inescapable problem in the practical 
statistical evaluation of the relative importance of environmental and political 
effects.74
The issue of multicollinearity has been only dimly perceived in output 
studies. Only fifteen of the American and ten of the British studies listed in 
Table 1 even recognize the problem.75 In the absence of an explicit discussion 
within the study the presentation of the zero-order correlation matrix 
provides some indication of the degree of collinearity between independent 
variables.76 However, other than the studies which recognize the presence of 
collinearity only six American and two British studies present a zero-order 
correlation matrix.77 The extent to which output studies results for the relative 
importance of the environment and politics are affected by collinearity is 
therefore largely unknown.
The problem of multicollinearity, then, means that even standardized 
measures of total effects derived from a multiple equation system specified in 
a form isomorphic to Easton’s theory do not necessarily provide reliable 
estimates of the relative importance of environmental and political variables. 
However, this model specification and statistical technique can provide 
estimates which are superior to those provided by the models and techniques 
discussed below.
(2 ) Techniques a n d  M o d e ls  in O u tp u t Studies
The forms of model which follow from the statistical techniques used in 
output studies are shown in the path diagrams and equations in Models I I  and 
I I I .  Most output studies use statistical techniques which estimate only ‘direct 
effects’ and thereby implicitly test Model I I .  A  small number also estimate 
‘indirect effects’ in the form shown in Model I I I .  In short, no output study 
obtains statistical results from a model consistent with Easton’s theory. It
74 For a concise discussion of possible responses to the multicollinearity problem see D. 
Gujurati, Basic Econometrics (Auckland: McGraw Hill, 1979), Chap. 9. The specification of 
Model I  slightly alleviates the collinearity problem to the extent that environmental variables do 
not appear in the same equation as policy-maker variables anywhere in the model.
75 See Atkins and Glick, Booms and Halldorson, Clark, Dye and Renick, Elsinger (a) and (b), 
Fisher, Jones, Meier and England, Pulsipher and Weatherby, Rose, Shaffer and Weber, 
Sigelman and Smith, Sullivan, Appendix A; see Ashford et al., Davies et al. (a) and (b) 
Danziger, Jackman and Sellars, Nicholson and Topham (a) and (b), Pinch, Sharpe and Newton, 
Storey, Appendix B.
76 The zero order correlations are not in themselves an adequate test for multicollinearity. This 
requires that all the other independent variables be regressed on each independent variable in 
turn. See J. Johnston, Econometric Methods (New York: McGraw Hill, 1972), pp. 163-4.
77 See Baker and Colby, S. E. Clarke, Fairbanks (a) Gibson et al., Grumm, Ulsaner and 
Weber, Appendix A; see A lt, Boaden, Appendix B.
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Three models o f the relationship between the environment, politics and policy outputs
In the following diagrams and equations:
X x = Environmental conditions 
X 2 — Inputs
X 3 = Formal structure of the political system 
X 4 = Policy makers 
Y  = Policy outputs
Bs = Standardized regression coefficients 
Us -  Error terms
M odel I:
The Easton-Based M od el
Expressed as a path diagram this model is:
/
X v X ,
Expressed as a multiple equation system this model is: 
(A'], Exogenous)
X 2 = B xX x + U 2 Equation i
X 2 = B xX x + B 2X 2 + U 2 Equation 2
X 4 = B xX x +  B 2X ? + ByX2 + U 4 Equation 3
Y  -  B 4X 4 +  U v Equation 4
M odel I I :
The D irect Effects M odel
Expressed as a path diagram this model is:
X4
Expressed as a single equation this model is:
Y  =  B xX x +  B 2X 2 +  B 3X 3 + B4X 4 + Uy Equation 5
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Model 111:
The D irect and Indirect Effects M odel 
Expressed as a path diagram this model is:
h
Expressed as a Multiple Equation System this model is:
( X u Exogenous)
X 2 = B xX x + U 2 Equation 6
X 2 =  B )X x + B 2X 2 + U 3 Equation 7
X A =  B ]X ] +  B 2X 2 4- ByX3 + U 4 Equation 8
Y  = B xX x +  B 2X 2 +  ByX3 +  B 4X a + Uy Equation 9
t a b l e  2 C o m p a ris o n  o f  the T o ta l E ffe c t o f  E a c h  In d e p e n d e n t V a r ia b le  
in  E a c h  M o d e l
Model I  Model I I  Model I I I
Effect of X i =  (a x b x c x d) h (a x b x c x k)
+  ( a x g x d )  + ( a x g x k )
+  ( e x c x d ) +  ( e x c x  k)
+  ( f x d )  + ( f x k )
+  ( a x b x j )
+ (a x  i)
+ (/!)
Effect of X 2 =  ( b x c x  d)  / ( b x  c x  k)
+  ( g x d )  + ( g x k )
+  ( b x j )
+ (0
Effects of X 3 = (c x  d)  j  (c x k )
+ (/)
Effects of X a =
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must be emphasized that the models specified do not follow from some 
alternative theory. Rather, the m odels have been im posed  by the statistical 
techniques used , their structure implicit and their relationship to theory 
ignored. The proper relationship between theory, model specification and 
statistical technique has been inverted in output studies. The consequence of 
this dominance of technique over theory has been to pull most of the results 
into a statistical ‘black, hole' from which no clear signal can escape. The 
impact of testing Models I I  and I I I  on output studies’ estimates of the relative 
importance of independent variables and their combined explanatory power 
is considered below. It should be emphasized that the criticisms of the 
techniques are made within the context of Easton’s theory and the aims of 
output studies. They may be quite adequate in other contexts.
The statistical techniques which have been used to evaluate the relative 
importance of the environment and politics are shown in the columns labelled 
T ’ to ‘7’ of Table 1. The symbol (*) indicates in which studies each technique 
has been used. In American studies the early dominance of correlational and 
stepwise techniques has been replaced by single equation regression and, to a 
more limited extent, multiple equation regression, usually in the path analysis 
format. In the British studies later entry into the field has allowed the single 
equation regression technique to dominate: ironically it is only two of the 
early studies which use the more sophisticated path analysis format.
The techniques used in studies noted in columns 1 to 5 of Table 1 
(correlational, stepwise and single equation regression techniques) share the 
problem of imposing the form of specification shown in Model I I . 78 These 
techniques estimate the relative importance of variables on the basis of only 
direct effects. The model assumes that there are no causal relationships 
amongst the independent variables and that the effect of each variable is 
‘additive’. Where effects are additive the impact of an independent variable is 
the same regardless of the value of other independent variables.79 An additive 
specification is inconsistent with Easton’s model which emphasizes the 
interaction of environmental and political conditions. Thus, for example, the 
effect of environmental variables in Model I depends on the value of input, 
formal structure and policy-maker variables.
It  has been argued that additive models underestimate the relative import­
ance of environmental variables by omitting their indirect effect through 
political variables.80 Note that all the indirect effects shown for environmental
78 In addition to the shared problem of imposing an inappropriate model each of these 
techniques present individual technical problems which introduce further unreliability to the 
estimates obtained. On partial correlation see Blalock, Causal Inferences in Non-Experimental 
Research, pp. 85-8; on multiple partial correlation see Cnudde and McCrone, Appendix A; oil 
stepwise analysis see M . Lewis-Beck, ‘Stepwise Regression: A  Caution’, Political Methodology, 
tv (1978), 213-40.
79 For example, a £1 increase in rateable value per capita is assumed to have the same effect 
whether Labour holds 5 per cent or 55 per cent of a council’s seats.
80 See M . Lewis-Beck, Appendix A ; M . Lewis-Beck and L. B. Mohr, ‘Evaluating Effects of 
Independent Variables’, Political Methodology, 111 (1976), 27-47; Swant, ‘Linking Theory and 
Method in Urban Policy Analysis: Problems of Test Interpretation’.
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conditions in the path diagram for Model I are omitted from the path diagram 
for Model I I .  However, additive models also overestimate the importance of 
environmental variables to the extent that unintelligible direct effects are 
attributed to them. Note here that the effect‘/t’ in the path diagram for Model 
I I  is not present in the path diagram for Model I. Thus the net effect of 
techniques which impose Model I I  is not necessarily to underestimate the 
importance of the environment, rather the impact of these techniques on 
estimates of the relative importance of environmental and political variables 
is ambiguous. The statistical results may overestimate the effect of either 
category of variable.81
The studies noted in column 6 of Table i use multiple equation systems to 
estimate the relative importance of the environment and politics. Twelve of 
the thirteen studies noted use standardized regression coefficients and there­
fore in principle can provide optimal estimates of relative importance if the 
model is appropriately specified.82 However, this condition is not met in any 
of these studies.
Instead Model I I I  has been imposed because the assumption is made that 
every independent variable can have a direct effect on outputs, and estimates 
of relative importance are derived on this basis. It  can be seen that Equations 
6 to 8 in Model I I I  are identical to Equations i to 3 in Model I. However, the 
difference between Equation 4 and Equation 9 reflects the radically different 
assumptions of the models concerning the possibility of a direct effect by the 
environment, inputs and formal structure. This difference is also shown in the 
path diagrams for Models I  and I I I .  Model I I I  adds the direct effects th \  V  
and 7 ’ from the path diagram for Model I I  to the effects shown in the path 
diagram for Model I. Thus estimates derived from multiple equation systems 
specified in the form shown in Model I I I  overestimate the relative importance 
of environmental variables.83 The total effect of the environment in this model 
is derived not only from indirect effects but also from theoretically unintelli­
gible direct effects.
The studies noted in column 7 either use a technique which does not permit 
the evaluation of the relative importance of environmental and political 
variables or present results in a form which makes interpretation difficult. 
Studies designated as ‘A ’ use only zero order correlations or cross tabulations 
which estimate the effect of each independent variable without any form of 
control for the others. Studies designated as ‘B ’ indulge in various forms of 
frippery with partial correlation.84 Only studies designated as ‘C ’ are of any
81 It is important to stress that the source of the unreliability discussed here is specification 
error. The extent to which the estimates are inefficient because of multicollinearity is yet a further 
source of unreliability. The same point applies to the discussion of Model I I I  below.
82 The exception is Klaas, Appendix A.
83 The overestimate in any particular study depends on the extent to which direct effects are 
included in the estimate of total effects for all environmental variables.
84 Most show partial correlations only for the political variables; some show ‘selected’ partial 
correlations on no apparent basis; Bingham, Appendix A , attempts to test Model I I I  through a 
cumbersome sequence of partial correlations which defies interpretation.
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substantive interest. These studies attempt to identify the joint impact on 
outputs of the interaction of environmental and political variables, using 
either correlational or single equation regression techniques. These studies 
use one of two methods to estimate interaction effects.
The first method is to split the cases into subgroups on the basis of one 
independent variable and then to test the effect of other independent 
variables within each sub-group.85 For example, Lineberry and Fowler86 split 
cities into ‘reformed’ and ‘unreformed’ and examine the strength of the 
relationship between social heterogeneity and outputs within each category. 
There are two problems here. Firstly, no measure of the relative importance 
of the ‘conditioning’ variable is provided. Secondly, an additive specification 
is imposed for the remaining independent variables within each sub-group.
The second method of testing for an interaction effect has been to include a 
multiplicative term in a single equation. This is consistent with Easton’s 
theory to the extent that the effect of each independent variable is influenced 
by the others. However this specification cannot, by definition, reveal 
anything about the relative importance of environmental and political 
variables.87
(2 ) C au sa lity
In the absence of a valid causal model statistical results may simply describe 
the pattern of covariation amongst variables rather than providing evidence 
about causal relationships. However, in output studies the standard statistics 
textbook warning that correlation does not equal causation is respected in 
principle but frequently neglected in practice. While many of the results of 
output studies show that particular characteristics of the environment, politics 
and policy c o in c id e , two problems arise in inferring that the relationships 
amongst the variables are causal. The first is the use of static models which 
measure the level of both independent and dependent variables. The second 
problem is the use of inappropriate lag structures for the times at which the 
independent and dependent variables are measured.
The argument for the adoption of causal models in output studies is 
longstanding.88 The development of causal models has proceeded along two
85 SeeG. Wright, ‘Linear Models for Evaluating Conditional Relationships, American Journal o f  
Political Science, xx (1976), 349-73.
86 Lineberry and Fowler, Appendix A.
87 There is also a subtle theoretical difference between specifying a single equation model with 
a multiplicative interaction term and specifying a multiple equation model. In the single equation 
specification, policy makers are assumed never to act independently of environmental con­
straints. However, in the multiple equation model, this assumption is tested by estimating the 
value of X x in Equation 3 of Model I. I f  the coefficient is not significant then this is consistent 
with autonomy from direct environmental constraints, although not from the indirect constraints 
which operate through inputs and formal structure
88 See Coulter, ‘Comparative Community Politics and Public Policy’. For a broader discussion 
of the meaning of ‘cause’ see R. A . Dahl, ‘Cause and Effect in the Study of Politics’, in D . 
Lemer, ed., Cause and Effect (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1965).
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separate paths: multiple equation models and models of policy change. These 
two separate developments must be united in order to meet the conditions for 
the specification of a causal model.89 Advocates of multiple equation models 
implicitly assume that the specification of a system of equations is a sufficient 
condition for a causal model.90 A  multiple equation model is certainly 
necessary to test causal hypotheses about the structure of relationships 
through which each independent variable affects outputs. However, a multi­
ple equation model is insufficient to test causal hypotheses if the model is 
static with all variables measured as levels .91 A  valid causal model requires 
both a multiple equation system and the measurement of variables in terms of 
change. Support for a causal hypothesis requires that change in the dependent 
variable follows change in the independent variable.92 While a considerable 
number of output studies have analysed change in the dependent variable 
they have usually measured the independent variables as levels and therefore 
fail to meet this condition for a causal model.93 Thus for most output studies it 
is necessary to assume that the results reflect causal processes because causal 
hypotheses are not directly tested. Without this assumption the interpretation 
of the statistical results must simply be that environmental and political 
conditions coincide with policy outputs to a greater or lesser extent.
The second problem of making causal inferences, from results both for 
output levels and for output change, is lack of attention to the specification of 
lag structures. Few output studies recognize that a necessary condition of an 
appropriate lag structure is that sufficient time must be allowed for the
89 Strictly, a fully dynamic model requires a non-recursive specification which would involve 
linking theories of policy formulation to theories of policy implementation and identifying the 
unique impact of policy on the environment. Given the present state of the art of policy analysis 
this seems rather like running before we can crawl. However, two interesting attempts to move 
more quickly in this direction are P. Fowler and R. Lineberry, ‘Comparative Policy Analysis and 
the Problem of Reciprocal Causation’, in C. Liske, eds., Comparative Public Policy (New York: 
Wiley, 1975), and W. B. Shepard and R. K. Godwin, ‘Policy and Process: A  Study of 
Interaction’ , Journal o f  Politics, xxxvn (1975), 576-82.
90 See D . S. Van Meter and H . B. Asher, ‘Causal Analysis: Its’ Promise for Policy Studies’, 
Policy Studies Journal, 11 (1973), 103-9; Dye, Policy Analysis-, Lewis-Beck, Tompkins, Appendix 
A.
91 For a general discussion of the problems of inferring causal processes from static cross- 
sectional models, see R. D . Brunner and K. Liepelt, ‘Data Analysis, Process Analysis and System 
Change’, Mid Western Journal o f  Political Science, xvi (1972), 538-69. Their argument is 
developed in the output studies context in Gray, Appendix A . A  useful alternative approach to 
this issue which arrives at substantially the same conclusions as Brunner and Liepelt is R. I. 
Hofferbert and G. Schaeffer, ‘The Application of General Systems Methodology to the 
Comparative Study of Public Policy’, International Journal o f  General Systems, vm (1982), 
93-108.
92 J. W. Dyson and D . St. Angelo, ‘A  Methodological Problem in the Socio-Economic 
Interpretation of State Spending’, Policy Studies Journal, 11 (1975), 131-6.
93 A  notable exception is Jones, Appendix A . It  is possible to justify the use of static 
measures where they represent variables of theoretical importance which were constant over the 
period in question. O f the studies which analyse output change this is argued only by Lyons and 
Morgan, Appendix A .
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independent variables to affect outputs.94 While several critiques have noted 
the specific problem of using current environmental conditions to explain 
long-established governmental forms95 it is only recently that some attention 
has been given to the general issue of lags in output studies.96 The widespread 
presence of questionable lag structures throws further doubt on the statistical 
results. However, there can be no ‘general theory of lags’ on which 
prescriptions for an appropriate lag structure can be based. The specific lag 
structure which is appropriate for a particular set of independent variables 
and a particular output must stem from substantive knowledge of the policy 
area under consideration.
v .  R E S U L T S
The results of American and British output studies are summarized in Table 
3.97 The results are arranged in nine output level categories (four financial and 
five non-financial) and five output change categories (four financial and one 
non-financial). In each column two pieces of information are provided for 
each study which has analysed that particular output.
Firstly, the figure on the left of each column is the combined explanatory 
power (/?2) of the political and environmental variables employed. I f  more 
than one output within a category has been analysed by the study then the 
range of R 2s is shown. If  no R 2 is reported within the study then the symbol 
(X ) is shown.
Secondly, on the right of each column the result of the study for the relative 
importance of environmental and political variables for that particular 
category of output is shown. The symbol ‘E ’ indicates that the environment 
outweighs politics and the symbol ‘P’ indicates the reverse. Where more than 
one output is analysed within a category then the symbol represents the 
balance of the results. Where this balance is very close the symbol ‘M ’ (mixed 
results) is shown. Again, if no statistical result which permits a comparison of 
the importance of environmental and political variables is reported within the 
study then the symbol (X ) is shown.
There is no attempt in this discussion to examine the results for individual 
variables. Given the failure to test hypotheses or explain results within an 
explicit theoretical context, many of the results for individual variables 
appear capricious, contingent upon the statistical technique and bundle of
94 Exceptions are Morss, Jones, Roeder, Shaffer and Weber, Uslaner and Weber, Appendix 
A; Nicholson and Topham, (a) and (b). Karran, Appendix B.
95 Coulter, ‘Comparative Community Politics and Public Policy’, Rakoff and Schaeffer, 
‘Politics, Policy and Political Science: Theoretical Alternatives’; Munns, ‘The Environment, 
Politics and Policy Literature: A  Critique and Reformulation’.
96 H . Tucker, ‘I t ’s About Time: The Use of Time in Cross-Sectional State Policy Research’ , 
American Journal o f Political Science, xxvi (1982), 176-96.
97 Studies listed in Table 1 which report results neither for the relative importance of 
environmental and political variables nor for their combined explanatory power are omitted from 
Table 3.
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other variables pressed into service.98 Attention is therefore focused on the 
combined explanatory power and the relative importance of the general 
environmental and political categories of variable.
The discussion of results in this section is shadowed throughout by the 
general problems of theory and methodology noted in Sections I I - IV .  These 
problems will not be repeated at every turn; however it is important to 
remember the questions which they raise about the validity of the results.
T he  E x p la n a to ry  P o w e r  o f  O u tp u t Studies M o d e ls
O f the studies listed in Table 3, sixty-five of the American and fourteen of the 
British studies report R 2s. Many may report an artificially inflated estimate of 
R 2 because they fail to take account of the degrees of freedom in the models 
used. As the degrees of freedom decline (i.e. as the number of cases falls or 
the number of independent variables increases) the significance of the 
explanatory power of the model declines. This significance can be measured 
either through the F  statistic or through an R 2 which is adjusted for degrees of 
freedom.99 However, only six of the American studies and one British study 
report an adjusted R 2, ]0° while only two American studies and two British 
studies record an F  statistic.101 Assuming that these problems are uniform 
across all output categories, however, it is possible to note some salient 
features of .the results.
Firstly, the explanatory power of the models is generally higher for output 
levels than for output change.102 In the American studies the mean percentage 
R 2 for output levels is in the lower 50s while that-for output change is in the 
lower 40s. Within the output level and output change categories there is no 
substantial difference in explanatory power between financial and non- 
financial outputs. In the British studies there are too few analyses of output 
change and non-financial outputs to make similar comparisons. However, it 
can be noted that the mean R 2 in the British studies is 10-15 per cent lower 
than in the American studies. It is only possible to speculate on the reasons 
for this, but the relatively narrow range of political variables in the British 
studies may well be a contributory factor.
98 A  further problem in interpreting results for individual variables is that some studies fail to 
report the results of significance tests even where the cases represent a sample. There is 
considerable divergence of opinion within output studies on the utility of significance tests where 
the cases constitute a population. There is a good discussion of this issue in Sharpe and Newton, 
Appendix B. See also R. E. Henkel, Tests o f Significance (Beverley Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976).
99 See Johnson, Econometric Methods, pp. 35-8 and 129-30.
100 Booms, S. E. Clarke, Eisinger (b), Mazmanian and Sabatier, Stonecash and Hayes, 
Winters, Appendix A; Storey, Appendix B. The adjusted R2 can be calculated provided 
information on the number of cases, number of variables and unadjusted R1 is presented. See 
Johnson, Econometric Methods, pp. 130 for the formula.
101 Fisher, Giertz, Appendix A; Danziger, Foster et al., Appendix B.
102 This greater ability to explain output levels than to explain output change is also true of 
incremental models. See Danziger, Hoggart, Appendix B.
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Results in  O u tpu t Studies Financial
Results for the ouput levels
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United States R2 1 R 2 I R2 1 R2 I R2 I R2 I R2 1 R2 I R2 I R2 1 R 2 1 R2 I R- 1 R2 I
Dawson and Robinson 1963 X  E
Fisher 1964 .9 E 44-75 E 65 E
Matthews & Prothro 30 E
Booms 1966 44 E
Dye (b) 27-76 E 25-74 E 16-80 E 20-82 E
Fenton 35-63 M 59 E
Cho 1967 43 P 51-81 M 86 E 87-91 M
Dye (c) 12-56 E
Lineberry & Fowler 36 X 52 X
Morss et al. 24 P 38 P
Sharkansky(a) 88 P 72-88 P 91 P
Sharkansky(b) 93 P 82-97 E 95 P
Dye (d) 1968 X E
Pulsipher &  Weatherby 26 X 20-83 E 58 E
Sharkansky (c) 50 P
Cnudde & McCrone 1969 X E
Clarke 74 E
Cowart X  P
Dye (e) X E X  E X E
Dye (f) 74 E 59 E 64 E
Lineberry 14 E
Paulson et al. X  E *X E
Sharkansky &  Hofferbert (a) 69 E 70 E
Fry &  Winters 1970 55 P
Clark 1971 50 E 66 E 5' E
Cole 12 E 8-12 E
Grumm 64 E 66 E 16 E
Sharkansky(e) X  E X  E
Sharkansky (f) X  E X  P
Ffoffman & Prather 1972 56-62 E 69 E
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The R e la tive  Im p o rta n c e  o f  E n v iro n m e n ta l a n d  P o lit ic a l V ariab les
Sixty-six of the American studies and ten of the British studies listed in Table 
3 record explicit conclusions on the relative importance of environmental and 
political variables and/or present their results in a form that allows relative 
importance to be evaluated.1"' The unknown net impact of the derivation of 
the results from models inconsistent with theory and the presence of 
multicollinearity amongst the independent variables makes the interpretation 
of the results particularly hazardous. 104 However, assuming that the problems 
noted in Sections 11—IV  above apply equally to all output categories some 
salient aspects of the results can be noted. These are summarized in Table 4 .
In the American studies the balance of environmental and political effects 
is markedly different between categories of output. For financial output levels
t a b l e  4  S u m m a ry  o f  Results f o r  the R e la tiv e  Im p o rta n c e  o f  E n v iro n ­
m e n ta l a n d  P o lit ic a l V ariab les  by B ro a d  O u tp u t C ateg ory
Financial Non-financial
Category of A ll outputs output levels output levels O utput change
variable dom inant n ( 7c) n ( 7c) n (To) n ( 7c)
United States
Environm ental 66 (53) 42 (69) 20 (47) 4 ( 19)
M ixed 13 (10) 9 ( 15) 3 (7 ) 1 (5 )
Political 46 (37) 10 (16) 20 (47) 16 (76)
Total 125 (100) 61 (100) 43 (101) 21 (100)
Britain
Environm ental 17 (7 i ) 14 (82) 3
M ixed 2 (8) 2 (12) 0
Political 5 (21) 1 (6) 4
Total 24 (100) 17 (100) 7
* Total exceeds too because of rounding.
103 The discussion of unstandardized regression coefficients on p. 492 noted that they are an 
inappropriate means of measuring the relative importance of the environment and politics 
because of the different measurement scales of the variables. However, the difference between the 
significance of the estimates of the unstandardized regression coefficients of environmental and 
political variables is so clear-cut as to allow a conclusion concerning their relative importance in 
the following studies: Cnudde and McCrone, Pulsipher and Weatherby, Jennings (b), Appendix 
A; Oliver and Stanyer, Nicholson and Topham (a), Danziger, Scholfield, Foster et al., 
Appendix B.
104 This is especially so in the case of results for total expenditures. Weicher and Emerine have 
shown that the statistical significance of an independent variable in the total expenditure equation 
depends on the signs, magnitudes and variances of the coefficients for that variable in the 
equations for functional expenditures of which total expenditure is composed. They conclude 
that the estimates in the total expenditure equation are likely to be so misleading that they serve 
no useful purpose. See J. C. Weicher and R. J. Emerine, ‘Econometric Analysis of State and 
Local Government Expenditure Functions’, Public Finance, xxvm (1975), 69- 83.
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the balance is strongly towards the dominance of environmental variables. 
For non-financial output levels the results suggest the approximate equality of 
environmental and political effects. For output change the balance is strongly 
towards political variables. This general pattern corroborates the findings of 
the few studies which present results for both financial and non-financial 
output levels in the same policy area105 and those which present results tor 
output levels and output change within the same policy area. 106
Results of the British studies allow the comparison of environmental and 
political effects only for financial and non-financial output levels. The balance 
of effects is similar to the American studies: clear environmental dominance 
for financial output levels and the approximate equality of environmental and 
political effects for non-financial output levels.
It seems, then, that there is a definite relationship between the type of 
policy output analysed and the relative importance of environmental and 
political variables. The results clearly indicate that in both the United States 
and Britain financial output levels are more strongly influenced by environ­
mental than by political conditions, and that both categories of variable play 
an approximately equal role in influencing non-financial output levels. Studies 
of output change in the United States show a pronounced dominance of 
political effects over environmental effects. Given the similar pattern of 
output level results in both countries it is to be expected that these American 
results for output change will be replicated in future British studies.
However, before leaving the consideration of results for the relative 
importance of environmental and political variables it is necessary to enter 
another caveat concerning the reliability of this surprisingly neat pattern of 
relationships between output category and the balance of political and 
environmental effects. There is an alternative explanation for this pattern of 
results; an explanation which is ostensibly more anarchic but underlines the 
necessity for an explicit theoretical base in output studies. This alternative 
explanation is suggested by Sullivan’s reanalysis of Fry and Winters’s study of 
the determinants of redistribution. 107 Fry and Winters derived their result, 
which showed greater political than environmental effects, from a model 
which included the ‘best’ five of twelve political variables with the ‘best’ five 
of only six environmental variables. Sullivan argued that this procedure 
preconditioned the results in favour of political variables. He therefore re-ran 
the statistical analysis with the same best five political variables but with the 
best five from twelve environmental variables. He found that the relative 
importance of the environment and politics was reversed. Developing Sul­
livan’s argument, an alternative explanation for the pattern of results
105 See Aiken and Alford, Asher and Van Meter, Gary, LeMay, Appendix A ; G. W. Downs 
and D. Rocke, ‘Bureaucracy and Juvenile Corrections’, in Dye and Gray, The Determinants 
of Public Policy.
106 See Asher and Van Meter, Cho and Frederickson (a), Lyons and Morgan, Shaffer and 
Weber, Appendix A; a conflicting result is Eisinger (a), Appendix A .
107 Sullivan, Fry and Winters, Appendix A.
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t a b l e  5 Results in  A m e ric a n  O u tp u t Studies f o r  the R e la tive  Im p o rta n c e  
o f  E n v iro n m e n ta l a n d  P o lit ic a l V ariab les  C a teg o rize d  by N u m ­
b er o f  E ach  T yp e  o f  V a r ia b le  in  M o d e ls  Tested
Results from
Results from models with
models with equal number Results from
more environ­ o f environ­ models with
m ental than mental and more political
Category of Results from political political than environ­
variable dom inant all models variables variables m ental variables
N  (% ) n (% ) n (% ) n (% )
Environm ental 66 (53) 5 i (87) 12 (44) 3 (8)
M ixed 13 (10) 2 (3) 5 (19) 6 ( 15)
Political 46 (37) 6 (10) 10 (37) 30 (77)
Tota l 125 (to o ) 59 (100) 27 (to o ) 39 (100)
summarized in Table 4  is that studies which use more environmental than 
political variables find the environment dominant and those which use more 
political than environmental variables find politics dominant. The validity of 
this argument in the case of American studies108 is examined in Table 5 .
It is necessary to emphasize caution in the interpretation of these figures 
given the process of compression and interpretation which underlies them. 
However the extent to which they are consistent with the argument that 
results for relative importance are a product of the ratio of environmental to 
political variables in the model is striking: 87 per cent of results derived from 
models containing more environmental than political variables show environ­
mental effects dominant, and 77  per cent of results derived from models 
containing more political than environmental variables show political effects 
dominant. 109 In short, output studies results for the relative importance of 
environmental and political variables may be largely the product of a crude 
numbers game. There is a certain ironic justice in the results of studies so 
unconcerned with theory being so affected by ad-hocery. I f  this explanation of 
the pattern of results is valid there could be no stronger evidence for the case 
that every single variable in an output studies model should be pinned to an
108 A  similar analysis is not possible for the British studies because none use more political 
than environmental variables.
109 This pattern is also present within the broad output categories. For financial output levels 
91 per cent of results from models containing more environmental than political variables show 
environmental effects dominant and 55 per cent of results from models containing more political 
than environmental variables show political effects dominant. The parallel figures for non- 
financial output levels are 94 per cent and 83 per cent and for output change are 50 per cent 
and 82 per cent. It  is difficult to interpret the low figure for models containing more environmental 
than political variables in the output change category because it is based on only six results.
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explicit theoretical base. A ll models by their nature must roll loaded dice, but 
the loading should be explicit and theoretically based, not the accidental 
product of the ratio of one type of variable to another.
C O N C L U S I O N
The contribution of output studies to political science cannot be considered 
impressive. Because of the problems discussed above, it is impossible to be 
confident about the substantive significance either of the estimates of the 
explanatory power of the models or of the estimates of the relative import­
ance of environmental and political variables. The unreliability of the results 
as a guide to the cause of local policy variation is fundamentally the product 
of testing statistical models which are inconsistent with their theoretical base. 
It is important to stress that it is this inconsistency with theory rather than the 
nature of the output studies approach itself which is the root of the 
unreliability of the results. Therefore the results of studies which have been 
analysed in this review do not provide a valid measure of the utility of output 
studies as a research technique for identifying the determinants of policy 
variation. In order to permit a more rigorous evaluation of the utility of the 
approach, future output studies should endeavour to meet the following 
conditions concerning the general format of the model tested and the specific 
independent variables included in the model.
Output studies models should be specified in a multiple equation system the 
structure of which is isomorphic to Easton’s theory. In order to test causal 
hypotheses the models should be dynamic, with variables measured in terms 
of change in an explicit lag structure. Optimal estimates of the relative 
importance of environmental and political variables can be derived from the 
total effects coefficients estimated from this model.
Critics of output studies have lamented the failure of the approach to 
identify a single set of variables with high explanatory power across all 
outputs. 110 However the use of ‘standard models’ across all outputs should be 
abandoned. The set of independent variables should be output specific, 
derived from substantive knowledge of the policy area under consideration. 
A  search for simple, timeless and universal explanations is so unrealistic as to 
be doomed to failure. By contrast, Easton’s systems framework offers an 
approach of great flexibility and potential utility within which variables can be 
tested on the basis of hypotheses concerning their effects in specific systems of 
sub-national governments, at specific times and on specific policies. The 
assumption within Easton’s model that political systems are ‘open’ empha­
sizes the need to remain alert to the diversity of possible environmental 
influences on policy outputs. Similarly, while asserting the causal priority of 
politics the model does not prejudge which political variables are most 
important and thereby does not bias inquiry towards a narrow operationaliza­
tion of the concept of a political system.
110 Danziger, Sharpe and Newton, Appendix B.
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Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the development of output studies is a 
cautionary tale with implications for all politometric research. The message is 
familiar but, given the output studies experience, clearly bears repetition: in 
the absence of theory, and a methodology which rigorously applies that 
theory, there is no safety in numbers.
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Abstract
This paper tests the median voter hypothesis that variations in policies across political systems 
are caused by variations in median voter preferences. The context of the empirical analysis is 
the tax policies of three groups of sub-national governments in England in three time periods. 
The results of a median voter model of tax policy variation are compared to the results of a 
mean voter model in different party systems and different electoral systems. The evidence pro­
vides little support for the median voter hypothesis.
Economic theories of politics seek to explain public policies on the basis of 
the self interested actions of members of the political system. The basic 
Downs model of representative democracy postulates that the consequence 
of personal utility maximisation by voters and politicians is that policies re­
flect the interests of the median voter1. This simple abstraction from the 
complexity of political behaviour implies that the fundamental cause of po­
licy differences over time or across political systems is different median vo­
ter preferences. For those who have agonised over the question ‘does 
politics matter?’ the median voter model promises a reassuring answer2. 
This paper tests the median voter model in the context of variations in tax 
policies across sub-national governments in England. Section 1 examines 
the implications of previous tests of the median voter hypothesis. Section 
2 presents median and mean voter models of local tax policies and specifies 
the variables through which the models are tested. Section 3 presents the re­
sults of tests of the models in different party systems and electoral systems. 
Section 4 summarises the findings and offers some concluding remarks.
1. Previous tests of the median voter hypothesis
Most of the literature on the median voter hypothesis consists either of crit­
iques of the assumptions of Downs’ model3 or logical proofs of the implica-
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tions of altering the assumptions4. The scarcity of empirical evidence is 
ironic given Downs’ belief that ‘theoretical models should be tested primari­
ly by the accuracy of their predictions rather than by the reality o f their as­
sumptions’5.
The few empirical tests of the median voter hypothesis which have been 
conducted can be divided into three categories.
First, there are several ‘indirect’ tests of the hypothesis. Kasper (1971) 
found that the coefficient of variation for welfare expenditures in the USA  
was smaller in ‘two-party’ states than in ‘one-party’ states. He concludes 
that inter-party competition causes ‘moderate’ policies to be adopted. The 
evidence is a long way from directly establishing the impact of party compe­
tition on welfare policies, let alone the impact of the median voter. Howe­
ver, if  the median voter is ‘moderate’ , then the evidence suggests that the 
two-party struggle for votes assumed in the Downs’ model may be a precon­
dition in practice for median voter influence on policies. Further indirect 
tests of the median voter hypothesis by Hoffman (1976) and by Kristensen 
(1982) are based on ‘percentage difference’ scores. These scores are obtai­
ned by subtracting the percentage of the public favouring higher service ex­
penditures from the percentage favouring lower expenditures. I f  
expenditures match median voter preferences then the scores should be close 
to zero. Neither study finds much support for the median voter hypothesis. 
Hoffman extends the analysis by exploring several variables which might 
mediate between public opinion and service expenditures. The results corro­
borate Kasper’s inference: the fit of the median voter model tends to be im­
proved by the presence o f a two-party system.
A  second category of empirical analyses has used data on sub-national go­
vernments in the USA to test directly the statistical relationship between me­
dian voter and policy variables. The pioneering study by Barr and Davis 
(1966) found that local expenditures were negatively related to median tax 
price, but not significantly related to median income6. Several subsequent 
studies have found both median tax price and median income to be impor­
tant influences on local tax and expenditure decisions7. However, these stu­
dies have been criticised for failing to compare the performance of the 
median voter model with plausible rival models8. Most studies of local po­
licy variation use measures of the average characteristics of the local electo­
rate as explanatory variables. This ‘mean voter’ model is supported by the 
statistical results o f a large number of studies9.
These results can be interpreted as indirect support for the median voter 
model because there is likely to be a positive correlation between median and 
mean voter variables. However, the median and mean models yield diffe­
rent predictions. Therefore a ‘crucial experiment’ for the rarely tested me­
dian voter model is whether it performs better than the frequently tested and 
widely supported mean voter model. In the median voter model policies
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reflect the demands o f a ‘pivotal’ elector on the distribution of public prefe­
rences. In the mean voter model policies reflect the aggregate demand per 
elector. Thus suppose in two cities that median and mean voter demand for 
public expenditure per capital is as follows:
The median voter model predicts that actual expenditure will be higher in 
City A  while the mean voter model predicts the reverse. I f  the data supports 
the mean model this need not imply the heretical inference that politicians 
are motivated by an altruistic concern for the ‘general interest’ . It may 
simply indicate that the mean voter variable is acting as a proxy for other 
self interested behaviour (e.g. pressure group activity), and that such beha­
viour outweighs the impact of vote-maximisation by politicians.
A  third small category of studies has compared median voter with mean 
voter models o f policy variation across local communities in Switzerland. 
Pommerehne and Frey (1976) found that the performance of the two models 
was virtually identical10. However, the results differed when Pommerehne 
(1978) conducted the analysis separately for various types of local political 
systems. The median voter model produced superior results to the mean vo­
ter model in direct democracies but not in representative democracies. These 
results offer little succour to the median voter model. It is, after all, the me­
chanisms of representative democracy which push policies towards median 
voter interests in the Downs model. However, the results indicate that the 
fit of the median voter model depends on whether the policy process is insu­
lated from public preferences. Even where all local political systems are re­
presentative democracies there will be variations in the potential exposure 
of politicians to electoral pressures. Such variations seem likely to influence 
the correspondence between the median voter model and empirical data.
In sum, several important features emerge from this survey of previous 
tests o f the median voter hypothesis. Substantively, there is little evidence 
on the impact of the median voter on public policies. This paper presents 
additional evidence and extends the empirical base to English local govern­
ment, a context in which the hypothesis has not previously been tested. 
Methodologically, it is important to compare median voter and mean voter 
results and to take account of differences in political context. Both of these 
features are incorporated in the empirical analysis below.
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Table 1. Variables, labels and data sources
Concept Operationalisation Label Source
Tax policy Annual °7o change in 
rate poundage
ARP 1
Median voter interests Local tax price of 
the median voter
M EDTP 1,2,3,4
Mean voter interests Local tax price of 
the mean voter
M EANTP 1,2,3,4
Central grants Annual *Vo change in 
central grants at 
market prices
AGR 1
Political disposition Percentage of Council 
seats held by the 
Labour party
LAB 5
Local incomes Proportion of population 





Commercial and industrial 




1. Financial and General Statistics (London, C IPFA, Annual).
2. Electoral Statistics, (London, OPCS, Annual).
3. Rate Collection Statistics (London, C IPFA, Annual).
4. Housing Rents Statistics (London, C IPFA, Annual).
5. The Municipal Yearbook (London, Municipal Publications, Annual).
6. Key Statistics For Local Authorities (London, OPCS, 1983).
2. Models of variations in local tax policies
This section specifies the variables used to test the median and mean voter 
models and discusses the political context of the empirical analysis. The 
variables and data sources are summarised in Table 1.
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2.1. The dependent variable: L o c a l tax  po licy
Tax policy is specified as the annual percentage change in the level of pro­
perty tax, the local ‘rate’ . Unlike sub-national governments in the USA and 
Western Europe, local authorities in England rely solely on the property tax 
for local tax revenue11. The local rate is levied on both domestic property 
(houses, flats etc.) and non-domestic property (commercial, industrial and 
governmental premises).
The level of property tax is the most salient issue in local political systems 
for two reasons12. First, rates are a highly visible tax. Ratepayers are con­
fronted by a lump-sum demand for payment which must be met from in­
come net of other taxes. This may cause a ‘fiscal illusion’ whereby the 
burden o f local taxes compared to other taxes is overestimated by 
ratepayers13. The second cause of the political salience of rates is that they 
are a ‘non-buoyant’ tax. There is no annual property revaluation and there­
fore the rate level must be reset each year simply to keep pace with inflation. 
This requirement for an annual resolution of conflict over rates ensures a 
persistently high position on the policy agenda.
2.2 In d e p e n d e n t variab les
2.2.1 M e d ia n  v o te r interests
The self interest axiom suggests that there is a negative relationship between 
the existing rate payment of the median voter and the size of rate increases. 
More specifically, those voters who pay no local taxes can benefit from the 
services funded by extra rate revenue at no direct cost to themselves14.
Data on the local tax price of the median voter is not directly available 
but can be derived as follows. Domestic ratepayers comprise not the whole 
local electorate but only ‘householders’ . The ratio of domestic ratepayers 
to electors (R /E ) varies from around 40% to 65%. I f  R /E  is less than 50% 
than the median voter in a local authority is not a ratepayer and therefore 
incurs no perceptible cost from a rate increase. Similarly, if  R /E  is greater 
than 50% than the median voter is a ratepayer and incurs a direct cost from 
a higher level of property tax.
More formally, if  R /E  <  50% then M ED TP = 0 and if R /E  >  50% then 
M E D T P  >  0. Median voter tax price could simply be operationalised as a 
dichotomous variable. However positive M E D T P ’s can be better approxi­
mated by using data on the average domestic rate payment in areas where 
R /E  >  50%. It is reasonable to assume that positive median voter rate pay­
ments are closely correlated with local domestic tax costs.
2.2.2 M e a n  v o te r in terests
The median voter hypothesis suggests that policies respond to the interests
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of a specific segment of the electorate. However, tax decisions may be in­
fluenced by the local tax burden on the electorate as a whole. The validity 
of this alternative perspective can be evaluated by estimating the relation­
ship between the tax price of the average elector and tax policies. Mean voter 
tax price is specified for each locality as total domestic rate revenue divided 
by registered electors. I f  the aggregate interests o f the electorate are reflec­
ted in tax policies then M E A N TP  should have a negative impact on ARP.
2.2.3 C e n tra l g ran ts
Central grants are widely considered to be a major constraint on local fiscal 
autonomy (Bennett, 1982). Grants and rates are substitute sources of fund­
ing for net expenditure on services. In recent years central government has 
reduced the proportion of local service costs met by grants from around 
60% to 50% 15. However a change in tax policy is only one response to a 
change in grant support. Other responses include service cuts, use of bal­
ances, increased use of fees and charges, greater efficiency and ‘creative ac­
counting’ (Wolman, 1983). Nevertheless, while grant changes may not 
dominate local tax decisions there is likely to be at least a moderate negative 
relationship between AGR and ARP.
The change in central grant support is specified as the annual percentage 
change in anticipated grant receipts per capita at market prices. AGR is mea­
sured as anticipated rather than actual grant change because it is the expect­
ed grant income which is relevant when the rate decision is taken, prior to 
the start of the financial year.
2.2.4 P o lit ic a l  d isp os ition
The most consistent conclusion of studies of local policy variation in Eng­
land is that political disposition is an important influence on total expendi­
ture and taxation policies. Local disposition towards the level of property 
tax can be operationalised as the percentage o f council seats held by the 
Labour party. This captures elements both of the disposition of elected re­
presentatives and of the wider electorate. On the basis of the traditional dis­
position of the Labour party towards the role of government a positive 
relationship between LAB and ARP is hypothesised.
2.2.5 In c o m e
The level of personal income in each area is likely to influence elite percep­
tion of the capacity o f the local electorate to bear rate increases and electoral 
tolerance of such increases. Data on personal income is not available for 
English local authorities16. However, income is closely related to social 
class. Therefore the proportion of the adult population in the top three so­
cial classes (professional, managerial and skilled non-manual) is used as an 
income proxy.
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2.2.6 Business ra tepayers
The opposition of businesses to rate increases is well established by opinion 
surveys17 and case studies of local policy making18. Recently a sympathetic 
Conservative central government endowed business ratepayers with a statu­
tory right to be consulted by local authorities prior to rate decisions19. The 
increased concern by local authorities since the late 1970’s to protect the lo­
cal economy may also have added weight to ‘the threat of.disinvestment’20. 
The potential opposition of business ratepayers to tax increases is opera­
tionalised through the proportion of the tax base which consists of commer­
cial and industrial premises21. I f  this opposition is effective then there 
should be a negative relationship between BRP and ARP.
2.3 T he m ed ian  vo te r a n d  m ean  vo te r m odels
The above discussion suggests the following two models of variations in 
local tax policies:
I. The median voter model -
ARP = a + b jM ED TP + b2AGR + b3LAB + b4IN C  + b5BRP
II .  The mean voter model -
ARP = a + b6M E A N TP + b2AGR + b3LAB + b4IN C  + b5BRP
The expected signs on the parameters are:
b] , b2> b3, bg <  0 
b3, b4 >  0
I f  the median voter hypothesis is valid then model I should provide superior 
statistical results to model I I .
The models are tested for all three groups of English lower-tier local 
authorities in three time periods. The first group of authorities is the 32 
London boroughs. The second group is the 36 metropolitan districts which 
are responsible for the major urban areas outside London (e.g. Birmingham, 
Sheffield, Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Newcastle). The third group, 
which covers the rest of England, is the 296 non-metropolitan districts. The­
se include rural, suburban and coastal areas as well as cities which rank be­
low London and the major metropolitan districts in the urban hierarchy22. 
Service responsibilities within each of these groups are uniform with the ex­
ception of education provision in London. The education service is the 
direct responsibility o f the outer London boroughs but is provided by the 
Inner London Education Authority in the inner boroughs. To cater for this 
difference an education provision dummy variable (outer =  1, inner =  0 )
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is added to the models for the London boroughs.
The models are tested for tax policies in the financial years 1982/3, 
1983/4 and 1984/5. It is appropriate to focus on single financial years be­
cause in the 1980’s very few authorities have planned their finances more 
than twelve months ahead23. Thus tax policy decisions are best modelled as 
a response to constraints imposed during individual budgetary cycles. The 
following lag structure is therefore appropriate:
ARPt = f (M E D T P t _ ,, M E A N T P t _ ,, LA B t _ ,, BRPt _ ,, IN C t _ ,, AGRt)
Data availability allows the models to be tested using this lag structure for 
all variables except IN C . Data on IN C  is available only for 1981. It should 
therefore be cautioned that the estimated coefficients for the impact of IN C  
on ARP may be progressively attenuated by measurement error in the results 
for 1983/4 and 1984/5.
2.4 C o m p a r in g  th e  m odels  in  d if fe re n t  p o lit ic a l  con texts
All English local political systems are representative democracies in formal 
structure. However, there are variations in party systems and in electoral ar­
rangements. This diversity permits a comparison of the median voter and 
mean voter models in different political contexts.
There is no established classification of party systems in English local go­
vernment. However, authorities can be allocated to one of the following 
three categories. First, one-party systems where the largest single party 
holds at least 75% of total council seats. Second, two-party systems where 
the leading two parties combined seat share is at least 85%. Third, all remai­
ning authorities which can be classified as multi-party systems. Both the 
Downs’ model and previous empirical results suggests that the median voter 
model should perform best in two-party systems. Ideally, the results for 
two-party systems would be compared directly with the results for other 
party systems. However, there is a sufficient number of cases for a direct 
comparison only in the non-metropolitan districts. In the other two groups 
of authorities indirect evidence on this issue can be obtained by comparing 
the results for two-party systems with those for all systems24.
Electoral arrangements differ both across and within the three groups of 
authorities. In the London boroughs and the majority of the non­
metropolitan districts there are ‘whole-council’ elections every four years. 
In the period covered by this analysis these were held in 1982 and 1983 
respectively. The discussion in Section 2 suggests that in these years the ex­
posure of politicians to the electorate provides an especially favourable con­
text for the validity of the median voter model. In the metropolitan districts 
and the remaining non-metropolitan districts there are ‘partial council’ elec­
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tions in three out of every four years. One third of council seats were con­
tested in 1982, 1983 and 1984. In this context the relative performance of 
the median voter and mean voter models should be more consistent over 
time because o f the sustained exposure of politicians to electoral pressures. 
There is no a-priori basis on which to predict whether whole council elec­
tions or partial council elections provide a more favourable context for the 
median voter hypothesis. This will be examined in the discussion of the em­
pirical evidence.
3. Empirical evidence
The results of the tests of the models are illustrated in Tables 2 to 425. The 
models are tested on identical data with the exception o f the M E D TP  and 
M E A N TP  variables. Thus any differences between the results of the two 
models stem from these two variables.
While the statistical explanation provided by the models is in general only 
moderate the R2’s are comparable to other studies of annual changes in 
local outputs26. The estimated coefficients for some of the independent 
variables must be interpreted with caution because of the presence of 
substantial multicollinearity (see Appendix). Where multicollinearity is high 
(R2 >  R2) the estimated coefficients are inefficient and, while unbiased, 
imprecise in single small samples. However, this problem does not impair 
the overall level of statistical explanation as a basis for comparing the per­
formance of the median and mean voter models.
3.1 T h e  e x p la n a tio n  p ro v id e d  b y  th e  m odels
The overall level of statistical explanation is generally better for the mean 
voter model than for the median voter model. The position is reversed only 
in the results for non-metropolitan districts with two-party systems (see 
below). Elsewhere the mean model provides R2’s and F ’s which are either 
higher than or approximately equal to the median model. The S.E.R. fig­
ures suggest the same conclusion27. The estimate of ARP produced by the 
regressions is generally more precise when M E A N TP  is included than when 
M E D T P  is included.
3.2 T h e  c o e ffic ie n ts  f o r  M E D T P  a n d  M E A N T P
In most of the regressions multicollinearity may have reduced the precision 
and significance of the estimated coefficients for M E A N TP and, to a lesser 
extent, for M E D TP . Therefore to provide further insight the change in R2 
when M E D T P  and M E A N TP  are added to the regression models is also
Table 2. OLS regression results, London boroughs, (n = 32)
1982 1983 1984
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
R2 0.35 0.42* 0.45* 0.68** * 0.55** 0.63***
F 2.20 3.04 3.41 8.91 5.0 7.11
S.E.R. 14.74 13.85 27.87 21.22 8.15 7.35
RSQCH 0.04 0.11* 0.03 0.26*** 0.00 0.09
M EDTP 0.03 -0 .0 4 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
M EA N TP -0 .1 3 * -0 .3 4 * ** -0 .0 6 *
(0.06) (0.07) (0.02)
AGR -0 .7 0 - 0.68* -0 .5 6 -0 .7 6 ** -0 .1 9 -0 .1 5
(0.36) (0.33) (0.28) (0.22) (0.12) (0.11)
IN C 0.26 -0 .2 8 0.56 2.08* 0.26 0.71*
(0.70) (0.72) ( 1.10) (0.91) (0.34) (0.35)
LAB 0.01 - 0.11 0.52 0.86* 0.22 0.32*
(0.24) (0.24) (0.42) (0.33) (0.13) (0.12)
BRP -0 .0 7 -0 .4 0 -1 .7 8 * -  1.14 -0 .3 5 - 0.12
(0.41) (0.42) (0.81) (0.64) (0.18) (0.18)
OUTER 15.34 15.60* -45 .08* -5 2 .9 8 *** -9 .2 1 * -1 4 .5 0 ***
(9.26) (7.21) (16.75) (10.84) (4.45) (3.90)
Constant -21 .32 -3 .8 4 80.09 52.71 19.95 0.05
(38.33) (37.23) (62.97) (48.29) (18.58) (17.21)
Notes
1. Standard errors in brackets.
2. Significance levels -  * >  0.05;
* *  >  0 .01; 
* * *  a  0.001.
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Table 3. OLS regression results, non-metropolitan districts, partial council elections, single and multi-party systems
1982 (n = 55) 1983 (n = 51) 1984 (n = 60)
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
R: 0.39*** 0.41*** 0.34** 0.40*** 0.13 0.13
F 6.38 6.78 4.64 6.04 1.61 1.63
S.E.R. 11.23 11.09 16.29 15.52 13.90 13.89
RSQCH 0 0.02* 0 0.06* 0.01 0.01
M EDTP - 0.01 -0 .003 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
M EANTP - 0.11 -0 .2 4 * -0 .0 8
(0.09) (0.11) (0.09)
AGR -0 .5 3 * * * -0 .5 4 * * * -  1.32*** -  1.64*** -0 .4 1 * -0 .4 2 *
(0.11) (0.11) (0.36) (0.37) (0.19) (0.19)
INC 0.50 0.83* 0.12 0.59 -0 .3 0 -0 .1 8
(0.30) (0.36) (0.44) (0.44) (0.35) (0.41)
LAB 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.09* -0 .1 5 -0 .1 7
(0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13)
BRP - 0.22 -0 .1 5 -0 .1 7 0.01 0.51 0.55
(0.27) (0.28) (0.39) (0.37) (0-27) (0.28)
Constant -5 .6 2 -9 .4 7 9.41 19.61 6.48 13.51
(14.79) (13.50) (21.46) (19.55) (17.89) (16.56)
Table 4. OLS regression results, non-metropolitan districts, partial council elections, two-party systems
1982 (n = 48) 1983 (n = 52) 1984 (n = 59)
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
R2 0.32** 0.30** 0.30** 0.22* 0.19* 0.19*
F 4.03 3.53 3.98 2.63 2.55 2.45
S.E.R. 11.22 11.46 8.10 8.55 9.03 9.06
RSQCH 0.03 0 0.08* 0 0.01 0
M EDTP -0 .0 3 -0 .0 3 - 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
M EANTP - 0.01 - 0.02 - 0.001
(0.09) (0.06) (0.06)
AGR -0 .4 3 ** -0 .4 2 ** -0 .4 6 ** -0 .4 9 ** -0 .4 8 * -0 .4 6
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.22) (0.23)
IN C 0.01 0.18 0.10 - 0.10 0.46* 0.41
(0.26) (0.28) (0.20) (0.23) (0.18) (0.22)
LAB 0.17 0.11 0.01 -0 .0 7 0.04 0.06
(0 .10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
BRP -0 .7 0 * -0 .12* -0 .0 6 -0 .1 3 -0 .5 1 * -0 .5 2 *
(0.27) (0.28) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21)
Constant - 10.12 -22 .40 1.53 17.72 43.43*** 40.83***
(15.21) ( 12.66) ( 11.88) (10.26) (10.83) (10.15)
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considered (see RSQCH figures in Tables 2 to 4).
The estimated coefficients provide no support for the hypothesis for 
M ED TP. The relationship between M ED TP and ARP fluctuates in sign and 
is never significant at 0.05 level. By contrast the results offer some support 
for the M EA N TP hypothesis. The estimated coefficients for M E A N TP  are 
uniformly negative, but are consistently significant only in the London bor­
ough regressions.
The RSQCH figures largely corroborate the evidence provided by the re­
gression coefficients. The one exception is in the results for 1983 in Table
4. While the coefficient for M ED TP is not significant, the RSQCH figure 
indicates that the variable adds significantly to the explanatory power of the 
model.
In general then neither M ED TP nor M E A N TP  is a pervasive influence 
on local tax policies. In the London boroughs M EA N TP is substantially 
more important than M ED TP; in the metropolitan districts neither variable 
is a significant constraint on ARP; and in the non-metropolitan districts 
each variable is occasionally but not frequently significant.
3.3 T h e  re la tiv e  p e rfo rm a n c e  o f  the  m o d els  in  d if fe re n t  p a r ty  system s
In the London boroughs and metropolitan districts the relative performance 
of the median and mean models differs little between all authorities and 
two-party systems. Thus in these two groups of authorities there is no evi­
dence that two-party systems facilitate the impact of median voter interests 
on tax policies.
However, the pattern is different in the non-metropolitan districts. The 
mean voter model is superior in single and multi-party systems; but the 
median voter model provides better results than the mean model in two- 
party systems. The difference in the performance of the models is not great. 
However, the pattern is consistent in both the whole-council election and 
partial-council election groups. This suggests that in the non-metropolitan 
districts the impact of median voters on tax policies is slightly enhanced by 
the presence of a two-party system.
There are several possible reasons why two-party systems appear to pro­
vide a more favourable context for the median voter model in the non­
metropolitan districts but not in the major urban authorities. First, the dif­
ference in the results across the groups of authorities may be an artefact of 
the method of analysis. I f  it had been possible to compare directly two-party 
system results with other party system results for the London boroughs and 
metropolitan districts then a pattern similar to that in Tables 3 and 4 might 
have emerged. Second, there may be substantive reasons for the difference. 
In comparison to the two groups of urban authorities the non-metropolitan 
districts provide a smaller range of services which are less professionalised
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and less salient in national politics. Thus the role of large professional 
bureaucracies or central government may overwhelm local electoral con­
siderations in urban authorities but not in the non-metropolitan districts28. 
A  further substantive reason for the difference is the relative size of the 
authorities. Average population in the urban groups is over three times as 
large as in the non-metropolitan districts. Smaller populations may facili­
tate the identification of and response to median voter interests in two-party 
systems29.
3.4 T h e  ro le  o f  e lectio n  system s
The results do not suggest that the potential exposure of politicians to elec­
toral pressure strengthens the impact of median voters on tax policies. The 
performance of the median voter model relative to the mean voter model 
is not better in years when the whole council was elected, either in the Lon­
don boroughs or in the non-metropolitan districts. Similarly, there is little 
difference in the relative performance of the models between whole-council 
election and partial-council election authorities. Thus there is no evidence 
that either the imminence of an election or the type of election system influ­
ences the validity of the median voter model.
3.5 T h e  o th e r  in d ep en d en t variab les
The presence of multicollinearity constrains the interpretation of the coeffi­
cients for AGR, LAB, IN C  and BRP in the London regressions; and the in­
terpretation of the coefficients for LAB and IN C  elsewhere. However, most 
of the coefficients have the expected signs and there is only one which is sig­
nificant with the ‘wrong’ sign.
The impact of AGR on ARP is consistently negative and is significant in 
most contexts. IN C  generally has the hypothesised positive sign in the Lon­
don and non-metropolitan district results but the coefficients are rarely sig­
nificant. In  the metropolitan district regressions IN C  fluctuates in sign and 
is never significant. BRP is almost uniformly negative in sign as expected 
but is not frequently significant. The hypothesis for LAB is not well suppor­
ted. The estimated coefficients are not consistently positive in any group of 
authorities. While several of the positive coefficients are significant one of 
the negative coefficients is also significant30.
In general, then, the evidence indicates that the influence of central grants 
on local tax policies is more systematic and pervasive than the influence of 
either the local tax costs of the electorate or the interests of businesses rate­
payers. A  precise evaluation o f the role of political disposition and personal 
incomes is clouded by multicollinearity, but these variables also appears to 
be less important than central grants.
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4. Conclusion
The statistical results offer little support for the median voter hypothesis. 
Most of the evidence indicates no significant relationship between median 
voter and tax policy variables. The median voter model performs better than 
the rival mean voter model only in smaller local authorities where there is 
a two-party system. However, even here the impact of the median voter is 
weak.
Thus the evidence is not consistent with Inman’s (1978) claim that politics 
can be ‘buried’ in the median voter. Median voter interests appear to be a 
poor proxy for the aspects of local political systems which influence policy 
variation.
However, it must be emphasised that these results provide only initial evi­
dence on the validity of the median voter hypothesis for one type of policy 
decision by local political systems in England. The evidence is not sufficient 
to imply a need to amend the median voter model or abandon it in favour 
of yet further theories of policy formation. As Rogowski (1978) has argued, 
progress towards ‘normal science’ in the study of politics has been prevented 
by a proliferation of theories which mostly constitute ‘mere jargon’31. 
Conclusions on the utility of the median voter model can only be tentative 
until there is much more evidence than provided by the dozen empirical ana­
lyses published in the last 20 years.
NOTES
1. The term ‘median voter’ is not actually part of Downs’ (1957) lexicon. On the genesis of 
median voter models of direct and representative democracy see Mueller (1979).
2. A  major recent investigation of the role of politics in local policy variation is Sharpe and 
Newton (1984). For a review of the American and British studies in this field see Boyne 
(1985).
3. For example Barry (1978), Dunleavy and Ward (1981).
4. For example Davies et al. (1970), Comanor (1976). For a synthesis of the literature see 
Austen-Smith (1983).
5. Downs (1957: 21). For critiques of the ‘irrelevance of assumptions’ position see Blaug 
(1980) and Toye (1976). For a broader evaluation of the ‘scientific’ content of rational 
models see Moe (1979).
6. Barr and Davies and subsequent studies use various proxies for median tax price and 
median income. See Romer and Rosenthal (1979) for a critique of the specification of these 
variables.
7. Results consistent with the median voter hypothesis are obtained by Bergstrom and Good­
man (1973), Inman (1978), Lovell (1978), Holcombe (1980) and Sjoquist (1981). However, 
the results of Romer and Rosenthal (1982) do not support the median voter model.
8. See Mueller (1979), Romer and Rosenthal (1979).
9. The most frequently used measure is per capita income. See Boyne (1985) for a discus­
216
sion of the specification of the explanatory variables and a summary of the results in these 
studies.
10. Pommerehne and Frey claim that their results show that the median model is superior. 
However, there is very little difference between the R2’s. The different significance of the 
median and mean voter variables probably reflects multicollinearity. See Romer and 
Rosenthal (1979).
11. See Sharpe (1981) for a discussion of local tax revenue in Western Europe.
12. The reasons for the political salience of rates are discussed in detail in Newton and Karran 
(1985).
13. On fiscal illusion see Wagner (1976). The term usually refers to the underestimation of 
the price of public services. On ‘reverse’ fiscal illusion see Pommerehne and Schneider 
(1978).
14. This point has recently been used to justify proposed reforms to local taxation which 
would replace domestic rates with a poll tax. See Department of the Environment, Scot­
tish Office and Welsh Office (1986).
15. See Association of County Councils (1985) for a discussion of recent trends in central 
grants.
16. See Foster et al. (1980) for a discussion of the problems of constructing an income proxy.
17. See for example Jackman (1978). On the impact of rates on businesses see Crawford et 
al. (1985).
18. Dearlove (1973), Saunders (1979).
19. Under the 1984 Rates Act.
20. See Piven and Friedland (1984) for a discussion of the importance of this source of busi­
ness power.
21. For similar measures of business power in studies of subnational policy variation in the 
USA see Game (1980) and Perry (1981).
22. For a discussion of this concept and tlje rank order positions of English cities see Sharpe 
and Newton (1984).
23. For a survey of financial planning in local authorities see Audit Commission (1984).
24. The small number of two-party systems in the London boroughs and metropolitan dis­
tricts creates the danger of outliers dominating the results. However, inspection of the 
scatterplots and of the residuals from the regressions indicated that the results were not 
seriously distorted by deviant cases.
25. The results of the regressions for the other groups of authorities are available upon re­
quest from the author.
26. There are no previous studies of the determinants of financial output change in England. 
Studies in the USA of changes in taxes and expenditures have yielded average R2’s of 
around 30-40% .
27. Achen (1982) argues that the S.E.R. is a superior measure of ‘goodness of fit’ to the R2.
28. On the impact of bureaucratic power on local policy variation see Boyne (1987).
29. For a discussion of the relationship between size and democracy see Newton (1982). On 
constituency size and the responsiveness of representatives see Greene and Salavitabar
(1982).
30. In the two-party metropolitan district results for 1982.
31. Rogowski (1978: 307).
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R2 for independent variables in Tables 2 to 4
Table 2
1982 1983 1984
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
MEDTP 0.62 0.57 0.60
M EANTP 0.59 0.56 0.63
AGR 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.18 0.19
INC 0.84 0.87 0.77 0.81 0.79 0.84
LAB 0.85 0.86 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.84
BRP 0.57 0.65 0.62 0.64 0.34 0.47
OUTER 0.66 0.51 0.63 0.49 0.55 0.52
Table 3
1982 1983 1984
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
M EDTP 0.41 0.38 0.25
M EANTP 0.46 0.56 0.54
AGR 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.27 0.12 0.18
INC 0.57 0.63 0.59 0.66 0.50 0.65
LAB 0.59 0.48 0.59 0.51 0.54 0.49
BRP 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.45
Table 4
1982 1983 1984
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
M EDTP 0.20 0.27 0.18
M EANTP 0.53 0.57 0.53
AGR 0.05 0.05 0.37 0.45 0.11 0.15
INC 0.64 0.76 0.67 0.70 0.60 0.71
LAB 0.73 0.71 0.69 0.63 0.65 0.63
BRP 0.45 0.47 0.40 0.42 0.34 0.39
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Bureaucratic Power and Public Policies: 
a Test of the Rational Staff 
Maximization Hypothesis
G e o rg e  A .  Boyne  
P o ly te c h n ic  o f  W ales
This paper tests the staff maximization hypothesis that bureaucratic power is 
positively related to labour inputs to the production of public sector goods and 
services. The context of the test is the staffing policies of three groups of British local 
authorities in three time periods. The relationship between bureaucratic power and 
changes in authorities’ staff is estimated while controlling for the influence of local 
party politics, central grants and conditions in the environment of the local political 
system. The results of the statistical analysis refute the staff maximization 
hypothesis.
A  widely held assumption in political science is that bureaucrats, defined 
broadly as the senior staff of governmental organizations, can bias public 
policies towards their own preferences. The theoretical support for this 
assumption stems largely from the rational choice theory of utility maximiza­
tion by self-interested actors. The empirical support stems from case studies of 
policy decisions or from the general observation that much of the policy process 
flows through bureaucratic channels. This paper attempts to estimate the 
relationship between buraucratic power and public policy on a systematic 
comparative basis. The policy area within which this relationship is estimated is 
one which might be expected to be particularly sensitive to the effect of bureau­
cratic power: the number of state employees.
Since shortly after the 1979 general election the Conservative government has 
exhorted local authorities to shed staff as part of a wider strategy aimed at 
reducing the size and functions of the state. The response of local authorities 
has varied greatly— while most have cut staff some have recruited additional 
employees. The staff maximization hypothesis predicts that those authorities 
where bureaucrats are most powerful will suffer the least severe staff cuts. This 
hypothesis is tested by examining the relationship between bureaucratic power 
and staffing policies while controlling for other relevant variables such as local 
socioeconomic conditions, financial resources and party politics.
The analysis below is in three parts. Part I surveys the rational choice 
literature on bureaucratic behaviour and summarizes existing empirical results 
about the relationship between characteristics of the bureaucracy and local 
policy variation. Part I I  presents a model of variations in staffing policies and
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specifies the variables through which the model is tested. Part I I I  presents the 
results of various forms of the model.
I. Bureaucrats and Policies: Theory and Evidence
R a t io n a l B u reau cra ts?
Rational choice theory seeks to explain bureaucratic behaviour on the basis of 
the fundamental economic assumption of utility maximization. 1 Put simply, 
the theory predicts that from a range of policy options those policies which 
most closely match bureaucrats’ preferences will be selected. A  critical element 
in rational choice theory is therefore the ‘arguments’ in bureaucrats’ utility 
functions. It is through the specification of this utility that bureaucratic 
behaviour and its potential implications for public policy can be deduced. 
However, the rational choice literature bristles with conflicting assumptions 
about bureaucrats’ utility and the consequences of bureaucratic behaviour.
The rational choice perspective was first formalized by Niskanen2 in a model 
which predicts the oversupply of public sector goods and services on the basis of 
three assumptions. The first is that bureaucrats’ utility is positively related to 
budget size. The second is that bureaucrats have the capacity to maximize their 
budgets. Niskanen argues that the power distribution between bureaucrats and 
their political sponsors who provide funds is heavily weighted in favour of 
bureaucrats. Because actual costs of production are known only to bureaucrats 
it is possible to hoodwink political sponsors into providing funds surplus to that 
necessary to produce the output ‘really’ demanded. The third assumption is 
that bureaucrats spent their ‘discretionary budget’ on extra units of output.
Subsequent developments in the rational choice literature have largely 
accepted Niskanen’s assumption that bureaucrats desire  budget maximization.3 
However, the assumptions that bureaucrats have the c a p ac ity  for budget 
maximization and that surplus funds are allocated to o u tp u t  have been 
disputed. It has been widely argued that Niskanen over-emphasizes the ability 
of bureaucrats to avoid effective ‘monitoring’ by politicians.4 It  is accepted, 
however, that bureaucrats possess some capacity to manipulate information. 
The level of this capacity determines whether more revenue is acquired than
1 For a review of the broader literature on bureaucracy see B. Jenkins and A. Gray, 
‘Bureaucratic politics and power: developments in the study of bureaucracy’ , Political Studies, 31
(1983), 177-93; T. Moe, ‘The new economics of organisation’ , American Journal o f  Political 
Science, 28 (1984), 739-77.
2 W. A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago, Aldine-Atherton, 
1971). For a discussion of the nature of formal models see M . P. Fiorina, ‘Formal models in 
Political Science’ , American Journal o f  Political Science, 19 (1975), 133-59.
3 The budget maximization assumption has been criticized on the basis that some bureaucrats 
may prosper by budget cutting. See, for example A. Breton and R. Wintrobe, ‘The equilibrium size 
of a budget maximising bureau: a note on Niskanen’s theory of bureaucracy’ , Journal o f  Political 
Economy, 83 (1975), 195-207.
4 See for example Breton and Wintrobe, ‘The equilibrium size of a budget maximising bureau’; 
J. Conybeare, ‘Bureaucracy, monopoly and competition: a critical analysis of the budget 
maximising model of bureaucracy’ , American Journal o f  Political Science, 28 (1984), 479-502; 
G. Miller and T. Moe, ‘Bureaucrats, legislators and the size of government’ , American Political 
Science Review, 77 (1983), 297-322.
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that needed to produce ‘efficiently’ . For the purposes of this paper the 
implication is that bureaucratic power is not constant but varies across local 
political systems.
Niskanen’s assumption that surplus revenue is allocated to output has been 
criticized on the basis that bureaucrats may spend their discretionary budget in 
a variety of ways.5 To the extent that surplus revenue is allocated solely to 
output the opportunity to spend on other commodities and activities must be 
forgone. The key argument for the purposes of this analysis is that bureaucrats’ 
utility may be maximized not through the level of output but through the level 
of la b o u r  inp u ts  to the production process.6 This ‘staff maximization 
hypothesis’ is adduced rather than derived logically. It therefore has no greater 
or firmer status than any other hypothesis about how bureaucrats might spend 
the money obtained by disguising true costs of production. However, the idea 
that public sector organizations are ‘overstaffed’ may have an intuitive appeal 
parallel to that of ‘Parkinson’s Law’ , which states that bureaucracy expands 
even in the context of declining output.7
While critiques of Niskanen’s model abound, the discussion is virtually 
uncontaminated by data. Indeed, even the budget maximization assumption 
has not been directly tested. Several authors, including Niskanen himself, 
provide evidence which is consistent with budget maximization8 but there is also 
evidence which is inconsistent with it .9 The major questions therefore remain 
largely unanswered: how great is the desire for surplus funds? how great is the 
capacity to secure such funds? and how is the discretionary budget spent?
This analysis retains the assumption that bureaucrats’ utility is positively 
related to budget size. The assumption of a uniformly powerful bureaucracy 
which bamboozles politicians in the budgetary process is, however, relaxed. On 
this basis the staff maximizaton hypothesis is tested within the context of the 
model of variations in staffing policy developed below. First, empirical 
analyses of local policy variation are examined for evidence on the effect of 
bureaucratic power.
5 See for example J. Migue and G. Belanger, ‘Toward a general theory of managerial discretion’ , 
Public Choice, 17 (1974), 27-43; R. E. Goodin, ‘Rational politicians and rational bureaucrats in 
Washington and Whitehall’, Public Administration, 60 (1982), 23-41. Niskanen has conceded this 
point. See W. A. Niskanen, ‘Bureaucrats and politicians’, Journal o f  Law and Economics, 18 
(1975), 617-43.
6 See M . Fiorina and G. Noll, ‘Voters, bureaucrats and legislators’ , Journal o f  Public 
Economics, 9 (1979), 239-54; W. Orzechowski, ‘Economic models of bureaucracy: surveys, 
extensions and evidence’ , in T. E. Borcherding (ed.), Budgets and Bureaucrats (Durham, N.C., 
Duke University Press, 1977); W. Pommerehne and B. S. Frey, ‘Bureaucratic behaviour in a 
democracy: a case study’ , Public Finance/Finances Publiques, 33 (1978), 98-111.
7 See A. Breton and R. Wintrobe, ‘Bureaucracy and state intervention: Parkinson’s Law’ , 
Canadian Public Administration, 22 (1979), 208-26; G. A. Boyne, ‘Housing administrators and 
empire building: a test of Parkinson’s Law’, Public Policy and Administration, 1 (1986), 18-32.
8 Niskanen, ‘Bureaucrats and politicians’ ; R. M . Spann, ‘Rates of productivity change and the 
growth of state and local expenditures’, in Borcherding (ed.), Budgets and Bureaucrats-, T . E. 
Borcherding, W. C. Bush and R. M . Spann, ‘The effects on public spending of the divisibility of 
public outputs in consumpton, bureaucratic power, and the size of the tax sharing group’, in 
Borcherding (ed.), Budgets and Bureaucrats.
9 J. H. Beck, ‘Budget maximising bureaucracy and the effects of state aid on school expendi­
tures’ , Public Finance Quarterly, 9 (1981), 159-82; T. G. McGuire, ‘Budget maximising govern­
mental agencies: an empirical test’ , Public Choice, 36 (1981), 313-22.
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B u reau cra ts  a n d  L o c a l P o lic y  V a r ia t io n
Measures of various characteristics of the bureaucracy have been used as inde­
pendent variables in over a dozen studies of influences on sub-national policy 
variation in the US and Western Europe. 10 The principal characteristics 
measured are bureau size (ratio of staff to local population), organizational 
structure (vertical and horizontal differentiation) and ‘professionalism’ (pay 
and qualifications). It is characteristic of such studies of local policy variation 
that neither the specification of bureaucratic variables nor the results for their 
relationship to policy variables are much discussed. 11 In addition, the different 
control variables used make it difficult to compare the net effect of the 
bureaucracy in different studies. These studies therefore offer little guidance 
for further analysis of the relationship between bureaucratic power and 
policies.
The British studies of local policy variation which use measures of the 
bureaucracy as independent variables display similar problems. Nicholson and 
Topham use an ‘impetus’ variable to estimate the influence of the bureaucracy 
on housing policies. 12 The concept of impetus is operationalized through 
previous housing policy outputs. Previous policies are interpreted as a measure 
of ‘technostructure attitudes to the task of building houses, reflecting the 
dynamic of the town hall machine’ . 13 Previous policies are used in the same way 
in Nicholson and Topham’s subsequent study of expenditure on roads and by 
Danziger in an analysis of a range of local service expenditures. 14 The major 
problem in using previous policy outputs as a proxy for bureaucratic power is 
the great distance between the concept and its operationalization. Previous 
policy outputs are likely to have been the product of the same gamut of forces 
as current policy outputs. Therefore, while bureaucratic power may be 
contained somewhere in the impetus variable, its extent is unknown.
Several British studies use the fragmentation of local authorities’ organiza­
tional structure as an indicator of the ‘autonomy’ o f the bureaucracy. 15
10 A  full list of these American studies is provided in G. A. Boyne, ‘Theory, methodology and 
results in political science— the case of output studies’ , British Journal o f  Political Science, 15 
(1985), 473-515. For bureaucracy variables in European studies see: R. C. Fried, ‘Party and policy 
in West German cities’ , American Political Science Review, 70 (1976), 11-24; T. Hansen and F. 
Kjellberg, ‘Municipal expenditures in Norway: autonomy and constraints in local government 
activity’ , Policy and Politics, 4 (1976), 25-50; M . Aiken and S. Bacharach, ‘The urban system, 
politics and bureaucratic structure’ , in L. Karpic (ed.), Organisation and Environment: Theory, 
Issue and Reality (London, Sage, 1978); T. Hansen, ‘Transforming needs into expenditure 
decisions’ , in K. Newton (ed.), Urban Political Economy (London, Frances Pinter, 1981).
11 The only useful discussions are in G. W. Downs, Bureaucracy, Innovation and Public Policy 
(Lexington, Mass., D. C. Heath, 1976); and Aiken and Bacharach, ‘The urban system, politics and 
bureaucratic structure’ .
12 R. J. Nicholson and N. Topham, ‘The determinants of investment in housing by local 
authorities: an econometric approach’ , Journal o f  The Royal Statistical Society, Series A , 134 
(1971), 273-303.
13 Nicholson and Topham, ‘The determinants of investment’ , p. 285.
14 R. J. Nicholson and N. Topham, ‘Urban road provision in England and Wales 1962-68’, 
Policy and Politics, 4 (1975), 3-29; J. N. Danziger, Making Budgets (Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage, 
1978).
15 N. T. Boaden, Urban Policy Making (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971); B. P. 
Davies, A. Barton, I. McMillan and V. Williamson, Variations in Services fo r  the A ged  (London, 
G. Bell and Sons, 1971); T. Karran, ‘Borough politics and county government: administrative 
styles in the old structure’ , Policy and Politics, 10 (1982), 317-42.
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Boaden, for example, argues that the number o f separate council committees 
and sub-committees reflects the extent to which ‘chief officers are pursuing a 
professionally based appeal for the expansion of their services’ . 16 Boaden’s 
results show a weak positive partial correlation between bureaucratic autonomy 
and only one of 11 policy outputs examined.17 Davies et a l. also find a positive 
effect of the autonomy of the welfare bureaucracy on the share of total 
expenditure allocated to welfare provision and on a minority of the sub­
function welfare outputs which they analyse. 18 However, they note that these 
relationships may well be coincidental rather than causal, with both organiza­
tional structures and levels of welfare provision reflecting common historical 
influences. 19 Karran concludes that organizational structure influences most 
service expenditures but indicates neither the strength nor the direction of this 
influence.20 Measures of the ‘professionalism’ or ‘expertise’ of the bureaucracy 
are also included in a number of analyses of policy variation.21 However, the 
indicators used are again problematic and little evidence is yielded about the 
relationship between this characteristic of the bureaucracy and public 
policies.22
The final dimension of the bureaucracy used as an explanatory variable in 
British studies of local policy variation is ‘size’ . Storey uses staff per head of 
population as a measure of bureaucratic power in an analysis of staffing 
policies in the London Boroughs.23 The bureau size variable was not found to 
be significantly related to staffing policies when socioeconomic and political 
features of the boroughs were held constant. However, the use of staff per head 
of population as a proxy for bureaucratic power involves the same problem as 
the use of previous policy outputs. The ratio of staff to population is likely to 
reflect a variety of forces in addition to attempts by bureaucrats to maximize 
staff.
The above discussion has highlighted the limitations of both the theory and 
the evidence about the relationship between bureaucrats and public policies.
16 Boaden, Urban Policy Making, p. 33.
17 Expenditure on children’s services.
18 Davies et al., Variations in Services fo r  the Aged.
19 Davies et al., Variations in Services fo r  the Aged, p. 133.
20 Karran, ‘Borough politics and county government’ , p. 332.
21 Boaden, Urban Policy Making-, Karran, ‘Borough politics and county government’ ; B. P. 
Davies, A. Barton and I. McMillan, Variations in Children’s Services among British Urban 
Authorities (London, G. Bell and Sons, 1972).
22 In Boaden, Urban Policy Making, the measure of professionalism is whether the local 
authority has employed an organization and methods or work study consultant. The variable is not 
sufficiently important to be entered in any of the partial correlation analyses. In Karran, ‘Borough
politics and county government’ , one of the initial variables is chief officer membership of
professional associations. This variable subsequently sinks without trace into one of the 
‘administrative factors’ constructed from the initial variables. Davies et al., Variations in 
Children’s Services among British Urban Authorities, offers the most detailed discussion of this 
aspect of the bureaucracy. A number of measures of ‘staff calibre’ are specified. However these are 
used as independent variables only in the zero-order correlational analysis. In the path analysis 
models the measures of staff calibre are dependent variables.
23 D. J. Storey, ‘The economics of bureaux: the case of the London boroughs 1970-76’, Applied  
Economics, 12 (1980), 223-34. Karran, ‘Borough politics and county government’ , also uses a 
bureau size variable. However, like his ‘professionalism’ variable this is lost in an administrative 
factor.
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The rational choice literature consists of a variety of conflicting assumptions 
about how bureaucrats spend their discretionary budgets. In this context the 
staff maximization hypothesis must be regarded as one of a set of plausible 
conjectures each of which is more or less ‘free standing’ . Thus evidence on staff 
maximization neither directly undermines nor supports the budget maximiza­
tion assumption. Strictly, evidence against the staff maximization hypothesis 
simply suggests that if  surplus funds are being extracted by bureaucrats then 
they are spending the money on something other than labour inputs. Similarly, 
evidence for staff maximization simply suggests the ability to implement a 
preference for a particular factor of production, not an ability to extract 
surplus funds or to produce ‘ inefficiently’ .
Empirical analyses of the relationship between characteristics of the 
bureaucracy and local policy variation have yielded little useful evidence. In 
addition to sharing the general problems in the analysis of local policy 
variation,24 the studies display the particular problem of the poor operational­
ization of the concept of bureaucratic power. The result of these problems is an 
absence of cumulative evidence on the impact of bureaucrats on policies.25 In 
this context, the empirical analysis below must be regarded as largely 
exploratory.
I I .  A Model of Staffing Policies
When estimating the influence of bureaucratic power on public policies it is 
necessary to control for other potential influences. The bivariate relationship 
between bureaucratic power and policies is a crude measure which is unequal to 
the task of identifying the net influence of bureaucrats.26 The rational choice 
literature does not deal with the question of which other variables should be held 
constant when estimating the effect of bureaucratic power. Monitoring by 
political sponsors is the only suggested constraint on bureaucratic behaviour. 
However, it is necessary to place bureaucratic power in a wider context. The 
rational choice perspective on bureaucratic behaviour is a ‘partial’ theory 
which must be tested within a more general model of policy making.
The general model used in this analysis is a simplified version o f Easton’s 
system framework. This model has been widely applied to the problem of 
explaining local policy variation. Stated formally, the model can be expressed 
as
p =  f (E , I, PM)
where p = staffing policies
E = conditions in the environment of the local political system 
I =  inputs to the local political system 
PM  =  characteristics of local policy-makers
24 See Boyne, ‘Theory, methodology and results in political science’ .
25 On the issue of cumulation in political science in general, see G. Sjoblom, ‘The cumulation 
problem in political science: an essay on research strategies’ , European Journal o f  Political 
Research, 5 (1977), 1-32.
26 An analysis of bureaucratic power at central government level which examines only bivariate 
relationships is C. Hood, M. Huby and A. Dunsire, ‘Bureaucrats and budgeting benefits: how do 
British central government departments measure up?’ , Journal o f  Public Policy, 4 (1984), 163-79.
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T a b le  1. Variables and Hypotheses for S ta ff Change Regressions.
Concept Operationalization Label Source
Expected
sign
Staffing policy %  Change in S taff, 1980/81 — 
1981/ 82, 1981/ 82- 1982/ 83, 
1982/ 83- 1983/84
C H S T A F 81, 
82, 83
1
Policy-makers (a) In itia l Staffing Level, 1980
(b) S ta ff per 1,000 Population,
B U R P O W 5 +
1980
(c) %  Labour Seats, 1981/ 82,
S IZ E 1 7
1982/ 83, 1983/84  
(d) %  Conservative Seats, 1981/
L A B 6 +
82, 1982/ 83, 1983/84 C O N 6 -
Inputs
Environm ental
%  Change in Central Government 
Grant Support, 1980/ 81- 81/ 82, 
1981/ 82- 82/ 83, 1982/ 83- 83 /84  
(a) %  Change in Population,
SQ Z 4 +
conditions 1980- 81, 1981- 82, 1982-83  
(b) %  Population aged 0 -1 5  plus 
%  Population over
P O P C H 2 +
pensionable age, 1981 
(c) °7o Population in social classes
DEPS 3 +
E and F, 1981 
(d) °/o Households with no inside
L O C L A S 3 +
W C , 1981 
(e) °7o Males aged 16 -65
N O W C 3 +
unemployed, 1981 U N  ' 3 +
Sources:
1. Joint Manpower Watch press notices (Department of the Environment, Welsh Office, quarterly 
1980-84)
2. Local Authority Vital Statistics (London, Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, 1980-83)
3. 1981 Census
4. Financial, General and Rating Statistics (Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy, 1980/81 to 1983/84)
5. See Table 4 below
6. Municipal Year Book, 1975 to 1984
The version of this general model used here is simplified in that the statistical 
specification is in the form of a single equation. This is because the focus of the 
analysis is the bureaucratic power variable. No attempt is made to construct a 
comprehensive causal model of variations in staffing policies. In  the absence of 
any theory of local staffing policies it is premature to decompose the total effect 
of independent variables estimated from the single equation model into direct 
and indirect effects. The specification of a structural equation system which 
reflects how each independent variable influences staffing policies must await 
further theoretical and empirical development. Accordingly, the statistical 
results derived are not used to evaluate the ‘relative importance’ o f the political
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and environmental variables. Such comparisons are inappropriate on the basis 
of the estimated coefficients from a single equation.27
The variables through which the model is specified and the hypotheses to be 
tested are set out below and are summarized in Table 1.
T h e  D e p e n d e n t V a riab le : S ta ff in g  P o lic ie s
The concept of staffing policies is operationalized as the percentage change in 
full-time staff in three time periods: 1980/81 to 1981/82, 1981/82 to 1982/83 
and 1982/83 to 1983/84.28 The figures are taken from the Joint Manpower 
Watch which is published quarterly. The Manpower Watch compares staff 
levels in one year with those of the previous year on a day in the same month. To 
reduce the measurement error contained in such ‘snapshots’ the average annual 
change across the four Manpower Watch data points (June, September, 
December and March) is used as the dependent variable in the analysis. The 
staffing policies of three groups of local authority are analysed: first, the 20 
outer London boroughs and 36 metropolitan districts; secondly, the 296 
English non-metropolitan districts; and thirdly, the 37 Welsh districts. Service 
responsibilities within each group of authorities are uniform. Therefore 
separate analyses effectively control for different responsibilities as a possible 
source of variation in changes in staffing.29 An indication of the scale of staff
27 See M. Lewis-Beck and L. B. Mohr, ‘Evaluating effects of independent variables, Political 
Methodology, 3 (1976), 27-47.
28 The figures exlude staff in the Police, Magistrates Courts and Probation Services. In these 
services the Conservative government has encouraged expansion. Figures for only full-time staff are 
used because the part-time figures are not comparable across authorities or over time within 
individual authorities (see Joint Manpower Watch press notices). The restriction of the analysis to 
full-time staffing levels should not seriously distort the results. Over the relevant period full-time 
staff represented approximately 81 per cent of total full-time equivalent staffing for local 
government as a whole. This proportion is lower for the outer London boroughs and metropolitan 
districts because of the heavy concentration of part-time employees in Education and the Personal 
Social Services. However, for the English non-metropolitan districts and Welsh districts full-time 
staff represent approximately 93 per cent of total full-time equivalent staffing (figures derived from 
Manpower Watch press notices).
29 A  problem of variation in service responsibilities which must be tackled is that some 
authorities have shed staff through substantial privatization programmes, principally in the area of 
refuse collection. The Manpower Wiatch figures for these authorities show staff decreases as large as 
25 per cent in a single year. However, the actual reduction in the number of jobs as a result of the 
switch to private contractors is unknown. It is therefore inappropriate to compare the figures for 
these authorities with those for the bulk of authorities where direct responsibility for service 
provision has been retained. In addition, privatization involves a change in the functional scope of 
government which is substantively different from mere staff reductions. Authorities where 
considerable privatization has occurred are therefore excluded from the analysis for the year in 
which the related staff changes occurred.
The excluded authorities are:
Outer London Boroughs and Metropolitan Districts: Merton, Wirral.
English Non-Metropolitan Districts: Babergh, Basingstoke, Bath, Chiltern, Eastbourne, Fylde, 
Mendip, Milton Keynes, North Norfolk, Penwith, Sevenoaks, South Kesteven, Southend, South 
Oxfordshire, Tandridge, Taunton Deane, Vale of White Horse.
Welsh Districts: Afan is excluded because major repairs to its housing stock caused a large 
temporary increase in its labour force in 1982 followed by a large reduction when the programme 
was completed in 1984.
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T a b le  2 . M ean Percentage Changes in Staffing Levels (x ) and N um ber o f Authorities  
Increasing ( + )  and Decreasing ( -  ) Staff.
Outer London
boroughs and English non­
m etropolitan metropolitan Weish
districts districts districts
X +  - X  + X +  -
C H S T A F 81 - 2 .1 7 45 - 2.5 44 236 - 3.2 4 29
C H S T A F 82 - 1.3 11 42 - 1 . 2 88 190 - 0.3 16 18
C H S T A F 83 - 0.4 20 33 0.2 160 112 - 0 . 8 16 18
Note: Figures for increases and decreases do not add up to the total of authorities in each group 
because of missing and excluded cases
changes taking place is given in Table 2 which shows the mean percentage 
changes and the number of authorities increasing and decreasing staff in each 
year. Together the three time periods and three categories of authority allow the 
examination of the effect of bureaucratic power in nine different contexts.
In d e p e n d e n t V ariab les
E n v iro n m e n ta l C o n d itio n s . The operationalization of the environment of a 
political system has received little consideration in studies of local policy 
variation. Large numbers of indicators of environmental conditions are often 
fired at policy variables. A  problem with this approach is that on grounds of 
probability alone some environmental variables are likely to be ‘direct hits’ in 
the sense of attaining statistical significance.30 Two criteria are used here to 
select environmental conditions of potential relevance to staffing policies. The 
first criterion is that the conditions should reflect the extent to which the local 
population are unable to pay for goods and services in the private market. The 
second criterion is explicitly inductive. The conditions selected reflect the type 
of variables found to be related to local staffing policies in a previous empirical 
analysis.31
On this basis it is hypothesized that the following conditions are positively 
related to the change in staffing: the change in total population, the percentage 
of the population in ‘dependant’ age groups (children and pensioners), the 
percentage of population in the low social classes (semi-skilled and unskilled), 
the male unemployment rate and the percentage of households in poor housing 
conditions.32 The specific indicators used are listed in Table 1.
30 See J. L. Payne, ‘Fishing expedition probability; the statistics of post-hoc hypothesising’, 
Polity, 7 (1974), 130-8.
31 See G. A. Boyne, ‘Socio-economic conditions, central policies and local staffing levels’ , 
Public Administration, 64 (1986), 69-82.
32 Ideally all of these indicators would measure the annual change in the relevant conditions. This 
would provide firmer grounds for causal inferences than the relationship between condition levels 
and policy change. However, data of the quality and comprehensiveness of the census is available 
only for total population. The other four variables can therefore only be specified as levels.
88 Bureaucratic Power and Public Policies
In p u ts . The concept of an input to the local political system is operationalized 
as the level of financial support from central government. This is measured as 
the annual percentage change in the level of grant in the three relevant financial 
years. In conjunction with ministerial exhortation the reduction of grant has 
been the indirect method used by central government to press local authorities 
to cut staff.33 The change in grant is measured in the same year as the change in 
staff because it represents a revenue source available to fund expenditure on 
staff within that year. It is hypothesized that grant changes will be positively 
related to staff changes, those authorities suffering the biggest cuts in grant also 
making the biggest cuts in staff.
P a r ty  P o litic s . The political composition of the local council is operationalized 
in two ways: as the percentage of Labour seats and as the percentage of 
Conservative seats. It is useful to include both measures because they are not 
simply mirror images of each other, especially in the English non-metropolitan 
districts and the Welsh districts.34 The political composition variables are 
measured in the same year as the staff changes. It seems unlikely that there is a 
substantial delay in the implementation of staffing decisions. Therefore it is 
preferable to measure political composition as close as possible to the 
Manpower Watch data points rather than measuring political composition in 
the previous year.
On the basis of the parties’ traditional disposition towards the size of the 
state a positive effect for Labour seats and a negative effect for Conservative 
seats is hypothesized. There is no basis on which to predict whether local 
Labour resistance to or local Conservative cooperation with a Conservative 
central government policy will have the greater impact. This will be examined in 
the empirical analysis.
B u re a u c ra tic  P o w e r. The concept of bureaucratic power is operationalized 
through a measure of the ‘initial staffing level’ in each authority prior to the 
changes in staff under consideration. The derivation of this measure is 
explained below. A  high initial staffing level is interpreted as reflecting high 
bureaucratic power and vice versa. The measure should be a good proxy for 
bureaucratic power to the extent that bureaucrats have a preference for labour 
inputs and have the capacity to translate this preference into policy. In other 
words, the initial staffing level must reflect bureaucratic power if  the staff 
maximization hypothesis is valid.
As noted in Part I, the ratio of staff to population is a poor measure of 
bureaucratic power because it contains the effect of variables other than the 
attempt by bureaucrats to maximize staff. To obtain a better indicator of 
bureaucratic power it is necessary to purge the staffing level measure of these 
other influences. Following the logic of the model of staff changes outlined 
above, the potential influences on the initial staffing level other than bureau­
cratic power are: conditions which reflect the dependence of local population
33 T. Travers, ‘Pay versus jobs: the choices facing local authorities’ , Public Money (December 
1982), 19-24.
34 See G. A. Boyne, ‘Changes in Labour power on district and county councils: regional 
patterns and policy consequences’ , Local Government Studies, 12 (July/August 1985), 91-106.
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on public sector service provision, the support for the local political system 
from central government and the party political composition of the council. By 
regressing the raw number of staff on these variables a measure of the level of 
staffing can be derived which is cleansed of their influence. This measure is the 
residual from the regression analysis. A  positive residual is a measure of the 
initial staffing level which indicates that an authority employs more staff than 
predicted on the basis of environmental conditions, central grant and party 
politics. Similarly, a negative residual indicates less staff than expected. This 
measure of initial staffing levels can then be interpreted as an indirect measure 
of bureaucratic power.
The variables used in the regressions to derive the measure of bureaucratic 
power are shown in Table 3. The dependent variable is the level of staff in 
1980/81, prior to the central government pressure on local authorities to reduce 
staff through the ‘resource squeeze’ which accompanied the introduction of 
block grant in 1981/82. The level of staff is averaged across the four Manpower 
Watch data points for the same reason as this procedure was followed above 
when measuring staffing change. The specification of, and hypotheses for, the 
environmental variables are identical to those in Table 1 with the exception that 
population change is replaced by population level. Similarly, the change in 
grant is replaced by level of grant. Finally, the party politics variables are 
measured as the average level of Labour and Conservative seats between 1974 
and 1980. Because the staff level in 1980 has been built up over a number of 
years (and only since the 1974 reorganization in all the authorities except the 
London boroughs) the seven-year averages should be better indicators than the 
party political composition in 1980 alone.
The independent variables are unlikely to purge completely the measure of 
initial staffing levels of all substantive influences other than bureaucratic 
power. In addition, measurement error and stochastic error will be present in 
the residual. However, the reliability of the measure produced by the regression
T a b l e  3. Variables and Hypotheses for Bureaucratic Power Regressions.





Number of Staff, 1980/81 
(a) Mean °7o Labour Seats,
1
1974-80 
(b) Mean °7o Conservative Seats,
LABAV 6 +
1974-80 CONAV 6 -
Inputs Level of Central Grant, 1980/81 
(£000s)
GRANT 4 +
Environmental (a) Population, 1980 POP 2 +




Sources: As Table 1
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R2 0.94 0.85 0.97
R2 0.93 0.84 0.96
F 87.9 191.3 100.8
LABAV 63.8* 3.1** - 1.6
(2.2) (2.8) ( l .D
CONAV 42.3 - 1.2 - 0.6
(1.5) (1.4) ( -0 .3 )
GRANT 0 . 11*** -0 .03 -0.009
(5.0) (0.04) ( 1.2)
POP 10.1* 13.5*** 15.2***
(2.0) (19.1) ( 12.6)
LOCLAS -305.1* 3.5 25.1
(2.4) (0.5) (1.9)
DEPS -173.1 20.6** 31.2*
(0.9) (3.0) (2 .1)
UN 258.2** 34 q * * * 8.9
(3.1) (5.4) (0 .8)
NOWC 263.0 25.5 25.0*
(1.7) (1.9) (2.7)
Constant 1,763.7 -  1,811.9 -2 ,157.1**
(0 .2) (5.9) (3.1)
Note: t statistics in brackets in this and subsequent tables. Significance levels 
in this and subsequent tables are indicated as follows: *= 0 .05  or better; 
**  = 0.01 or better; * * * = 0.001 or better
analysis does not require that o n ly  bureaucratic power is present in the residual. 
Rather it is necessary that bureaucratic power d o m in a te s  the residual.35 The 
validity of the assumption that bureaucratic power dominates the residual 
requires that the model from which the residual is derived has high explanatory 
power. There are no established criteria, but if  the residual is obtained from a 
model with only moderate or low explanatory power the assumption that it is 
dominated by a measure of a single concept seems implausible.
In this context the results of the regression analyses used to derive the indirect 
measure of bureaucratic power are encouraging. The key feature of the results 
shown in Table 4 is the strong and highly significant explanatory power of the 
model in all three types of authority. The estimated coefficients of the 
individual variables are not of direct concern here and should be treated with
35 See J. Kugler, ‘Use of residuals: an option to measure concepts indirectly’ , Political 
Methodology, 9 (1983), 103-20.
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T a b l e  5. Correlation between BURPOW and 
SIZE.
Outer London boroughs and 0.46*** 
(n = 54) 
0.49*** 







caution because of substantial multicollinearity amnongst some of the 
independent variables (see Appendix).
The high level of statistical explanation provided by the regression models 
permits considerable confidence in the use of the residuals as an indirect 
measure of bureaucratic power. On the basis of the staff maximization 
hypothesis a positive relationship between this measure and staffing change is 
hypothesized: strong bureaux are expected to cut least or increase their staff. 
For purposes of comparison the analysis below also presents results for staff 
per 1,000 population as a measure of bureau power. The correlations in Table 5 
show that the two measures are distinct— the authorities with high initial 
staffing levels net of influences other than bureaucratic power are not 
necessarily those with the highest ratio of staff to local population. I f  
BURPOW is a better measure than SIZE then the former should have a 
stronger positive relationship than the latter with staff changes.
The statistical results for the model of variations in staffing policies are 
presented in Tables 6 to 10. The tables show the combined explanatory power 
of the independent variables and estimated OLS regression coefficients for 
individual variables. The relevance of some coefficients to the hypotheses is 
difficult to interpret because of high multicollinearity36 amongst some 
independent variables (see Appendix). The coefficients of such variables may 
be insignificant not because of substantive unimportance but because multi­
collinearity has inflated the standard errors of the estimates. Therefore, to 
provide some additional insight on the validity of the hypotheses, various forms 
of the model have been tested to compare R2s, SERs and Fs. Models 1 and 2 
contain both CON and LAB and include BURPOW  and SIZE in turn. Models 3 
and 4 omit both bureaucratic power variables and include CO N and LAB in 
turn. Models 5 -8  show separate results first for BURPOW  and then for SIZE  
with each of the party political variables.
For four of the nine contexts in which the model was tested neither the
I I I .  Results
T h e  E x p la n a to ry  P o w e r  o f  the  M o d e l
36 The criterion of ‘high’ multicollinearity used here is RJ-2> R 2. See J. Johnson, Econometric 
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T a b le  7. Regression Results for Outer London Boroughs and Metropolitan Districts: CHSTAF83.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(n = 51) (n = 51) (n = 53) 3^ II (n = 51) (n = 51) (n = 51) (n = 51)
R2 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.27 0.28
R2 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.15
SER 1.31 1.34 1.34 1.33 1.30 1.30 1.33 1.32
F 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.1
SQZ - 0.02 -0 .004 - 0.01 -0 .009 - 0.02 - 0.02 -0.005 -0.005
(0.4) (0 .1) (0.3) (0.3) (0.5) (0.4) (0 .1) (0 . 1)
POPCH -0 .05 -0 .07 0.04 0.004 - 0.01 -0 .05 - 0.01 -0 .0 6
(0 .1) (0 .2) (0 .1) (0 .01) (0.03) (0 .1) (0.03) (0 .1)
LOCLAS 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.05
(0 .6) (0.5) ( 1.2) (0 .8) (0.9) (0 .6) (0 .8) (0.5)
DEPS 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.05
(0.4) (0.3) (0 .1) (0 .1) (0.4) (0.5) (0 .2) (0.3)
UN -0 .0 4 -0 .04 -0 .04 -0 .03 -0 .04 -0 .0 4 -0 .05 -0 .0 4
(0 .6) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (0 .6) (0 .6) (0.5) (0.4)
NOWC 0.20 0.21 0.13 0.13 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.21
(1.5) (1.4) (1.0) (1.0) (1.5) (1.5) (1.4) (1.4)
CON -0.0009 - 0.002 - 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.01
(0.05) (0 .1) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9)
LAB 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0 .6) (0 .8) (1.2) ( 1.1) ( 1.2)












Constant -5 .3 -4 .3 - 2.1 -3 .2 -4 .4 -5 .4 - 2.8 -4 .0












T a b l e  8. Regression Results fo r  English Non-Metropolitan Districts: CHSTAF81.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(n = 279) (n = 279) (n = 279) (n = 279) (n = 279) (n = 279) (n = 279) (n = 279)
R2 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.14
R2 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.11
SER 2.71 2.67 2.72 2.72 2.71 2.71 2.67 2.66
F 3.6 4.8 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.0 5.2 5.4
SQZ 0 .02* 0.03** 0.01 0.01 0 .02* 0 .02* 0.03** 0.03**
(2 .2) (2.9) (1.7) ( 1.6) (2 .1) (2 .0) (2.9) (2.9)
POPCH -0 .08 -0 .07 -0 .09 -0 .0 9 -0 .0 7 -0 .08 -0 .08 -0 .07
0 .0) ( 1.0) ( 1.2) (1.3) ( 1.0) ( 1.1) ( 1. 1) ( 1.0)
LOCLAS 0.005 0.01 0.001 0.02 - 0.001 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0 .1) (0 .2) (0 .001) (0 .2) (0 .01) (0.3) (0.3) (0 .2)
DEPS -0 .1 7 * - 0.12 -0 .1 6 * -0 .1 6 * -0 .1 6 ** -0 .1 6 * -0 .1 6 ** - 0.12
(2.5) ( 1.8) (2.5) (2.3) (2 .6) (2.4) (2 .6) (1.7)
UN -0 .1 5 * -0 .0 4 -0 .1 6 * -0 .15 * -0 .1 6 * -0 .1 5 * -0 .03 -0 .0 4
(2 .2) (0 .6) (2.5) (2.3) (2.5) (2.3) (0.4) (0 .6)
NOWC -0 .13 - 0.10 -0 .14 -0 .13 -0 .1 4 - 0.12 - 0.10 - 0.10
( 1.0) (0 .8) ( 1.1) ( 1.0) ( 1.1) ( 1.0) (0 .8) (0 .8)
CON -0.008 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005
0 .0) (0.4) (0.7) (0.9) (0 .6)
LAB -0.004 0.01 - 0.001 - 0.002 0.01
(0.4) (1.1) (0 .1) (0 .2) ( 1.2)






SIZE -0 .3 0 ***
(3.5)
-0 .2 6 ***
(3.4)
-0 .3 0 ***
(3.6)
Constant 7.7* 6.3* 6 .8* 6.3* 7.2* 6.5* 7.6* 5.9









T a b le  9. Regression Results for English Non-Metropolitan Districts: CHSTAF83.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(n = 267) (n = 267) (n = 269) (n = 269) (n = 267) (n = 267) (n = 267) (n = 267)
R2 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09
R2 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.07
SER 2.39 2.39 2.40 2.44 2.41 2.45 2.41 2.44
F 4.4 4.5 5.3 3.8 4.5 3.1 4.5 3.4
SQZ 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(1.5) (1.5) (1.4) (1.3) (1.4) (1.4) (1.5) (1.4)
POPCH 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.27 0.31 0.28 0.32 0.25
(1.9) (1.9) (1.9) ( 1.6) ( 1.8) ( 1.6) (1.9) (1.5)
LOCLAS 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.14* 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.13
( 1.0) ( 1.0) (1.5) (2 .0) (1.4) (1.9) (1.3) ( 1.8)
DEPS 0.03 0.04 -0.006 0.06 -0.007 0.06 -0.008 0.08
(0 .6) (0.7) (0 .1) ( 1.0) (0 . 1) ( 1.0) (0 .1) (1.2)
UN -0 .0 6 -0 .04 - 0.02 -0 .07 - 0.02 -0 .07 - 0.02 -0.003
( 1.0) (0 .6) (0.3) ( 1.2) (0.3) ( 1. 1) (0.3) (0.5)
NOW C -0 .15 -0 .15 -0 .13 - 0.11 -0 .13 - 0.11 -0 .13 - 0.11
(1.3) (1.3) ( 1.2) ( 1.0) ( 1.2) ( 1.0) ( 1.2) (1.0)
CON -0 .0 3 *** -0 .0 3 *** -0 .0 3 *** -0 .0 3 *** -0 .0 3 ***
(3.7) (3.5) (4.1) (4.1) (4.1)
LAB 0.02 0 .02* 0 .02* 0 .02* 0.03**
( 1.8) (2 .0) (2 .6) (2 .6) (2.9)
BURPOW - 0.02 -0 .05 0.02
(0 .1) (0.3) (0 .1)
SIZE -0 .05 0.004 -0 .0 9
(0.7) (0 .1) (1.3)
Constant -0 .6 9 1.0 0.61 4.2 0.76 -4 .1 0.8 -4 .4
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combined explanatory power of the independent variables nor any of their 
individual coefficients were significant.37 In these contexts, if  there are any 
strong systematic influences on staffing policies then they are neither repre­
sented by, n o r  even a p p ro x im a te d  by, the variables contained in the model. 
Results for the other five contexts are shown in Tables 6 to 10. The R2s for the 
two ‘ full’ versions of the model (1 and 2) range from 0.08 to 0.66. While these 
R2s are all significant at the 0.05 level or better they are generally low. With the 
exception of the results shown in Table 10 the model leaves most of the 
variation in staffing policies unexplained. The following discussion of the 
effect on C HSTAF of individual independent variables concentrates on the five 
contexts where the model has some explanatory power. However, the 
complete failure of the model in four contexts must be borne in mind 
throughout.
B u re a u c ra tic  P o w e r
Neither the results for BURPOW  nor SIZE are consistent with the staff 
maximization hypothesis. Any marginal effect for either measure of bureau­
cratic power is the opposite of that predicted.
In the four contexts where the combined explanatory power of the 
independent variables was not significant it may be concluded tentatively that 
all the hypotheses for environmental conditions, grant and party politics are 
refuted. The degree of multicollinearity amongst the independent variables 
means that while this conclusion is highly plausible it can be only tentative. 
However, such reservations are unnecessary in the interpretation of the 
insignificance of BURPOW  because it is largely independent of the other 
variables. Therefore in these four contexts the statistical insignificance of 
BURPOW  indicates substantive unimportance. This pattern is replicated in 
Tables 6 to 10. The estimated coefficients for BURPOW  and the low multi­
collinearity with other variables indicates that bureaucratic power is not related 
to staffing policies.
There is some evidence of an effect of BURPOW  on C H STA F in the outer 
London boroughs and metropolitan districts. This can be seen by comparing 
the results of model 5 with model 3 and model 6 with model 4 in Tables 6 and 7. 
The addition of BURPOW  to the models containing either LAB or CON  
increases the R2, reduces the SER and increases the F. Thus BURPOW  is 
making a marginal but significant contribution to the explanatory power o f the 
model even though this is not reflected in the conventional 0.05 significance test 
on the estimated coefficient. It should be emphasized, however, that the sign on 
the coefficient is negative and therefore this evidence does not support the staff 
maximization hypothesis. The comparison of R2s, SERs and Fs indicates no 
similar effect of BURPOW  in the English non-metropolitan districts nor in the 
Welsh districts (see Tables 8 to 10).
The results allow little scope for a judgement on the subsidiary hypothesis 
that BURPOW  has a stronger positive relationship than SIZE with CHSTAF. 
The hypothesis is supported to the extent that SIZE is significantly and
37 Results for these four contexts are not shown. They are available on request from the author.
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negatively related to CHSTAF in two contexts. However, SIZE is highly multi- 
collinear with the other variables and therefore the estimated coefficients must 
be regarded with circumspection. Little light is shed on this issue by comparing 
the R2s, SERs and Fs from models which are identical but for the replacement 
of BURPOW  with SIZE (1 and 2, 5 and 7, 6 and 8). In some contexts the 
BURPOW  models are superior (for example, Table 6), in some the SIZE  
models are superior (for example, Table 7) and in others the results are identical 
(for example, Table 10, models 5 and 7).
There is, then, no evidence in these results to support the staff maximization 
hypothesis. The failure in nine different contexts is a comprehensive rejection 
of its validity. O f course, there are rival interpretations of the statistical 
evidence. The most obvious is that BURPOW is not a measure of the initial 
staffing level which is sufficiently cleansed of influences other than bureau­
cratic power. However, given the limited theoretical and empirical knowledge it 
is difficult to identify relevant variables which have been omitted from the 
regressions in Table 4. A  second rival interpretation is that the absence of an 
effect of BURPOW  on C HSTAF at the aggregate authority level may be 
masking effects at the departmental or sub-departmental level.38 However, 
pending empirical evidence on such interpretations the conclusion must be that 
the staff maximization hypothesis is refuted.
P a r ty  P o litic s
The hypothesized relationships between the party political variables and 
C HSTAF receive some support from the statistical results. CON is significantly 
and negatively related to C HSTAF in Tables 6 , 9 and 10. LAB is significantly 
and positively related to CHSTAF in Tables 6 and 9.
It  is difficult to evaluate whether CON or LAB has the most important effect 
because of their multicollinearity with other variables, particularly in the case 
of LAB (see Appendix). Some evidence on whether CON or LAB has the 
greater effect on staffing policies can be obtained by comparing the results for 
models 3 and 4, models 5 and 6 , and models 7 and 8 . In Tables 6 , 9 and 10 the 
CON models yield higher R2s, lower SERs and higher Fs. This is particularly 
pronounced in the results for the Welsh districts in Table 10 where substitution 
of CON by LAB causes the R2 and F to plummet and the SER to rise. In Table 8 
the explanatory power of the CON and LAB models is virtually identical. 
Only in Table 7 is the explanation provided by the LAB models slightly superior.
The stronger apparent effect of CO N may to some extent simply reflect the 
fact that it is less multicollinear than LAB with other independent variables. 
However, the degree of difference in the results for the CON and LAB models 
in Table 10 suggests that this is not the entire explanation. On balance, then, the 
results indicate that local Conservative cooperation has a stronger effect than 
local Labour recalcitrance on the implementation o f the Conservative central 
government’s policy on local government employment.
38 For a discussion of this ‘disaggregation hypothesis’ see G. A. Boyne, ‘Output disaggregation 
and the quest for the impact of local politics’ , Political Studies, 32 (1984), 451-58. On the possible 
importance of disaggregation for the analysis of staffing policies, see Storey, ‘The economics of 
bureaux’ .
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G ra n t a n d  E n v iro n m e n ta l C o n d itio n s
The hypothesized relationship between grant changes and staff changes is 
supported in only two of the nine contexts. SQZ is significantly and positively 
related to C HSTAF in Tables 6 and 8 . In Table 10, SQZ is significantly but 
negatively related to CHSTAF. Ironically this last result is the most statistically 
reliable because SQZ is not highly multicollinear in the context of the R2 in 
Table 10.
None of the hypotheses for the environmental variables is consistently 
supported in Tables 6 to 10. However, their estimated coefficients must be 
treated with extreme caution. PO PCH is the only one of the five environmental 
variables which is not severely multicollinear with the other independent 
variables. It is significant only in Table 10 but has the opposite sign to that 
predicted in this and in most models in Tables 6 to 9. The signs and significance 
of the other environmental variables fluctuate across the contexts in which the 
model was tested. Within the constraints on interpretation imposed by the 
severe multicollinearity all that can be said with any certainty is that the 
predominantly low R2s indicate that LOCLAS, DEPS, U N  and NO W C  as a 
group are not strongly related to CHSTAF. This conclusion is also justified 
where the R2 is high, as can be seen by comparing the results for the various 
forms of the model in Table 10.
S u m m a ry  a n d  im p lic a tio n s
The results indicate that the model does not consistently represent the 
influences on local staffing policies. The explanatory power of the model is 
generally low and only the party political variables have the effect hypothesized 
when their estimated coefficients are significant. The implication o f these 
results for the staff maximization hypothesis are discussed in the conclusion. 
Several implications of broader relevance to the explanation of variations in 
local staffing policies are noted here.
First, the difficulty of explaining variations in staff changes is in stark 
contrast to the almost trivial ease with which variations in staff levels were 
statistically accounted for in Table 4. This pattern is similar to the differing 
capacity of studies of local policy variation to account for expenditure levels 
and expenditure change.39 However, while the explanation of policy change is 
more difficult it provides a more solid foundation for causal inferences.40 
Therefore further attempts to explain variations in local staffing policies should 
specify the dependent variable as change and not level of staff.
Secondly, the importance of multiple tests of models is emphasized by the 
variable ‘ fit ’ of the model of staffing policies.41 The inconsistent performance 
of the model across contexts and time illustrates the hazards of generalizing 
from a single test.
Thirdly, the different results across the contexts in which the model was
39 See Boyne, ‘Theory, methodology and results in political science’ .
40 See R. D. Brumer and K. Leipelt, ‘Data analysis, process analysis and system change’ , Mid- 
Western Journal o f  Political Science, 16 (1972), 538-69.
41 On the importance of multiple tests see L. J. Sharpe and K. Newton, Does Politics Matter? 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984), ch. 1.
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tested indicate a need for case study analysis to identify systematic and idio­
syncratic influences on staffing policies. Any systematic influences suggested 
by the case study analysis may contribute to the development of a model which 
more consistently represents the influences on local staffing policies. On the 
basis of the statistical results of this analysis it is likely that such a model would 
include party political variables.
Conclusion
The evidence from the statistical analysis refutes the staff maximization 
hypothesis. Bureaucratic power has no significant effect on the staffing policies 
of English and Welsh lower-tier local authorities. It  is worth re-emphasizing 
that the rejection of the staff maximization hypothesis does not undermine the 
validity of the assumptions that bureaucrats have the desire and the capacity for 
budget maximization. These assumptions are not logically antecedent to staff 
maximization and require separate examination. Such broader aspects of 
rational choice theory are therefore unimpaired by this analysis.
The validity of the staff maximization hypothesis itself may be preserved by 
grafting on various auxiliary hypotheses which reduce its content. For example, 
it may be claimed that it is not applicable to the British political system, or that 
it applies only to bureaucrats in central government or that it applies only to 
contexts of sustained economic growth or only to political climates favourable 
to the public sector. The reasons for such restrictions are not apparent in the 
rational choice literature, but no doubt anyone concerned to save the staff 
maximization hypothesis can find or invent them. Whatever the context of 
subsequent tests, further evidence on the validity of the hypothesis is clearly 
required.
For the present, the notion that bureaucratic power is systematically and 
positively related to labour inputs to the production of public sector goods and 
services is without empirical foundation.
Appendix. Correlation Matrices and Multicollinearity Amongst Independent Variables in the Regression Analyses
(R /2 for each independent variable regressed on the others in the equation
Table A4a











































-0 .4 1 *** 1
LABAV 0.20 0.17 0.03 0.72*** - 0.01 0.52*** 0.39* -0 .9 2 1
R i 2 0.93 0.92 0.85 0.29 0.73 0.40 0.87 0 . 8 8
T able A4b
STAF GRANT POP LOCLAS DEPS UN NOWC CONAV LABAV
STAF l
GRANT 0 74* * * 1
POP 0.87*** q  75*** 1
LOCLAS 0.35*** 0.33*** 0.15 1
DEPS - 0.00 0.05 - 0.10 - 0.11 1
UN 0.46*** 0.37*** 0 .22*** 0.67*** 0 . 12* 1
NOWC Q  2 1 * * * 0 37*** 0.07 0.47*** 0.04 Q  3 J * * * 1
CONAV 0.09 -0 .0 6 0.26*** -0 .3 6 *** -0 .0 6 -0 .2 3 *** -0 .3 0 ***  1
LABAV q  45*** 0.35*** 0.31*** 0.58*** -0 .3 3 *** 0.53*** 0.25*** -0 .1 8 **  1











\T a b le  A 4c
STAF GRANT POP LOCLAS DEPS UN NOWC CONAV LABAV
STAF 1
GRANT 0.83*** 1
POP 0.97*** 0.85*** 1
LOCLAS 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 0 0 . 1 0 1
DEPS -0 .4 0 * -0 .4 4 ** -0 .4 6 ** -0 .4 5 * 1
UN 0.42* 0.39* 0.32 0.73*** -0 .3 0 1
NOWC - 0 . 0 2 0.18 - 0 .1 2 0.23 -0 .17 0.27 1
CONAV 0.46** 0.32 0.55*** -0 .29 -0 .17 - 0 .1 1 -0 .4 2 1
LABAV 0.40* 0.53*** 0.39* 0.60*** -0 .6 2 *** 0.64*** 0.41 - 0 . 0 2 1
R,2 0.82 0.85 0.70 0.56 0.69 0.46 0.53 0 . 6 8
T a b l e  A 6
CHSTAF SQZ POPCH LOCLAS DEPS UN NOWC CON LAB BURPOW SIZE
CHSTAF 1
SQZ 0.34* 1
POPCH 0.06 0.03 1
LOCLAS 0.36* 0.24 - 0 . 1 0 1
DEPS 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.31* 1
UN 0.23 0.03 -0 .26 0.83*** 0.27 1
NOWC 0.05 0.28* -0 .18 0.61*** 0.34* 0.42** 1
CON -0 .4 1 ** 0.03 0.14 -0 .7 8 *** -0 .29 * -0 .6 9 *** -0 .5 2 *** 1
LAB 0.42** 0.08 -0 .06 0.81*** 0.26 0.65*** 0.52*** -0 .9 2 *** I
BURPOW -0 .3 9 ** -0 .3 1 * -0 .08 - 0 . 2 2 -0 .18 - 0 . 2 0 -0 .0 9 0.24 -0.31 1
SIZE 0 . 1 0 - 0 . 0 0 '-0 .42* 0.60*** 0 . 1 0 0.71*** 0.50*** -0 .6 1 *** 0.59*** 0.46*** 1









T a b le  A7
CHSTAF SQZ POPCH LOCLAS DEPS UN NOWC CON LAB BURPOW SIZE
CHSTAF 1
SQZ 0.24 1
POPCH -0 .0 8 0 . 2 0 1
LOCLAS 0.44*** 0  4 9 ** * - 0 . 1 2 1
DEPS 0 . 2 2 0.52*** 0.05 0.35* 1
UN 0.29* 0.46*** -0 .3 0 * 0.82*** 0.29* 1
NOWC 0.45*** 0.37** - 0 .2 2 0.59*** 0.33* 0.43** 1
CON -0 .4 2 ** -0 .4 8 ** 0.15 -0 .7 6 *** -0 .33 * - 0 .6 6 *** -0 .4 9 *** 1
LAB 0.46*** 0 4 4 ** * -0 .08 0.82** 0.30* 0 .6 6 *** 0.50*** — 0 93*** 1
BURPOW -0 .17 -0 .26 - 0 . 1 2 0 .0 1 0 .0 0 1 0 . 0 2 - 0 .0 1 0 .0 2 -0 .0 6 1
SIZE 0.28* 0.03 -0 .4 3 *** 0.58*** 0.17 0.69*** 0.45*** -0 .5 7 *** 0.58*** 0.46*** 1
R/2 0.56 0.37 0.85 0.31 0.76 0.45 0.87 0.89 0.14 0.69
T a b l e  A 8
CHSTAF SQZ POPCH LOCLAS DEPS UN NOWC CON LAB BURPOW SIZE
CHSTAF 1
SQZ 0 . 1 0 1
POPCH -0 .05 -0 .03 1
LOCLAS -0 .1 4 * - 0 .1 1 -0 .1 9 *** 1
DEPS -0 .1 8 ** 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 2 -0 .08 1
UN - 0 .2 2 ** * 0.05 -0 .1 7 ** 0 .6 8 *** 0.14* 1
NOWC -0 .1 6 ** -0 .2 4 *** -0 .0 4 0.50*** 0.03 0.36*** 1
CON 0.06 0 .2 2 *** 0.14* -0 .4 3 *** -0 .05 -0 .3 0 *** -0 .3 3 *** 1
LAB -0 .0 6 0.08 -0 .1 8 ** 0.58*** -0 .3 2 *** 0.55*** 0.32*** -0 .3 3 *** 1
BURPOW -0 .0 7 0 .2 2 *** 0.08 0 . 0 2 - 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 - 0 . 0 0 -0 .0 9 0 .0 1  1
SIZE -0 .2 5 *** 0.30*** - 0 . 1 0 0.50*** 0.08 0.69*** 0.27*** -0 .1 7 ** 0.60*** 0.49*** 1













T ab le  A9
CHSTAF SQZ POPCH LOCLAS DEPS UN NOWC CON LAB BURPOW SIZE
CHSTAF 1
SQZ 0.13* 1
POPCH 0.08 -0 .0 4 1
LOCLAS 0 .22*** 0.26*** -0 .07 1
DEPS 0.01 0.23*** 0.11 -0 .09 1
UN 0.14* q 25*** -0 .1 5 * 0.69*** 0.11 1
NOWC 0.08 0.23*** - 0 .12* 0 49*** 0.03 0.31*** 1
CON -0 .3 0 *** - 0 . 12* 0.13* -0 .4 8 *** 0.00 -0 .3 6 *** -0 .3 3 *** 1
LAB 0 .22*** 0.10 -0 .1 7 ** 0.62*** -0 .2 8 *** q 59*** 0 35*** -0 .4 3 ***  1
BURPOW - 0.02 0.03 -0 .1 7 ** 0.01 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.01 -0 .0 6  -0 .05  1
SIZE 0.08 0.18** -0 .1 8 ** q  49*** 0.09 0.67*** 0.25*** — 0 21*** 0 59*** 0 49*** 1
R,2 0.15 0.10 0.64 0.27 0.59 0.28 0.29 0.55 0.04 0.55
T able A10
CHSTAF SQZ POPCH LOCLAS DEPS UN NOWC CON LAB BURPOW SIZE
CHSTAF 1
SQZ -0 .05 1
POPCH -0 .2 9 - 0.01 1
LOCLAS 0.02 -0 .28 -0 .15 1
DEPS 0.01 0.05 -0 .28 -0 .3 8 * 1
UN -0 .2 9 -0 .37 * 0.08 0.71*** -0 .2 6 1
NOWC 0.14 - 0.10 - 0.11 0.33 - 0.21 0.30 1
CON -0 .5 9 *** -0 .05 0.17 -0 .29 -0 .27 - 0.12 -0 .44 * 1
LAB -0 .1 4 -0 .4 3 * 0.17 0.71*** -0 .6 1 *** 0.71*** 0.44* -0 .08 1
BURPOW - 0.12 - 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.12 0.06 -0 .13 - 0.01 - 0.02 0.09 1
SIZE -0 .4 2 * -0 .3 6 * 0.07 0.46** - 0.12 0.64*** 0.32 0.01 0.55*** 0.53*** 1
R/2 0.31 0.30 0.73 0.64 0.68 0.44 0.48 0.84 0.19 0.52
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Output Disaggregation and the Quest for 
the Impact of Local Politics
G e o rg e  A. Boyne  
T h e  P o ly te c h n ic  o f  W ales, P o n ty p r id d
In contrast to case studies of British local authorities, 1 most cross sectional 
statistical analyses have not found local politics to be an important influence on 
policy outputs.2 The results o f output studies indicate that the importance of 
specific independent variables differs between policy areas. However, in 
general, environmental variables (such as population size, demography, social 
class and rateable value) seem to possess greater explanatory power than 
political variables (such as party control, competition and turnout). While the 
case study and statistical analyses should properly be viewed as complementary 
rather than competing,3 the statistical results for political variables have been 
viewed with some disquiet. The response of British political scientists has not 
approached the supposed ‘near panic’ o f their American counterparts.4 Never-
1 See, for example, J. Dearlove, The Politics o f  Policy in Local Government (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1973); K. Newton, Second City Politics (London, Oxford University 
Press, 1976); P. Saunders, Urban Politics (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1979).
2 The full list of studies which test models of output variation which include both environmental 
and political variables is as follows: F. R. Oliver and J. Stanyer, ‘Some Aspects of the Financial 
Behaviour of County Boroughs’ , Public Administration, 47 (1969), 169-84; N. T. Boaden and 
R. R. Alford, ‘Sources of Diversity in English Local Government Decisions’, Public Administra­
tion, 47 (1969), 203-23; J. E. Alt, ‘Some Social and Political Correlates of County Borough 
Expenditures’ , British Journal o f  Political Science, 1 (1971), 49-62; N. T . Boaden, Urban Policy 
Making (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971); B. P. Davies, A . Barton, I. McMillan and 
V. Williamson, Variations in Services fo r  the A ged  (London, G. Bell & Sons, 1971); B. P. Davies, 
A. Barton and I. McMillan, Variations in Children’s Services Am ong British Urban Authorities 
(London, G. Bell & Sons, 1972); R. J. Nicholson and N. Topham, ‘The Determinants of Investment 
in Housing by Local Authorities: An Econometric Approach’, Journal o f  the Royal Statistical 
Society, Series A, 134 (1971), 272-303, and ‘ Investment Decisions and the Size of Local 
Authorities’ , Policy and Politics, 1 (1972), 23-44, and ‘Urban Road Provision in England and 
Wales, 1962-68’ , Policy and Politics, 4, 3-29; D. E. Ashford, ‘Resources, Spending and Party 
Politics in British Local Government, Administration and Society, 7 (1975), 286-311; D. E. 
Ashford, R. Berne and R. Schramm, ‘The Expenditure-Financing Decision in British Local 
Government’ , Policy and Politics, 5 (1976), 5-24; J. A. Schofield, ‘Determinants of Urban Service 
Expenditures’ , Local Government Studies, 4 (1978), 65-79; J. N. Danziger, Making Budgets 
(Beverly Hills, Sage, 1978); S. Pinch, ‘Patterns of Local Authority Housing Allocation in Greater 
London’ , Transactions o f  the Institute o f  British Geographers, 3(1978), 35-54; L. J. Sharpe, ‘Does 
Politics Matter? An Interim Summary with Findings’ , in K. Newton (ed.), Urban Political 
Economy (London, Frances Pinter, 1981).
3 Danziger, Making Budgets, ch. 8.
4 T. R. Dye, Policy Analysis (Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 1978).
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theless, there has been a continued concern to ‘improve’ the results for political 
variables.5
One recurrent criticism of output studies in both the American6 and British7 
literature is that total expenditure per service head is an inappropriate measure 
of output. It is considered that total expenditures are not the real issues around 
which conflict centres. Rather they are ‘accounting abstractions’ and their use 
as dependent variables in statistical models obscures the impact of politics. 
Therefore, it has been suggested that sub-function expenditures are more 
appropriate measures of outputs. It is argued that output d isaggregation  
pitches analysis at the level of concrete issues and thus for any particular policy 
area political effects will be stronger at the sub-function than at the aggregate 
level.
Testing the Disaggregation Hypothesis
Given the prevalence of the argument that aggregate outputs mask political 
effects, it is surprising that the disaggregation hypothesis has not been tested. 
The analysis below provides a preliminary test by confronting the hypothesis 
with existing results for sub-function outputs. Results for the relative impor­
tance of environmental and political effects on the sub-functions within a 
policy area are compared to the results for aggregate expenditure within that 
same area. It is a sad reflection of the condition of British output studies that 
sub-function results are available for only four services and for only the 
pre-1974 local government system.
Few of the results of output studies indicate that either the environment or 
the political system has n o  effect on policies. In principle, the balance of effects 
may range between the heavy dominance of the environment through 
approximate equality to the heavy dominance of politics. However, in practice, 
the statistical evaluation o f the relative importance o f environmental and 
political variables is problematic if  they are collinear. Where collinearity (or 
multicollinearity amongst several independent variables) is high it is impossible 
to weigh the relative effects of the environmental and political variables. The 
zero-order correlations which are reported8 in the studies discussed below are
5 See D. N. King, ‘Why Do Local Authority Rate Poundages Differ’ , Public Administration, 51 
(1973), 165-73; K. Newton and L. J. Sharpe, ‘Local Outputs Research: Some Reflections and 
Proposals’ , Policy and Politics, 5 (1977), 61-82; J. E. A lt, ‘Politics and Expenditure Models’ , 
Policy and Politics, 5 (1977), 83-92; Sharpe, ‘Does Politics Matter? An Interim Summary with 
Findings’ .
6 See J. Jacob and K. Lipsky, ‘Outputs, Structure and Power: An Assessment of Changes in the 
Study of State and Local Politics’ , Journal o f  Politics, 30 (1968), 61-82; P. B. Coulter, 
‘Comparative Community Politics and Public Policy’ , Polity, 3 (1968), 22-43; S. Rakoff and G. 
Schaeffer, ‘Politics, Policy and Political Science: Theoretical Alternatives’ , Politics and Society 
(1970), 51-77; J. M . Munns, ‘The Environment, Politics and Policy Literature: A  Critique and 
Reformulation’ , Western Political Quarterly, 28 (1975), 646-67.
7 See Newton and Sharpe, ‘Local Outputs Research: Some Reflections and Proposals’ ; 
Danziger, Making Budgets', Sharpe, ‘Does Politics Matter? An Interim Summary with Findings’ .
8 SeeBoaden, Urban Policy Making, 126-35 and Davies et al., Variations in Children’s Services 
Am ong British Urban Authorities, 143-57. Neither Boaden and Alford, ‘Sources of Diversity in 
English Local Government Decisions’ nor Davies et al., Variations in Services fo r  the A ged  report 
the zero order correlations amongst their independent variables. This is doubly unfortunate because 
this information allows alternative simple causal models to be fitted to the data. See H . B. Asher, 
Causal Modelling (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1976).
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generally low enough to suggest9 that the estimates of the coefficients are 
reliable. However, for one output this is not the case and the implications for 
the interpretation o f the result are discussed.
Welfare, Local Health and Children’s Services
Davies et a l . 10 use path analysis11 to identify the influences on sub-functions of 
the above three services in County Boroughs. They explicate the relationships 
between environmental variables, political variables and outputs in a hier­
archical causal structure. Path analysis diagrams show the relationships 
between the independent variables and show the indirect and direct impact of 
these variables on the outputs. The analysis by Davies e t a l. is not explicitly 
concerned with the relative importance of environmental and political variables. 
However, by reanalysing the various direct and indirect path coefficients 
presented in their results it is possible to compute total path coefficients for 
individual independent variables. 12 The importance of environmental and 
political variables can then be compared. The computed total path coefficients 
are shown in Tables 1 and 2. The low R2 in almost all cases should be noted 
when interpreting the results. 13
W e lfa re  Services
Davies e t a l. analyse influences upon 38 Welfare sub-functions. However, the 
results for only seven o f these permit the evaluation of the relative importance 
of environmental and political variables. 14 Results for the first and second 
outputs indicate that the single most important variable is political (OFFICS  
and LABSTS respectively). However, in both of these cases the effect of the 
political variables is outweighed by the combined effect of the environmental 
variables. Results for outputs 3 -7  indicate that the single most important 
variable is environmental and that political effects are heavily outweighed by 
environmental effects.
Results obtained by analyses of agg reg ate  Welfare expenditure15 are similar
9 The zero-order correlations are not in themselves an adequate test of multicollinearity. This 
requires that all the other independent variables be regressed on each independent variable in turn. 
See J. Johnston, Econometric Methods (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1972).
10 Davies et al., Variations In Services fo r  the Aged, and Variations In Children’s Services 
Among British Urban Authorities.
11 See H. B. Asher, Causa! Modelling; O. D. Duncan, Introduction to Structural Equation 
Models (New York, Academic Press, 1975).
12 The total path coefficient is the sum of the indirect path coefficients and the direct path 
coefficient. See M . Lewis-Beck and L. B. Mohr, ‘Evaluating Effects of Independent Variables’ , 
Political Methodology, 3 (1976), 27-47.
13 The R2 is not shown on the path analysis diagrams. It has been calculated by the formula: 
R2= 1 -  (residual path coefficient)2. See Asher, Causal Modelling, 31.
14 O f the remaining 31 outputs, 10 show no political effects and little environmental effect; 10 
show such a high residual path coefficient ^ R ^ O .IS )  that all effects may be considered 
unimportant; 7 are planned rather than actual outputs; 3 are artificially constructed factors; 1 
shows no residual path coefficient and therefore it is impossible to calculate R2.
15 See Alt, ‘Some Social and Political Correlates of County Borough Expenditures’; Boaden, 
Urban Policy Marking-, Danziger, Making Budgets-, Sharpe, ‘Does Politics Matter? An Interim 
Summary with Findings’ .
\T a b le  1. Total Path Coefficients (calculated from Davies e t  a l . ,  V a r i a t i o n s  i n  S e r v i c e s  f o r  t h e  A g e d )
LABSTS OFFICS TOPOP PRPROD FCI SCI WW POPCH (R2)
Welfare
1. Elderly residents in homes per 1,000 
population 0.09 0.20 -0 .0 6 0.17 0.06 -0 .03 0.36
2. Number registered blind/partially 
sighted per 1,000 population 0.52 ___ - 0.22 .. 0.42 0.32 -0 .1 8 ___ 0.44
3. Net current expenditure on physically 
handicapped per 1,000 population 0.06 0.11 -0 .17 _ -0 .1 8 -0 .0 4 0.02 0.19 0.28
4. Proportion of handicapped in 
residential homes 0.03 -0 .35 0.11 -0 .4 0 _ 0.34
5. Net expenditure on temporary
accommodation per 1,000 population 0.16 -0 .0 6 0.09 -0 .45 - 0.02 - 0.01 0.33
6 . Numbers of social workers per 
1,000 population 0.12 0.13 -0 .14 0.22 0.33 0.20 0.19 0.33
7. Ratio of numbers of social workers to 
total welfare expenditure 0.12 0.04 0.98 ------ 0.05 0.03 — - 0.10 0.80
Health
1. Home helps per capita 0.20 -0 .18 0.12 -0 .0 6 0.31
2. Net expenditure per capita on 
home helps 0.26 0.16 -0 .08 _ 0.23
3. Ratio of income from home help charges 
to gross expenditure on home helps -0 .13 -0 .05 ___ ___ -0 .4 2 -0 .0 4 _ 0.23
4. Ratio of home nurse vacancies to 
home nurse posts 0.20 _ 0.30 _ 0.12 0.32 ___ 0.19
5. Net expenditure per capita on home 
nursing 0.20 — 0.07 — 0.28 0.12 0.07 — 0.21




\T a b le  2. Total Path Coefficients (calculated from Davies e t  a l . ,  V a r i a t i o n s  i n  C h i l d r e n ’s  S e r v i c e s )
LABSTS TOPOP POPYO EMP SCI DISORG (R2)
1. Ratio of children in local authority 
homes to children fostered
2. Rate of turnover of children in care












Definition of variables in Tables 1 and 2. 
LABSTS = % Labour seats on the council 
OFF1CS = Autonomy of Welfare Officials 
TOPOP = Population Size 
PRPROD = Product of a penny rate 
FCI = Family Care Index 
SCI =  Social Conditions Index
W W  = Women Working/Males Working 
POPCH = Population Change 
POPYO = °7o Population aged under 18 years 
EMP = Employment Pattern Factor 





to those for sub-functions 3 -7 : the effect of political variables is generally 
weak. Therefore the fact that two of the sub-functions show relatively strong 
political effects provides some limited support for the disaggregation 
hypothesis.
L o c a l H e a lth  Services
Davies et a l. analyse influences upon 27 Local Health sub-functions. However, 
the results for only five of these permit the evaluation of the relative importance 
of environmental and political variables. 16
Results for the first two outputs indicate that LABSTS is the single most 
important variable. For the first output the effect o f LABSTS is outweighed by 
the combined effect of the environmental variables. For the second output 
LABSTS is not only the single most important variable but also slightly 
outweighs the combined effect o f the two environmental variables. Results for 
outputs 3 -5  indicate that the single most important variable is environmental 
and that environmental effects outweigh political effects.
Results obtained by analyses of aggregate  Local Health expenditure are 
similar to the sub-function results. In one case17 LABSTS is the most important 
variable while in the other two cases18 environmental effects outweigh political 
effects. Therefore the results for the sub-function outputs provide no support 
for the disaggregation hypothesis.
C h ild r e n ’s Services
Davies e t a l. analyse influences on 8 Children’s Services sub-functions. 
However, the results for only two of these permit the evaluation o f the relative 
importance of environmental and political variables. 19 These two results 
indicate that environmental effects heavily outweigh political effects. The sub­
function results reflect the balance of results for agg reg a te  Children’s Service 
expenditure20 and therefore provide no support for the disaggregation 
hypothesis.
Education
Education sub-functions have been analysed by Boaden and Alford, Boaden, 
Danziger and Sharpe.21 However, the form of results recorded by Danziger and
16 O f the remaining 22 outputs, 6 show no political effects and little environmental effect; 3 show 
such a high residual path coefficient ( =  R2<0.15) that all effects may be considered unimportant; 4 
are ‘planned’ rather than actual outputs; 1 is a combined figure for 2 separate sub-functions.
17 Alt, ‘Some Social and Political Correlates of County Borough Expenditures’ .
18 Boaden, Urban Policy Making", Danziger, Making Budgets.
19 O f the other six, five outputs show no political effect and little environmental effect; for one 
output the residual path coefficient is so high (R2 =  <0.15) that all effects may be considered 
unimportant.
20 See Alt, ‘Some Social and Political Correlates of County Borough Expenditures’ ; Boaden, 
Urban Policy Making; Davies et al., Variations in Children’s  Services Among British Urban 
Authorities", Danziger, Making Budgets', Sharpe, ‘Does Politics Matter? An Interim Summary with 
Findings’ .
21 Boaden and Alford, ‘Sources of Diversity in English Local Government Decisions’ ; Boaden,
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Sharpe do not permit the evaluation of the relative importance o f environ­
mental and political variables.22
Boaden and Alford analyse influences upon the submission o f plans for 
comprehensive reorganization by County Boroughs. The cross-tabulation form 
of their results does not provide for an explicit measure of the relative 
importance of environmental and political variables. However, their results 
suggest that the percentage o f the population o f school age is the most 
important influence followed by percentage of Labour seats and then social 
class composition and rate revenue per capita. Thus, environmental effects 
outweigh political effects.
Boaden analyses influences upon the percentage of 13 year olds in Grammar 
Schools in County Boroughs. His idiosyncratic use of partial correlation 
hinders a clear evaluation of the relative importance of the variables. However, 
the results indicate that social class composition is the most important 
influence, followed by level of central grant, percentage of the population of 
school age, and finally percentage of Labour seats which is of least importance.
Comparing these results to those for aggregate  education expenditure23 
provides no support for the disaggregation hypothesis. However, some caution 
is necessary when interpreting Boaden’s result because there is considerable 
collinearity between social class composition and percentage of Labour seats 
(r =  0.78). As the collinearity between two independent variables increases, the 
likelihood that the coefficient o f one is overestimated and the coefficient of the 
other is underestimated becomes greater. However, it is impossible to do more 
than speculate which o f the estimates in this case is inflated and which is 
depressed.
Conclusion
This preliminary test provides very little support for the disaggregation 
hypothesis. The results discussed indicate that the relative importance of 
environmental and political effects is little altered by changing the dependent 
variable from aggregate expenditure to sub-function outputs. I f  the question is 
how to ‘capture the full effect of politics’ then rather than simply to dis­
aggregate the outputs, the answer must be to develop more sophisticated 
causal models.24 A t a minimum, it is necessary to build on case study material
Urban Policy Making; Danziger, Making Budgets', Sharpe, ‘Does Politics Matter? An Interim 
Summary with Findings’ .
22 Danziger records only simple correlations for primary, secondary, further and special 
education expenditure; Sharpe records results only for political variables for milk/meals 
expenditure.
23 See Alt, ‘Some Social and Political Correlates of County Borough Expenditures’ ; Boaden, 
Urban Policy Making', Danziger, Making Budgets’, Sharpe, ‘Does Politics Matter? An Interim 
Summary with Findings’ .
24 Two important reformulations of the traditional model are J. Stonecash, ‘Politics, Wealth 
and Public Policy: The significance of Political Systems’, Policy Studies Journal, 7 (1979), 670-5; 
and T. Hansen, ‘Transforming Needs Into Expenditure Decisions’, in K. Newton (ed.), Urban 
Political Economy.
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by including variables which measure the effect of local political traditions,25 
pressure group activity,26 bureaucrats27 and public opinion.28
25 There is an interesting attempt to do this in Nicholson and Topham, ‘The Determinants of 
Investment in Housing by Local Authorities: An Econometric Approach’ .
26 See B. H . Zisk, ‘Local Interest Politics and Municipal Outputs’ , in H . Hahn (ed.), People and 
Politics in Urban Society (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1972); R. W. Getter and P. W . Schumaker, 
‘Contextual Bases of Responsiveness to Citizen Preferences and Group Demands’ , Policy and 
Politics, 6 (1978), 249-78.
27 See G. Downs and D. Rocke, ‘Bureaucracy and Juvenile Corrections’ , in T. Dye and V. Gray, 
The Determinants o f  Public Policy (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1980); on the measure­
ment of the relative strength of bureaucrats and groups see G. A. Boyne, ‘Community Models and 
Expenditure Skew’ , Public Administration, 60 (1982), 481-8.
28 See W. R. Shaffer and R. E. Weber, Policy Responsiveness in the American States (Beverly 
Hills, Sage, 1974); R. S. Erikson, ‘The Relationship Between Public Opinion and State Policy: A  
New Look at Some Forgotten Data’ , American Journal o f  Political Science, 20 (1976), 25-36.
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Summary. This paper develops and tests a model of variations in local economic policies. The influence of unemployment, 
financial resources and party politics on economic development expenditures is estimated empirically in the London 
Boroughs. The statistical evidence indicates that the model provides a satisfactory explanation of inter-borough differences 
in economic policies and that the impact of party political and local tax-base variables is particularly important. The 
implications of the results for central policies towards local economic development and for analyses of local policy variation 
are discussed.
Introduction
The aim of this analysis is to identify influences on 
the economic policies adopted by local authorities. 1 
The specific question considered is why, in an era of 
high unemployment, some authorities commit more 
money than others to the development of the local 
economy. A number of review articles and case 
studies have documented the nature and develop­
ment of such policies. However, there has been no 
systematic comparative analysis of why different 
local authorities pursue different economic policies. 
This paper undertakes such an analysis by develop­
ing and testing a model of the influences on 
variations in local expenditure on economic devel­
opment by the London Boroughs.
While economic intervention by local government 
has recently attracted considerable academic and 
political attention, it is not novel but stretches back 
to the ‘municipal enterprise’ of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, (Chandler and Lawl­
ess, 1985). In addition, some areas have a tradition 
of land development for industrial use which began 
in the inter-war period or in the 1950s and 1960s
(Camina, 1974). However, it is only in the last ten 
years that local authority economic policies have 
become more widespread and intensive. A  number 
of reasons have been idientified for the more active 
economic role by local government. The first is the 
redefinition of the authorities’ planning role under 
the 1971 Town and Country Planning Act. This 
legislation imposed a responsibility on authorities to 
survey local economic conditions and thereby 
enhanced the salience of this aspect of local policy­
makers’ environment (Johnson and Cochrane,
1981). A second factor is the 1972 Bains Report 
which exhorted local authorities to pursue the 
‘overall well-being’ of the local area rather than the 
conventional focus on the provision of individual 
services (Muller and Bruce, 1981). Third is the 
economic recession which has seriously affected not 
only those areas traditionally designated as ‘de­
pressed’ but also previously prosperous areas such 
as the West Midlands (Townsend, 1983). The fourth 
factor is the enhanced legitimacy bestowed on local 
government’s economic role in the late 1970s by 
central government’s urban policy. Department of 
the Environment Circular 71/77 exhorted local
George A. Boyne is at the Department o f Business and Administrative Studies, The Polytechnic o f Wales.
1 This paper is part of a broader project on local economic policies, funded by The Polytechnic of Wales. The origins of the paper are in 
work conducted jointly with Dr. A. I. Millington who made an invaluable contribution to whatever merits the paper may possess. I am 
also grateful to Paul McKeown for the preparation of the data.
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authorities to give greater priority to the economic 
implications of their activities and to appoint staff 
specifically to liaise with the business sector. In 
London in particular the Labour government’s 
urban programme adopted in 1978 resulted in a 
reversal of planning policy which since World War 
Two had emphasised the prevention of industrial 
development and the dispersal of population (Buck 
et al, 1986). Since 1979 the Conservative government 
has imposed various restrictions on local autonomy 
(Newton and Karran, 1985). However, while local 
attempts to combat the recession have been viewed 
with ambivalence by central government, few 
specific restrictions have been placed on local 
economic development policies (Young, 1986).
The above reasons may explain the general 
expansion of local authorities’ economic role, but 
national conditions cannot explain local policy 
variation. For such an explanation it is necessary to 
turn to the varying constraints and opportunities 
faced by local policy-makers and the varying 
characteristics of the policy-makers themselves. 
Section I below places economic policies in the 
context of a political theory of local policy variation. 
Section I I  develops a statistical model of inter­
authority differences in economic policies and 
operationalises the concepts in the model. Section 
I I I  presents empirical evidence on the validity of the 
model and Section IV  analyses the policy implica­
tions of the results.
Political Theory and Variations in Local Economic 
Policies
Local authority policies are the product of political 
processes which resolve conflicts about the required 
response to local conditions. Therefore it is appro­
priate to explain local economic policies from the 
perspective of a political theory of policy variation. 
Following Easton’s (1957; 1979) theoretical model 
of a political system it is possible to distinguish three 
types of influences on policy outputs: environmental 
conditions, inputs to the political system and the 
characteristics of the political system itself.
Easton’s framework has been the dominant 
paradigm in ‘output studies’ of policy variations 
across sub-national governments in the USA and 
Western Europe (Boyne, 1985). The same general 
framework has also been employed in studies of 
local policy variation in England, although different
terms have been used for the concepts (Hoggart,
1985). For example political scientists have categor­
ised the independent variables as ‘needs’, ‘resources’ 
and ‘disposition’ (e.g. Boaden, 1971; Danziger, 
1978). Similarly, economists have categorised influ­
ences on policy as ‘social marginal efficiency’ and 
‘social marginal cost’ variables (e.g. Nicholson and 
Topham, 1971, 1975), or simply as ‘supply side’ and 
‘demand side’ (e.g. Schofield, 1978; Storey, 1980). 
Despite the diverse terminology all these studies 
attempt to explain policy variations by reference to 
the environmental and political characteristics of 
local areas.
A recent modification of the traditional approach 
to local output research concerns the link between 
‘urban centrality’ and public policies (Aiken and 
Depre, 1981; Sharpe and Newton, 1984). The 
argument is that the decisions of a local authority 
may be influenced not only by the characteristics of 
its population but also by the area’s rank in the 
‘urban hierarchy’. Cities at the top of the hierarchy 
are the location for specialist facilities (e.g. enter­
tainment and shops) which are used by commuters 
and visitors from neighbouring authorities and by 
tourists. It  is argued that for local authority services 
such as transport and police the result is higher 
expenditure than required by the resident popula­
tion alone. However the general relevance of central 
place theory to the explanation of local policy 
variation has been questioned on both theoretical 
and empirical grounds (Sorensen, 1987). More 
specifically, economic development policies are 
unlikely to be influenced by urban centrality. The 
theoretical literature is vague about the causal 
mechanism which links centrality to policy outputs. 
It may be that selected service benefits are offered as 
a lure to non-residents, or it may be that visitors to 
the area seek such services. Neither of these 
mechanisms seems likely to feature in the politics of 
economic development. Firstly, economic develop­
ment policies are intended to benefit local residents 
and in particular to alleviate unemployment within 
local administrative boundaries (Young et a l, 1980, 
Johnson and Cochrane, 1982). Thus economic 
development should be viewed as a ‘divisible’ service 
which excludes non-residents from direct benefits 
(Hansen, 1984). Secondly, pressures for economic 
development activities are much less likely to 
emanate from non-residents than from local electors 
and businesses.
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While Easton’s conceptual model points to influ­
ences on policy variation in general, it does not identify 
the specific influences in individual policy areas. 
Possible influences on local economic development 
policies have been identified from the existing review 
articles and case studies in this field. The hypotheses 
derived from these sources and the variables used in 
the model are set out in the next section.
Variables and Hypotheses
( a )  L o c a l Econom ic Policies
The concept of economic policy is operationalised in 
this analysis as net current expenditure on economic 
development per 1,000 population (N E D X). Many 
local authority policies are relevant to local economic 
conditions. Decisions on total expenditure and rate 
levels are probably amongst the most important 
(Cuthbertson et a l, 1979; Gripaios and Brooks,
1982). The general distribution of funds between 
capital and current expenditure and between services 
may also have implications for local prosperity. In 
addition, local employment may be influenced by 
policies on the labour intensity of service provision 
(Boyne, 1987). The overall economic impact of such 
broad council decisions may well be greater than the 
impact of explicit economic development decisions. 
However, only economic development policies have 
the primary objective of directly protecting and 
promoting the local economy.2
Expenditure measures of the dependent variable 
in output studies have long been criticised for failing 
to reflect all the dimensions of the concept o f ’policy’ 
(e.g. Jacob and Lipsky, 1968; Munns, 1975). It is 
therefore important to emphasise that an explana­
tion is being sought for variations in only one 
dimension of economic development policy: the 
actual commitment of money. Separate models may 
well be necessary to account for inter-authority 
differences in non-financial dimensions of policy (Le 
May, 1973). This is because the same level of
expenditure may relate to different policy objectives, 
e.g., development p er se or labour intensive develop­
ment, jobs for any local residents or specifically for 
the ‘disadvantaged’. In addition to recognising that 
the focus is on only one dimension of policy 
‘output’, it is worth noting that expenditure levels 
may be unrelated to policy outcomes or impact 
(Dean and Peroff, 1977; Hinkley and Marquette, 
1983). Indeed it is widely considered that the impact 
of economic development policies on the local 
economy is marginal relative to the impact of 
market forces and central government policies, 
(Cochrane, 1986).
The level of expenditure on services may be an 
inappropriate operationalisation of current financial 
policy if the expenditure has been built up over 
many years. In this case it is inappropriate to seek to 
explain variations in historically determined expen­
diture levels by reference to contemporary environ­
mental and political variables (Tucker, 1982). For 
long established services, such as education, budget­
ary decisions are properly characterised as ‘incre­
mental’ because expenditures develop in a routine 
and regular way (Hoggart, 1983). In this context the 
appropriate operationalisation of current policy is 
the change in expenditure in each budgetary cycle 
rather than the expenditure level.
However, in the policy area of economic develop­
ment there is very little indication that the role of 
incremental decision routines is significant. Accord­
ing to Dempster and Wildavsky (1979), ‘if you 
want to know whether an incremental method is 
actually being used, then it is the regularity of the 
increments or subtractions from past practice that is 
important.’ Budget decisions on economic develop­
ment by the London boroughs do not display such 
regularity. The correlation between change in 
N E D X  in 1982/3 and 1983/4 is only 0.11; and that 
between 1983/4 and 1984/5 is only 0.14. The reason 
for the absence of an incremental pattern may be the 
relative novelty of spending on this function. Many 
London boroughs established a separate economic
2 The CIPFA questionnaire from which the policy data is derived gives the following advice to councils about the definition of economic 
development expenditure: “This heading covers (a) The promotion of development in the authority’s area by means of general 
publicity, the supplying of information, the advertisement of development opportunities and the organisation of promotional events 
such as seminars and ‘workshops', particularly to maintain or attract employment ... Holiday publicity and contributions to tourist 
boards or similar bodies should not be included here but in the Leisure and Recreation statistics, (b) The implementation of 
development ... either by the authority itself or by developers in partnership with, or attracted by the authority. Expenditure by the 
authority on land acquisition, infrastructure, buildings and site management should be included. Expenditure and income on industrial 
estates and nursery factories should be included here, (c) All expenditure, such as grants, rate/rent relief schemes and loans, which is 
aimed at attracting industry to the local authority's area should be included.”
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development budget only in the mid to late 1970s 
(Buck et a l, 1986). More broadly it has been argued 
that the constraints of incrementalism are weak on 
small services or expenditure categories (Sharpe and 
Newton, 1984). Whatever the specific cause, the 
absence of evidence of incrementalism means that 
the appropriate measure of current financial policy 
towards economic development is the level rather 
than the change in expenditure.
Analyses of local expenditure variation have 
obtained widely differing levels of explanation. The 
average amount of policy variation accounted for 
statistically in British output studies is 30-40 per 
cent (Boyne, 1985). However, as with incremental­
ism, there is a tendency for the explanatory power to 
decline as the proportion of total local authority 
expenditure constituted by the policy variable 
declines. Thus the output studies approach tends to 
be successful for services such as Housing, account­
ing for as much as 70 per cent of the variation in 
some analyses. By contrast, the approach tends to be 
unsuccessful for services such as Libraries or 
Leisure, accounting for little or none of the 
variation. This pattern of results suggests that while 
large services are subject to systematic constraints, 
small services are more open to idiosyncratic 
influences. It is therefore important to note that 
economic development expenditures represent a 
very small proportion of the total spending of the 
London Boroughs. Even for the highest spending 
authorities in the sample it represents only a little 
over one per cent of total net current expenditure. In 
the context of previous output studies results then, 
the share of total expenditure taken by economic 
development does not augur well for the explana­
tory power of the model outlined below.
(b )  E n v iro nm enta l Conditions
The concept of environmental conditions relevant to 
economic development policies is operationalised 
through several measures of unemployment. Urban 
economies in general in the U K  have suffered as a 
result of de-industrialisation and the spatial reor­
ganisation of production (Hasluck, 1987). In 
London in particular employment has declined 
because of complete plant closure rather than 
relocation (Elias and Keogh, 1982). The extent of 
unemployment in the local population is a salient 
symptom of economic malaise and may be inter­
preted as a clear indication of a ‘need’ for spending 
on economic development. In addition to represent­
ing a problem in itself unemployment is likely to 
cause pressure on local housing and social services, 
thereby re-enforcing the case for a policy response.
The view that the scale of local economic 
intervention is positively related to unemployment 
in the area is almost ubiquitous in the case studies of 
local authorities and the more general review articles 
(e.g. Townroe, 1979; Johnson and Cochrane, 1981; 
Boddy, 1982; Young 1986). In addition, a number of 
sources identify youth unemployment levels as an 
important spur to action (Needham, 1982; Norton,
1983). It has also been suggested that it is not only 
the absolute level of unemployment but also the rate 
of increase in unemployment which influences the 
extent of a local authority’s economic activity 
(Boddy, 1982; Young and Mills, 1983). Three 
measures of unemployment are used to investigate 
the validity of these arguments. First, G U N , the 
general rate of unemployment in 1981; second 
Y U N , the general rate of youth unemployment in 
1981; and third A G U N , the change in the general 
rate of unemployment between 1977 and 1981. 
A G U N  is specified as the percentage point increase in 
the rate of unemployment, which shows the extra 
part of the economically active population which 
became unemployed between 1977 and 1981. This 
measure of change assumes that if  an extra one per 
cent of the workforce become unemployed then the 
impact on N E D X  will be similar whether the initial 
level of G U N  was five per cent or ten per cent. 
Alternative specifications which weighted the change 
by the initial level of unemployment were experi­
mented with but produced inferior results to those 
presented below (for a discussion of alternative 
measures of employment change see Crouch, 1982; 
Gillespie and Owen, 1982).
The choice of the measures of unemployment was 
restricted by the requirement to match precisely the 
administrative areas of the London boroughs. This 
is a crucial consideration given the territorial focus 
of local economic policies. For example in one 
London borough the employment strategy ‘is based 
on the problems and needs of its own residents . . .  
the existing administrative boundaries clearly define 
the immediate target area of council policies and the 
residents who benefit from them’ (quoted in Young 
and Mills, 1983, 128). Ideally, annual measures of 
unemployment would have been used to investigate
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the lagged response of economic policies to environ­
mental conditions and to check for the impact of 
simultaneity bias on the estimated coefficients.
However this option was precluded by the 
absence of a regular and consistent source of data 
with the necessary correspondence to lower-tier 
local authority boundaries. This data restriction 
implies that the estimated coefficients for the 
unemployment variables may be attenuated in the 
later years of the study period. However this is 
unlikely to be a serious constraint on the interpreta­
tion of the coefficients because the pattern of 
unemployment across the London boroughs is very 
stable. For example, the level of general unemploy­
ment in greater London more than doubled between 
1971 and 1981 but the correlation between the level 
in these two years was as high as 0.96.
( c )  Inputs to the P o litic a l System
The concept of inputs is operationalised through 
measures of potential financial support for spending 
on economic development. Easton’s framework 
suggests that policy makers may be influenced by 
two types of input: demands and supports. However 
the existing literature on economic development 
provides little evidence on the role of demands. By 
contrast, several sources have identified financial 
resources as an important influence on local eco­
nomic policies. Two questionnaire surveys of 
economic development officers have found that 
inadequate finance is considered to be a key 
constraint on economic development activities 
(Falk, 1980; Mills and Young, 1986). Similarly, 
Camina (1974) found that authorities with a low 
rateable resource base tended to have a limited 
economic development role. More specifically, Cam­
ina found a statistically significant positive relation­
ship between local rateable value and advertising 
expenditure. This result is consistent with the 
widespread empirical support in output studies for 
the not implausible proposition that income is a 
precondition of spending. Almost all such studies 
specify financial resources as central grants and the 
value of the local tax base. For the major traditional 
areas of local authority activity in the U K  this may 
be an appropriate specification because there is a 
statutory obligation to provide services. Central 
grants are distributed on the basis of formulae which 
estimate the ‘need’ to spend on statutory responsi­
bilities and on the basis of the ability to fund such 
expenditure from the local tax base (Bennett, 1982). 
However there is no statutory responsibility to spend 
on economic development and therefore measures of 
financial resources are required which take account 
of the discretionary nature of the activity.
The level of financial commitment to economic 
development may be constrained by the need to 
spend on services which there is a legal obligation to 
provide. In other words spending on economic 
development may be a function of the availability of 
discretionary income. The amount of such ‘slack’ 
resources can be gauged by deflating the value of 
central grants and the local tax base by the level of 
statutory expenditure requirements. This involves 
the estimation of local expenditure ‘need’ which is 
fraught with conceptual and practical problems 
(Bennett, 1982; Bramley, 1984).
An ideal measure of need for the purposes of this 
analysis would fulfil two criteria. First, the measure 
would reflect the specific need for local authority 
services rather than the general need for public 
services in the local area. Second, the components of 
the need measure would be weighted to match their 
relative importance in the pattern of service provi­
sion. Currently the most comprehensive and sophis­
ticated attempt to meet these criteria on a regular 
annual basis is the measure of need used by central 
government to distribute ‘block’ grant to local 
authorities. This measure of need, the Grant Related 
Expenditure Assessment (G REA) estimates the 
spending required by each authority to provide a 
standard level of service. It is calculated on the basis 
of around 65 indicators of the requirement for local 
services. Many of these indicators are composite 
measures based on further sub-indicators (Society of 
County Treasurers). The data are grouped for block 
grant purposes into the following five categories:
A —  People In The Area (e.g. number and age 
composition of the resident population, day­
time net inflow of population, overnight 
visitors).
B —  Physical Features O f The Area (e.g. size, 
population density, road mileage, number of 
domestic and non-domestic properties).
C —  Social and Environmental Problems (e.g. spe­
cial educational needs, unemployment, hous­
ing conditions, one parent families, elderly 
living alone).
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D  —  Costs of Service Provision (e.g. labour costs of 
London salary weighting).
E —  Special Requirements of Particular Services 
(e.g. incidence of crime and fires, mandatory 
expenditures, debt charges).
This information about local conditions is used 
to estimate the number of ‘units of need’ for ser­
vice provision in each area. Each need indicator is 
then assigned a monetary weight based on the 
average cost of meeting a unit of need in the 
relevant group of local authorities. For each 
authority the number of need units is multiplied by 
the specified monetary weights to obtain the 
GREA. Such aggregate measures of need are 
inevitably open to the complaint that they are 
insensitive to the unique circumstances of indi­
vidual areas (see, for example, Flynn, 1986). How­
ever for the purposes of this analysis it is not 
necessary that G R EA ’s are a precise measure of the 
absolute level of service need in each area, but 
simply that they are a good proxy for the re la tive  
differences in statutory expenditure requirements 
across the London boroughs.
Two measures of sources of finance for economic 
policies are constructed by using G R EA ’s in 
conjunction with central grants and the size of the 
local tax base. These are G R N D , the ratio of central 
grants to GREA; and R VN D , the ratio of rateable 
value to GREA. The estimated relationship between 
the resource variables and N E D X  is not lagged 
because spending on economic development draws 
on funds available during the current financial 
year.
( d ) The P o litic a l System
The concept of the local political system is opera­
tionalised through the party control of the council, 
using dummy variables to indicate either Labour or 
Conservative control. While councils in some rural 
parts of England are still controlled by ‘indepen­
dents’, local politics in urban areas is dominated by 
the major national parties. Local elections in 
London have long been contested largely between 
Labour and the Conservatives (Young, 1975) and 
during the study period only one of the London 
boroughs (Richmond) was controlled by any other 
party. A one year lag is used for the party control 
variables because budgets are largely fixed towards
the end of the financial year prior to that in which 
the money is spent.
Much of the literature on local policy variation 
has dwelt on the question ‘does politics matter?’ 
From the perspective of Easton’s theoretical frame­
work this general question is absurd: politics is the 
sine qua non of public policies. However the specific 
question of the importance of p a r ty  politics is not so 
easily resolved. It  is therefore necessary to consider 
why and how party politics might influence spending 
on economic development.
The rationale for the inclusion of party political 
variables in studies of local policy variation is not 
well developed, despite their pervasive presence. The 
implicit assumption in most studies is that different 
party ideologies will be expressed in different 
policies. There is evidence that the party affiliations 
of local politicians are associated with sets of policy 
preferences which are sufficiently coherent to repre­
sent ideologies (Gordon and Whiteley, 1977). 
Nevertheless the constraint of such ideologies on 
policy choices may vary between issues. Thus it 
cannot be assumed that Labour and Conservative 
councils will differ consistently on all aspects of 
policy; and still less can it be assumed that Labour 
control will be associated with higher spending on 
all services (Sharpe and Newton, 1984). However 
there are strong reasons for supposing that Labour 
and Conservative local authorities will display 
different levels of financial commitment to economic 
development.
At national level since 1979 the parties have 
advocated widely different responses to the economy 
in general and unemployment in particular. Labour 
has attached the highest priority to the reduction of 
unemployment whereas the Conservative govern­
ment has stressed the overriding importance of 
reducing inflation. Further, Labour has advocated 
the alleviation of unemployment through public 
expenditure while the Conservatives have empha­
sised the role of the free market in the creation of 
‘real’ jobs. Thus the general ideological distinction 
between the parties on the size and functions of the 
state are clearly reflected in their response to 
economic problems. More specifically at the local 
level expenditure on intervention in the urban 
economy has been a key feature of Labour councils 
pursuing the new ‘municipal socialism’, (Boddy and 
Fudge, 1984). This is supported by survey results 
which indicate that economic intervention is gener­
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ally greater in Labour controlled areas than in 
Conservative controlled areas (Mills and Young,
1986). The approach of Labour authorities to 
economic problems is illustrated by the belief of 
councillors in one London borough that ‘the 
private sector operating alone in the free market is 
failing London and its people . . . intervention, 
particularly the practical invovlement of local 
authorities, is essential to encourage new investment 
in industry’ (Southwark Borough Council, 1986). 
Thus party politics can be expected to influence local 
economic policies because of differences between 
Labour and Conservative attitudes towards ‘public’ 
and ‘market’ repsonses to economic problems. It 
remains to consider how  party political influences 
might operate.
Easton’s systems model suggests that policy 
makers may influence policy outputs in two ways. 
First by a direct or additive effect which occurs 
regardless of environmental conditions or inputs. In 
the context of economic development this implies 
that Labour councils spend consistently more than 
Conservative councils whatever the level of financial 
resources or unemployment. The second role of 
policy makers is mediative rather than additive. This 
influence consists of ‘conditioning’ the impact of 
environmental conditions and inputs on policies. In 
the context of economic development the implica­
tion is that the effects of unemployment and 
financial resources are not constant but vary with 
party control. For example the presence of a Labour 
council might enhance the relationship between 
unemployment and spending while the presence of a 
Conservative council might dampen it.
The additive role of party politics suggests a 
model of the following form on the basis of the 
variables outlined above:
N ED Xj =  a + b jG U N j + b2G R N D f + b3R VNDj 
+ b4LABCj + ej
By contrast the mediative role of party politics 
suggests a model of the following general form:
NEDX; =  a +  b5LABG UNj + B6C O N G U N j
+ b7LABGRj + bgCONGRj +  b9LA-
BRVj + bjoCONRVj + ej
where LA BG UN  = G U N  if LA B C =1, otherwise 
LA B G U N  = 0
C O N G U N  =  G U N  if C O N C = l, otherwise 
C O N G U N  = 0
LABGR =  G R N D  if LABC =  1, otherwise 
LABG R = 0
C O N G R  =  G R N D  if CONC =  1, otherwise 
C O N G R  = 0
LABRV =  R U N D  if LABC =  1, otherwise 
LABR.V = 0
C O N R V =  R V N D  if CONC =  1, otherwise 
C O N R V = 0
Statistical support for the hypothesised effects of 
LABC and CONC in the mediative specification 
requires that the impact on N E D X  of the other 
explanatory variables differs significantly between 
Labour and Conservative boroughs (Wright, 1976). 
For example, the coefficient on LA B G U N  must be 
significantly greater than the coefficient on C O N­
G U N .
Traditionally only the additive role of political 
parties has been estimated in studies of local policy 
variation. However, it has gradually been recog­
nised that this procedure estimates only one of 
the potential role of parties in policy making 
(Godwin and Shepherd 1976; Hansen, 1981; Hog- 
gart, 1984). Neither the additive nor mediative 
model is theoretically superior. In any specific 
policy area political parties may play either or both 
roles. Therefore the relative validity of the two 
formulations is an empirical issue which depends 
on the policy area in question. Although political 
parties are widely considered to influence economic 
development decisions there is in general little 
indication in the literature whether their role is 
additive or mediative. However case studies of 
economic policy making in two London boroughs 
suggest that policy makers condition the impact of 
the environment on policy outputs. According to 
Young and Mills the effects of unemployment on 
policies are ‘mediated by the images, myths and 
power relationships that prevail within the organi­
sation’ (1983, 2). Similarly in a broader study of six 
London Boroughs it has been argued that re­
sponses to job loss ‘are conditioned by the dis­
positions and preoccupations of local policy 
makers, their priorities, and how strongly they see 
a need to intervene’ (Buck et a l, 1986, 117). I f  
such views are correct then the mediative model 
should produce superior statistical results to the 
additive model. This issue is explored in the 
discussion of the empirical evidence in the next 
Section.
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Empirical Evidence
This section presents evidence on the impact of 
unemployment, discretionary resources and party 
politics on variations in economic policies across the 
32 London Boroughs. Table 1 summarises the 
operationalisation of the concepts, the hvpotheses 
and the data sou ces. The analysis was ru for four 
separate financial years to alleviate the problem 
of interpreting a single ‘snapshot’ which might 
reflect a short-term disequilibrium amongst the 
variables (Brunner and Liepelt, 1972). The size of 
the sample differs slightly between the years because 
of missing data on the dependent variable for some 
cases.
Restriction of the analysis to the London Bo­
roughs averts difficulties which would arise in the 
context of other lower-tier local authorities in 
England and Wales. These problems principally 
involve variations in regional aid status and varia­
tions in upper-tier county council economic policies. 
Such features are constant across the London 
boroughs which all have the same regional aid status 
(non-assisted) and in the study period were covered
by the same upper-tier authority, the Greater 
London Council (see Eisenschitz and North, 1986).
Following the lag structure for each of the 
independent variables outlined above, empirical 
estimates were derived from recursive regression 
models using OLS. Various combinations of the 
independent variables were used to test the hypothe­
ses outlined in Section I I  and to examine the relative 
validity of the additive and mediative specifications 
of the role of party politics.
( a )  The E x p la n a to ry  P ow er o f  the M o d e l
The statistical evidence presented in Table 2 shows 
that a satisfactory explanation of variations in 
economic development expenditure is provided by 
the environment, input and political system vari­
ables. The explanatory power of the model is highly 
significant in each year, accounting for 60 per cent to 
75 per cent of the variation in N E D X . These results 
indicate that decisions on economic development are 
subject to considerable systematic constraints and 
are not simply the product of idiosyncratic circum­
stances in each authority.
Table 1
Variables in llie Analysis
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!. 1982 3. 1983 4. 1984 5 
General unemployment Rate. 
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Absolute Change in General 
Unemployment Rate. 1977-81 
Youth Unemployment Rate,
1981
Ratio of Central Grants to 
Expenditure Need. 1981 2,
1982 3. 1983 4. 1984 5 
Ratio of Rateable Value to 
Expenditure Need, 1981 2. 
1982 3, 1983 4, 1984 5 
Labour Control, 1980, 1981, 
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Data Sources: 1. Planning and Development Statistics (London, CIPFA, annual)
2. 1981 Census (London, OPCS, 1982)
3. National Dwelling and Housing Survey (London, HMSO, 1978)
4. Financial and General Statistics (London, CIPFA, annual)
5. Rate Collection Statistics (London, CIPFA, annual)
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1981 /2(n = 27) 1982/3(n =  28) 1983/4(n =  30) 1984/5(n =  27)
R2 0.61** 0.75*** 0.74*** 0.60**
R2 0.49 0.68 0.67 0.47
F 5.1 10.5 10.8 4.8
LABRV 2780** 6351*** 3644** 6676**
(3.4) (5.3) (3.6) (3-0)
CONRV -41 5 -231 -1 9 8 63
(0.5) (0.2) (0.2) (0-0)
LABGR -5 3 6 989 4789
(0.0) (0.0) (0.5) (1.3)
CONGR 2746 5065 2167 120
( 1.1) (1.7) ( 10) (0.0)
LABGUN 394 283 253 -3 1 6
(1-5) (0.9) ( 1-0) (0.6)
C O NG UN 636 338 161 400
(2.0) (0-7) (0.5) (0.6)
Constant -2546 -3466** -1428* -1256
(2.0) (3.2) (2.1) (0.8)
Notes: 1. t statistics in brackets
2. significance levels -  **  at least 0.01 
* * *  at least 0.001
The results for only the mediative specification of 
the role of party politics are shown in Table 2, 
because the additive specification yielded an inferior 
level of statistical explanation in each year. The R 2’s 
for the additive specification were 0.45 in 1981, 0.47 
in 1982, 0.61 in 1983 and 0.51 in 1984.3 Thus the 
conventional additive formulation not only misrep­
resents the role of party politics but also 
underestimates the impact of the set of independent 
variables on N E D X . It may therefore be the case 
that the inadequate operationalisation of political 
system variables in many previous output studies 
has artificially deflated the levels of explained 
variation obtained. Differences in the results for the 
two specifications are considered in more detail in 
the discussion of the estimated effects of the 
explanatory variables.
(b )  E n v iro nm enta l Conditions
Although the three aspects of unemployment out­
lined above are conceptually distinct they are 
virtually indistinguishable statistically.4 Thus in
practice it is impossible to isolate the separate 
effects of G U N , A G U N  and Y U N . The very high 
correlations between the measures of unemployment 
produced almost identical results when any one of 
them was included in the regression models. Conse­
quently only the results for G U N  are presented, but 
it should be emphasised that this variable is serving 
as an indicator of adverse employment conditions in 
general.
The statistical evidence offers little support for the 
hypothesised positive relationship between un­
employment and spending on economic develop­
ment. In Table 2 none of the coefficients for the 
impact of G U N  mediated by party politics is 
significant. When entered additively instead G U N  is 
significant only in 1981.5 One interpretation of these 
results might be that G U N  is a poor proxy for 
unemployment after 1981. However this seems 
unlikely given the stability in the spatial distribution 
of unemployment in London over time. Further, 
zero-order correlations between G U N  and N E D X  
are very consistent over the four years in the study 
period, at 0.49, 0.45, 0.49 and 0.48 respectively.
3 The F statistics for the difference between the mediative model R2 and the additive model R2 are: 1981, 4.1; 1982, 11.8; 1983, 5.8; 
1984, 3.3.
* The correlations between the three measures are: G U N  and Y U N , 0.94; G U N  and AGUN, 0.98; Y U N  and AGUN, 0.93.
5 It is unlikely that multicollinearity is masking the significance of G U N  when it is entered additively in the model N E D X  =  f(LABRV, 
CONRV, LABGR, CONGR, G UN). The R 2, for G U N  in this model is 0.50 in 1982, 0.43 in 1983 and 0.49 in 1984.
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Thus the results in Table 2 suggest that case 
studies and review articles have over-emphasised the 
impact of unemployment on economic development 
expenditure decisions. However it may be that the 
two sets of evidence can be reconciled by adopting a 
perspective outlined by studies of ‘diffusion of 
innovations’ across sub-national governments 
(Lutz, 1986). This suggests that the initial problem 
which prompts a policy response in some areas 
becomes less important as the policy pervades all 
areas. Thus although there may have been a link 
between unemployment and the early adoption of 
economic intervention, that link may have weak­
ened as the policy spread in an almost modish way 
to become part of the repertoire of all the boroughs. 
In the context of English local government the 
London boroughs may be in an analogous position 
to the regional groups of sub-national governments 
identified as important facilitators of innovation 
diffusion elsewhere (Walker, 1969; Harisalo, 1982).
Thus it is possible that the impact of unemploy­
ment has been eroded as all areas have been drawn 
to emulate or driven to compete with the innovative 
boroughs. I f  the decision to intervene in the local 
economy is a result of such stimuli then the 
subsequent level of spending depends not on local 
employment conditions but on variables such as 
financial resources and political disposition. Case 
studies of the history of economic policies in 
individual authorities would be required to test the 
diffusion perspective and to examine the roles of 
emulation and competition. But whatever the 
specific reasons the evidence indicates that un­
employment has little net effect on contemporary 
expenditures on economic development.
(c )  Inputs
The empirical evidence offers no support for the 
hypothesised impact of G R N D  on N E D X . None of 
the estimated coefficients for G R N D  is significant at 
the 0.05 level, either when the variable is mediated 
by party politics or when it is entered additively 
instead.6 Fiscal stress has been imposed on many 
local authorities by cuts in central grants in recent 
years, (Gibson et a l, 1987). The failure of revenues
to keep pace with required expenditures has been 
especially serious in the London boroughs (Audit 
Commission, 1987). Therefore it may be that even 
those areas with the highest G R N D  still had no 
slack grant funds to divert from spending on 
statutory functions.
The pattern of results for R V N D  is markedly 
different from that for G R N D . There is strong and 
consistent support for the hypothesised positive 
relationship between discretionary rate resources 
and economic development expenditure. However 
the impact of R V N D  on N E D X  occurs only in 
contexts where Labour control is also present. All 
the estimated coefficients for LABRV are positive 
and highly significant, but none of those for 
CO N R V is significant. Thus while high R V N D  
leads to high spending in Labour controlled authori­
ties this does not occur in Conservative controlled 
authorities. In other words high R V N D  is a 
necessary condition of high spending but is not in 
itself a sufficient condition. The results indicate that 
it is the interaction of discretionary rate resources 
with party control which is crucial to economic 
development decisions.
(d )  P o litic a l System
The statistical results support the hypothesised 
difference between the expenditure decisions of 
Labour and Conservative councils. The higher level 
of explanation provided by the mediative model 
indicates that the role of party politics is to enhance 
or suppress the impact of the other variables on 
N E D X . To test whether LABC or CONC had an 
additive as well as a conditioning effect, each party 
control variable was added separately to the 
mediative model. However no significant increase in 
the R 2 was produced in any of the four years.7 Thus 
Labour authorities do not spend more than Conser­
vative authorities regardless of environmental con­
straints and inputs to the political system.
The evidence indicates that party politics has an 
important impact on the relationship between tax 
base resources and economic policies. When R V N D  
is entered additively in place of LBRV and C O N R V  
the explanatory power of the model falls substan-
6 The non-significance of G R N D  when it is entered additively is not the product of multicollinearity. In the model N E D X  =  f(LABRV, 
CONRV, LABGUN, CONGUN, G R N D ), R2; for G R N D  is 0.21 in 1981, 0.35 in 1982, 0.27 in 1983 and 0.15 in 1984.
7 The R 2’s when LABC was added to the mediative model were 0.63, 0.76, 0.74 and 0.60; when CONC was added the R 2’s were 0.63, 
0.75, 0.74 and 0.60.
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tially, to 0.45 in 1981, 0.51 in 1982, 0.64 in 1983 and 
0.49 in 1984.8 Thus the LBRV and CO NRV  
coefficients are significantly different: the relation­
ship between R V N D  and N E D X  is strengthened by 
Labour control and weakened by Conservative 
control.
By contrast, the results show that party politics 
does not significantly condition the impact on 
economic policies of either grant resources or 
unemployment. The R 2 provided by the mediative 
model does not change significantly if either of these 
variables is entered additively.9 Thus Labour and 
Conservative authorities behave similarly in their 
responsiveness to unemployment and in their use of 
grant res urces to support economic development 
activities.
In sum then party politics does make a difference 
to economic development policies. However the 
impact of parties occurs through the mediation of 
R V N D  rather than through a direct influence on 
expenditure regardless of the circumstances. This 
pattern of results corroborates the argument that the 
limited role attributed to political variables in 
empirical studies of local policy variation may well 
be more reflective of method than substance (Boyne, 
1985).
Policy Implications
Two aspects of the statistical results particularly 
merit discussion in the context of current central 
government policies towards local authorities. These 
are the weak net impact of unemployment and the 
strong impact of rate resources on local economic 
policies.
Since 1979 the Conservative central government 
has adopted a series of policies which reflect a 
profound scepticism about the effectiveness and 
efficiency of local government. Pursuant to its broad 
ideological disdain for the public sector the Conser­
vative government has sought to reduce the func­
tional scope and financial autonomy of local 
government in general and urban local authorities in 
particular. Following the 1987 general election this 
approach has been reinforced by policies on the 
two major local services, education and housing, 
and by plans to reform local taxation. The govern­
ment also proposes to reduce local authorities 
economic role by establishing urban development 
corporations and by allocating grant money straight 
to private sector organisations.
In the context of this baleful climate for local 
government it is worth noting that the weak net 
relationship between G U N  and N E D X  does not 
lend force to central government’s case for curbing 
local authorities economic role. As the zero-order 
correlations between G U N  and N E D X  listed above 
show, there is a tendency for high spending on 
economic development to occur in the same areas as 
high unemployment. Although the regression results 
indicate that this pattern is not caused by unemploy­
ment p er se, the policy response nevertheless varies 
positively with ‘need’ and thereby corresponds to a 
rough ‘territorial justice’ (see Pinch, 1985). Thus 
while the targeting of funds on unemployment by 
local democratic institutions is far from perfect, it 
may well be no worse than central government’s 
record in the spatial distribution of resources to deal 
with urban problems (see for example Bentham, 
1985).
The evidence on the relationship between R V N D  
and N E D X  suggests that the government’s commit­
ment to the comprehensive reform of local taxation 
has important implications for local economic 
policies. The government proposes to centralise 
business rates and to replace domestic rates by a poll 
tax (Boyne, 1986). This will limit all authorities to a 
uniform and greatly reduced tax base per capita. 
One of the necessary conditions for high spending 
on economic development will thereby be removed, 
because diccretionary resources from a high ratio of 
rateable value to expenditure need will no longer be 
available. Further, the coincidence of unemploy­
ment and population decline in the same areas 
(Redfern, 1982) is likely to worsen the problems of 
funding economic development from the poll tax. 
Reductions in the new tax base as outmigration 
occurs will increase the difficulty of raising the 
required revenue in precisely those authorities where 
economic conditions are most adverse.
Thus rate reform is likely to fetter the economic 
activities of local authorities, and in particular to 
rein back spending by Labour authorities. This in 
turn means that ‘public’ approaches to urban
8 The F statistics for the difference between the R2’s produced by the two models are: 1981, 8.2; 1982, 20.2; 1983, 8.9; 1984, 5.5.
9 The R2's for the model N E D X  = f(LABRV, CONRV, LABGR, CONGR, G U N ) are 0.60, 0.74, 0.73, 0.58; the R 2’s for the model 
N ED X = f(LABRV, CONRV, G R N D , LBGUN, CO N G U N ) are 0.58, 0.72, 0.73, 0.58.
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economic problems will be curtailed. The eventual 
impact of this change on local conditions depends 
on the relative merits of public and market strategies 
for the regeneration of local economies. At present 
both sides can claim that their favoured approach 
has never been implemented sufficiently to be 
allowed to work (Duncan and Goodwin, 1985). 
Whatever the supposed long term benefits of more 
emphasis on a market approach, the short term cost 
of rate reform for local economic development is 
likely to be less diversity and therefore less oppor­
tunity to learn from testing different responses in 
different areas.
Conclusion
The above analysis examined the validity of various 
hypotheses about why different local authorities 
adopt different economic policies, in the context of a 
political theory of policy variation. The statistical 
model developed sought to explain variations in 
economic policies by reference to environmental 
conditions, inputs to the political system and the 
characteristics of the political system itself. The 
empirical evidence showed that such variables 
account for a substantial proportion of the variation 
in spending on economic development by the 
London boroughs. More specifically, party politics 
and the availability of discretionary income from the 
local tax base were found to be important influences 
on expenditure decisions.
The nature of the jo in t  impact of party politics 
and financial resources means that it is inappropri­
ate to evaluate their ‘relative importance'. While 
both Labour control and discretionary rate income 
are necessary conditions of above average spending, 
neither alone is a sufficient condition. Thus although 
Labour councils may be favourably disposed 
towards high levels of economic intervention, their 
ability to adopt such policies is contingent on the 
availabiiity of tax base resources beyond that 
necessary to pay for statutory services. This implies 
that if central government denies Labour authorities 
access to such resources then economic development 
activities are likely to be seriously curtailed.
Finally, as noted above, output studies models do 
not generally perform well when the dependent 
variable is specified as expenditure on a policy which 
represents a low proportion of total spending. The 
relatively high explanatory power of the model
suggests that economic development expenditure 
may have a ‘symbolic’ importance which other small 
categories of expenditure do not possess. To this 
extent the expenditures may represent authorities’ 
concern to be seen to be doing som ething  in response 
to a politically salient issue, even if  the total financial 
commitment is relatively small.
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CHAPTER VII
CENTRAL GRANTS AND LOCAL POLICY VARIATION
Abstract
This paper estimates the impact of central grants on local spending 
decisions in England in the 1980's. The analysis is based on a more 
explicit conceptual framework and a more appropriate methodology than 
conventionally used to measure grant effects in 'output studies' of local 
policy variation. A  set of six hypotheses is derived from political and 
economic theories of grant inpact. The relationship between grants and 
expenditure change is estimated through a TSLS regression model. The main 
empirical results are that grants are an important constraint on spending 
decisions and that different types of grants have different effects: lump
sum grants are substitutive and matching grants are stimulative. The 
evidence also indicates that spending is influenced by party politics, 
service needs and the local tax base.
1CENTRAL GRANTS AND LOCAL POLICY VARIATION
The impact of politics on local policy variation remains difficult to 
detect, despite a large and well established body of research^). Most 
'output studies' of the determinants of local policies have concentrated 
on the internal political characteristics of local areas. Much less 
attention has been devoted to the potential influence of external 
political forces, such as central government policies^). Considerable 
time has elapsed since central grants were declared the 'forgotten 
variable' in output studies,(^)but the omission has generally 
persisted. Further, when grants have been included as an explanatory 
variable their impact on policies has been poorly conceptualised and 
measured.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate empirically the effect of central 
grants on local spending decisions. The impact of grants is estimated on 
the basis of a more explicit conceptual framework and a more appropriate 
methodology than hitherto employed in output studies. Part I of the paper 
analyses political and economic theories of the role of grants. Part II 
assesses the quality of the existing evidence on the relationship between 
central grants and local policies in the U.K. Part III specifies a 
statistical model of the impact of grants on local expenditure and Part IV 
presents evidence on the validity of the model in the context of English 
local authorities.
2I THEORIES OF GRANT IMPACT
This section specifies six hypotheses concerning the relationship 
between central grants and local spending decisions. Three 
hypotheses are derived from political models of central-local 
relations, and three hypotheses are derived from economic models of 
income and price effects. The two theoretical perspectives borrow 
substantially from each other. For example, the political 
perspective suggests that grant impact is mediated by local economic 
variables. Similarly, the economic perspective suggests that grant 
impact is mediated by local political variables. Thus the six 
hypotheses belong to a broad 'political economy', of grant impact.
(a) The Politics of Grants
The role of grants is a key component of political models of 
central-local relations. The 'dependence' of local authorities on 
central grants has long been viewed as an important influence on 
local budgetary behaviour^). Recently it has been suggested that 
"it would be difficult to overstate the dominance of financial 
considerations in the current relationship between central and local 
government"^). In general it has been argued that central funding 
undermines local fiscal autonomy. More specifically, if grant levels 
are high then changes in grant will dominate local spending 
decisions.
3In the U.K. an 'agency' model of low local autonony and high central 
control has traditionally been counterposed with a 'partnership' 
model of local discretion within limits agreed between central and 
local government(^ ). In the 1960's and early 1970's the 
credibility of the agency model was undermined by evidence of local 
discretion. For example, Boaden found that the authorities most 
reliant on grant funding did not tend to conform to average 
expenditure levels for all authorities or to cluster at a similar 
expenditure l e v e l A s h f o r d  found that authorities did not 
become more uniform in their allocation of expenditure between 
services as the level of grant funding in the local government system 
as a whole increased. He concluded that "the heavy financial 
dependence of British local authorities an central government has not 
produced a demonstrable effect on policy choice in the sub-national 
system"(®). In the late 1970's the prevailing model of 
central-local relations absorbed elements of the literature on 
pressure groups and corporatism. Local government was viewed as 
trading the responsibilities of 'insider status' for guaranteed 
access to the policy process in central government^). The most 
well developed variant of the shift in perspective was Rhodes' 
'pcwsr-dependence' model which emphasises the role of negotiation and 
resource deployment within rules which are themselves modified by 
conflict resolution. Thus "the relationship between centre and 
periphery is not a 'control' relationship. Rather, central 
departments and sub-national public sector organisations are 
inter-dependent"(*0).
4However, since 1979 there has been a shift back towards the agency 
model as central government has sought to curb the powers and 
spending of local government. Central attempts to cut local 
expenditure have been pursued principally through cuts in grant. The 
grant funded percentage of net local government spending was reduced 
from 61% to 46% between 1979 and 1986. In addition grant penalties 
have been imposed on authorities deemed to be overspending by central 
government. Such policies have led to the view that "the actions of 
the Conservatives show quite clearly that local authorities in 
Britain are weak in relation to a central government which can ... 
impose unilaterally its own policy priorities"(**). The revised 
model of central-local relations in the U.K. may therefore be 
characterised as 'local governing under central pressure' or 'central 
power and local dependence'.
If the renewed credibility attached to the agency model is valid then 
central grants constitute severe constraints on local fiscal 
autonomy. In this context variations in local spending decisions 
should be closely correlated with variations in grants.
It has been argued that the impact of grants an local spending is not 
uniform across authorities but varies with local financial 
circumstances. There are two versions of this argument. First, 
changes in grants will have a stronger impact on those authorities 
which were previously most reliant on grant funding. If grants are 
high then local policy makers are more likely to comply with central
5government policies and less likely to respond to local demands. The 
view that high grants are incompatible with local 'accountability' 
was endorsed and effectively popularised by the Layfield 
Report(*2)# Academic members of the Layfield committee have 
subsequently restated the argument that if a large proportion of 
expenditure is covered by grants then spending decisions are 
dominated by changes in grant support. For example, "local 
government responsibility is undermined by a high level of grant ... 
because the attention of a local authority is turned more to the 
centre than to its voters in the local community" ( -^^ ). Similarly, 
as grant funding increases "the budgetary process in local 
authorities tends to become grant led ... (and) there is greater 
reluctance to take independent local action"(**).
A  second local financial variable which may mediate the impact of 
grants is the cost to ratepayers of replacing grant cuts. In 
particular, local authorities are viewed as sensitive to the 
'anticipated reaction' of the electorate if rate levels are increased 
to compensate for grant losses. In this case the impact of grants on 
spending decisions is caused by the 'gearing effect'(^^). For 
example, suppose that two authorities each spend £100 per capita but 
that the percentage of spending covered by grants is 30% in one and 
70% in the other. If grant funding is cut by £10 per capita in both, 
then the increase in local taxes necessary to compensate for the loss 
is only 14% in the first authority but is 33% in the second.
6Therefore it may be that the second authority will be more reluctant 
to replace the grant revenue than the first. Sharpe and Newton have 
argued that in the 1980's "those local authorities in receipt of the 
highest levels of grant will, given the gearing effect, be subject to 
disastrous financial instability arising frcm fairly small reductions 
in the central grant". ( ^ )
Thus political models of central-local relations yield three 
hypotheses on the relationship between central grants and local 
spending:
HI Variations in central grants are significant constraints on 
variations in local expenditure decisions.
HI I The impact of grants is significantly mediated by the prior 
level of grant funding.
HI 11 The impact of grants is significantly mediated by the rate cost 
of replacing grant cuts.
A  major gap in the literature on the politics of grants is the 
absence of specific predictions about the magnitude of grant effects 
on local spending. How much expenditure change will be produced by a 
given change in grants? For hypotheses on this issue it is necessary 
to turn to the economic theory of grants.
7(b) The Economic of Grants
Economic theory provides a sophisticated set of predictions about the 
direction and size of the impact of different types grants (17). 
Four hypothetical grant effects, from complete substitution to 
stimulation, are illustrated in diagram I. The vertical axis shows 
total net expenditure, funded from both grants and local tax 
revenues. The horizontal axis shows local authority income from 
central grants.
Complete substitution occurs if an increase in grant results in no 
change in total expenditure. In this case all of the extra grant 
revenue is used to cut local taxes. In effect local decision makers 
are treating central grants and local taxes as perfectly 
interchangeable, simply substituting one source of funds for the 
other. This situation is represented by the horizontal axis in 
diagram I: expenditure is unresponsive to shifts in grant.
If partial substitution occurs then an increase in grant produces 
some increase in spending, but the increase is less than the full 
amount of the grant. Hie remainder of the extra grant income is used 
to cut local taxes. The specific example of partial substitution 
shown in diagram I is midway between complete substitution and no 
substitution. In this instance an extra £10 of grant would be 
distributed equally between lower taxes and higher spending.
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8No substitution occurs when extra grant funds are all allocated to 
expenditure which therefore increases by the value of the grant. In 
this case an increase in grant results in no change in local taxes. 
This situation is represented by the 45° line in diagram I, where a 
shift in grant produces an identical shift in spending.
The final hypothetical impact of grants to be considered is 
stimulation. This occurs if extra grant produces an increase in 
expenditure which exceeds the value of the grant. In this situation 
not only is the whole grant allocated to expenditure but local taxes 
also rise. The specific example of stimulation in diagram I shows an 
increase in spending of £15 in response to an increase in grant 
of £10.
Economic theory suggests that the extent of substitution or 
stimulation depends on whether grants are 'lump-sum' or 'matching'. 
A  lump-sum grant is provided as an unconditional supplement to local 
community income. The extra funds can be used as local decision 
makers see fit, but in general the predicted impact of a lump-sum 
grant is partial substitution. If local authority services are 
'normal' goods then their consumption will rise because of the 
increase in the income of the local ccmmmity. However, the rise in 
local authority expenditure will be less than the full value of the 
grant. The remaining portion of the extra income will be spent on 
private goods, via a cut in local taxes. Hie balance between local 
services and private goods will depend on their relative income 
elasticities of demand.
9Matching grants are paid as a supplement to local revenue but with 
strings attached which require the fulfilment of certain formal 
conditions. First, matching gxant receipts are conditional upon the 
allocation of the money to service provision rather than local tax 
cuts. Second, local authorities must cover a proportion of total 
expenditure fran their own revenues. Hie payment of a matching grant 
is effectively a reduction in the relative price of local authority 
services compared with other goods. This price cut draws expenditure 
away frcm private consumption and towards the consumption of local 
authority services. Thus in general the predicted impact of a 
matching grant is stimulation. A  further distinction can be drawn 
between the hypothesised effects of 'open' and 'closed' matching 
grants. A  closed matching grant offers a price cut only as far as a 
level of consumption designated by central government. Thereafter 
the subsidy is removed and the full cost of further spending falls on 
local tax revenues. Thus the economic perspective on income and 
price effects suggests a hierarchy of grant impacts: open matching
grants are stronger than closed matching grants which are stronger 
than lump-sum grants.
The 'conventional' economic theory of grants outlined above assumes 
that local authority decisions are analogous to the response of an 
individual consumer to incane and price changes. Thus the complexity 
of local politics can be set aside and grant effects can be treated 
'as if' they resulted from the behaviour of the median voter(^®).
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However, the validity of this assumption has been undermined by 
empirical analyses of grant effects in the U.S.A. For
example, according to the median voter model, a rise in lump sum 
grants of £10 or a rise in private incomes of £10 should have roughly 
the same impact on local authority expenditure. In this case the 
extra grant is simply a 'veil' for a cut in central government 
taxes. However, the Impact of lump-sum grants on spending by states 
and localities in the U.S.A. is generally much greater than the 
inpact of private incomes. Thus the consequences for local spending 
differ substantially if additional funds are placed in private 
pockets rather than the public purse. This has become known as the 
'flypaper effect's money sticks where it hits. The explanation 
offered for this phenomenon is that the median voter is not the 
actual decision maker(20). instead, grant responses are determined 
by policy makers who prefer to retain the funds for their own 
purposes rather than pass the money on to local taxpayers. Local 
policy makers effectively swindle their constituents but escape 
electoral sanctions because voters suffer from a 'fiscal illusion' 
about the actual nature of the grants. (^1)
To square the economic theory of grants with the evidence it has 
therefore been necessary to replace the median voter model with a 
less simplistic model of local politics. The revised economic theory 
implies that grant impact depends on whether local policy makers 
prefer extra spending or lower taxes. For example, Labour
11
authorities may value spending increases more than tax cuts but the 
reverse may be true for Conservative authorities. If so, an increase 
in lump-sum grants will cause less substitution in Labour councils 
than Conservative councils. Similarly, an increase in matching 
grants will cause more stimulation in Labour than Conservative 
councils.
Thus economic theory provides three further hypotheses on the 
relationship between central grants and local spending:
HIV:The impact of lump-sum grants is partial substitution. 
HV: The impact of matching grants is stimulation.
HVI:The impact of grants is significantly mediated by local 
politics.
The procedures for testing these six grant hypotheses are discussed 
in Section III and empirical evidence on their validity is presented 
in Section IV. The next section evaluates the existing evidence on 
the relationship between central grants and local spending in the 
U.K.
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II ESTIMATES OF GRANT IMPACT IN THE U.K.
Table I summarises the evidence cm grants yielded by studies of local 
policy variation in the U.K.(^) The statistical results relate to 
only three of the six grant hypotheses listed above: HI, HIII and
HIV. Hie other three hypotheses have not been tested. The evidence 
is divided into three categories which correspond to the types of 
grant tested: lump-sum, matching and 'total' which includes both
forms of grant. Few of the studies contain much discussion of the 
specification or the impact of the grant variables which they 
include(^). Therefore, seme analysis of the results is necessary 
to extract the implications for political and economic theories of 
grants.
Hie interpretation of the evidence is least complex where the measure 
of fiscal policy is total expenditure and grant impact is estimated 
using unstandardised regression coefficients (see b values in Table 
I). In this case complete substitution is indicated if the 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero; partial 
substitution if it is significantly greater than zero but 
significantly less than one; no substitution if it is not 
significantly different from one; and stimulation if it is 
significantly greater than one(^). The implication of the 
evidence is less straightforward in studies which present only
TABLE I: ESTIMATES OF GRANT IMPACT
(a) LUMP-SUM GRANTS
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standardised measures of grant impact (e.g. a correlation coefficient 
or Beta weight). In this context a positive relationship between 
grants and spending may indicate partial substitution, no 
substitution or stimulation. However, more precise information is 
available if such studies analyse local taxes as well as 
expenditures(^6).
The general pattern of the empirical evidence is easy to summarise: 
chaos. The estimated grant coefficients are diverse and display 
little consistency even across studies of the same type of grant in 
the same time period. ( )  Much of the evidence suggests that the 
impact of grants is significant and therefore supports HI, however, 
there is little support for either HIV or HV. For both lump-sum and 
matching grants the estimates cover the whole range of hypothetical 
effects, from complete substitution to stimulation. This implies 
either that the economic theory of grants is incorrect, or that the 
evidence is invalid. There are strong arguments in favour 
of the latter interpretation. All the studies are affected by at 
least one of three important methodological problems: the absence of
controls for the influence of other variables; the failure to 
correct for the potential impact of simultaneity bias; and the use 
of historically determined variables to analyse contemporary fiscal 
relationships. The implications of each of these problems are 
discussed in turn.
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The diversity of the evidence is probably attributable in part to the 
different variables tested alongside grants. To derive valid 
estimates of the influence of grants on spending it is necessary to 
take other relevant influences into account. Therefore, on this 
criterion, the most credible results are provided by studies which 
examine the inpact of grants while controlling for local needs, 
resources and politics. Such controls are particularly important 
because the bulk of grant funding in the U.K. is intended to 
compensate authorities for differences in their needs and resources. 
In practice 'equalisation' of need and resource variations is far 
from perfect but high need and low resource areas generally receive 
high grants^®). In addition, labour party representation on local 
councils tends to be col linear with needs and resources. Therefore, 
if a grant variable is tested in isolation then it will tend to pick 
up the effect of these other variables and the estimated coefficient 
is likely to be biased. For example, the absence of control 
variables may explain why lump-sum grants appear to be stimulative in 
the studies by King and by Jackman and Sellars.
The problem of simultaneity bias undermines the validity of all the 
evidence on the impact of matching grants and total grants. Every 
study in these categories uses ordinary least squares methods to 
estimate the relationship between grants and local fiscal policies.
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This is appropriate only if grants are exogenous to expenditures. 
That is, if the causal relationship runs one way, from grants to 
spending. It is inappropriate if grants are endogenous, that is if 
the causation between grants and spending is reciprocal. It is this 
latter situation which obtains for the open matching grants included 
in these studies. For example, the allocation of the 'rate 
deficiency grant' tested by Boaden depended on the rate poundage 
levied by each authority. By setting a higher rate an authority 
could attract extra grant. In this context, the grant coefficient 
contains not only the influence of grants on spending, but also the 
influence of spending on grants. If both effects are positive, as in 
the case of most matching grants, then the coefficient will be biased 
upwards.
The third methodological problem is that all but two of the studies 
use historically determined measures of grants and local 
policies. Ostensibly, the statistical relationship between
expenditure levels and grant levels shows the contemporary 
responsiveness of local fiscal policies to centred grants. However, 
the level of expenditure is an invalid operationalisation of the 
concept of local policy and the level of grant is an inaccurate 
indicator of the impact of the current grant system.
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The level of expenditure by a local authority is the product of 
responses to constraints and opportunities over many years. It is 
not a measure of current 'policy' in the sense of a decision between 
various courses of action or inaction. Rather, local expenditure 
decisions focus on adjustments to the existing base, which are 
typically marginal or 'incremental' ( ) .  Therefore, the 
appropriate measure of responsiveness to grants is local expenditure 
change over time.
The level of grant allocated by central government also contains 
considerable historical influences. The distribution of grants 
between authorities changes very slowly, partly because of a 
conventional concern to protect local authorities from sudden swings 
in grant. When the grant system has been overhauled (as in 1966, 
1974 and 1981) stability has been sought through 'safety nets' and 
other transitional arrangements. Thus, although the type of grant 
may change markedly the level of grant may change little. In
this context the apparent relationship between current grants and 
spending levels may be dominated by the characteristics of the 
previous grant system. Therefore, to detect the effect of the 
contemporary grant system it is necessary to measure the change in 
grants.
Thus previous empirical studies have produced no evidence on grant 
hypotheses II, III and VI; and no satisfactory evidence on grant 
hypotheses I, IV and V. The principal questions posed by political 
and economic theories of grant impact therefore remain largely 
unanswered in the context of U.K. local government.
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III A  MODEL OF GRANT IMPACT
This section specifies a statistical model which will be used to 
estimate the impact of central grants on local expenditure change. 
The model includes not only grants but also measures of party 
politics, service needs and tax base resources. The measurement of 
the explanatory variables and their hypothetical effects on spending 
are discussed below. The full model and the method of estimation are 
then summarised and the context of the empirical analysis is 
outlined.
(a ) Grants
Since 1981 local authorities in England have received three 
types of grant from central government: block grant, domestic
rate relief grant and specific grants.(32)
Block grant comprises around 75% of total grant funding. It is 
a general equalisation grant which is intended to compensate for 
variations in local needs and resources. The change in block 
grant receipts (4BG) from one year to the next is largely 
determined by circumstances beyond the control of individual 
local authorities. The most important influences o n A B G  are 
central government decisions on the size of the block grant pool 
and its distribution between the various groups of authorities. 
Within these constraints, &  BG for an individual authority is 
further influenced by the change in local service needs and tax
18
base resources. These variables are also beyond local authority 
influence in the short term. Central government estimates
the level of service needs through the 'Grant Related 
Expenditure Assessment'. (^) Tax base resources are measured 
by the total rateable value of properties in the local area, 
which is also assessed by central government.
Thus BG is largely a lump-sum grant which is exogenous to local 
decisions on expenditure change (AEX). However, ABG is also 
influenced by A  EX to seme extent. Additional expenditure up to 
a limit set by central government attracts more grant. 
Expenditure beyond this limit attracts grant at a declining rate 
which may eventually became negative. This characteristic of 
block grant distribution implies that the relationship 
between A B G  and AEX contains an element of simultaneity. 
Therefore, it is necessary to create a proxy for ABG to remove 
the potential impact of simultaneity bias from estimates of its 
effect on A EX. A  modified measure of ABG can be created through 
the following equations:
BG^t = f(ND^t , TB^t , BG£t_j) Equn. I.
MABG^j. = EBG^j. - ®^it—1 Equn. II.
where i denotes an individual local authority, t and t-1 refer
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to the current and previous financial years respectively and the 
variables are defined as followsj (35)
BG is the level of block grant
TB is the size of the local tax base, measured by total rateable 
value.
ND is the level of service needs, measured by the Grant Related 
Expenditure Assessment.
EBG is the estimate of BG obtained from Equation I.
M&BG is the modified measure of ABG obtained from Equation II.
This procedure provides a proxy for ABG which is freed of the 
influence of A EX. The variable M£BG is a measure of the change 
in an exogenous lump-sum grant.
Domestic rate relief grants comprise around 5% of local 
authority grant income. This grant compensates local 
authorities for the statutory requirement to levy a lower rate 
poundage on private households than on businesses. The size of 
the grant in each area depends on the rateable value of domestic 
properties. The change in this grant (ADG) from one year to the 
next is determined by the change in domestic rateable value, 
largely as a result of new housing developments. Thus, for an 
area as a whole, ADG is a lump-sum grant which is exogenous to 
local spending decisions. However, the distribution of A D G
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between the upper and lower tier local authorities in the same 
area depends on the relative change in their respective rate 
poundages. If one tier increases its rate poundage by more than 
the other then it will receive a bigger share of the grant. 
This aspect of the distribution of ADG implies that the 
relationship between ADG and A EX is partly simultaneous. To 
deal with this problem a proxy for ADG can be created as 
follows:
MADGit = (DGj^j/lOO)-PDGit Equn. III.
where ,
DG is the level of domestic rate relief grant.
PDG is the percentage change in DG for the area as a whole. 
MADG is the modified measure of &PG.
This procedure yields a proxy for ADG which is freed of the 
influence of A EX. The variable MADG is a measure of the change 
in an exogenous lump-sum grant. The cannon characteristics of 
Z\MBI> and AMDG enable them to be added to form a single measure 
of the change in general grant revenue, AGG.
Hie final component of grant funding is specific grants. Unlike 
BG and DG these grants are allocated for particular services. 
Specific grants cover a fixed proportion of spending up to a
21
centrally specified level. Beyond this level the whole cost of 
further spending falls on local tax revenues. The limit imposed 
by central government means that the change in specific grants 
(ASG) from one year to the next is beyond local authority 
control. Whereas open matching grants are endogenous to local 
spending, closed matching grants such as A S G  are 
exogenous. (36)
The variables AGG and ASG can be used to test the hypotheses 
that grants are a significant constraint on spending decisions, 
that lump-sum grants are substitutive and that matching grants 
are stimulative. Before discussing the procedure for testing 
the other three grant hypotheses, it is necessary to consider an 
important complication in the measurement of grant impact.
In most previous studies the focus has been on grant levels and 
therefore all grant values have been positive. However, changes 
in grant over time may assume either positive or negative 
values. In this context, the estimation of a single grant 
coefficient is appropriate only if the expenditure response is 
uniform across the range of grant changes. Such a uniform 
response is illustrated by line U in Diagram II. The same rate 
of partial substitution is produced whether grants increase or 
decrease. However, it is possible that the rates of response to 
positive and negative grant changes differ. Local policy
DIAGRAM II: UNIFORM AND DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSES TO POSITIVE AND 
NEGATIVE CHANGES IN GRANT
A E X +
D
U
On line U a grant increase of £10 causes a spending increase of £4; 
and a grant decrease of £10 causes a spending decrease of £4.
On line D a grant increase of £10 causes a spending increase of £8; 
and a grant decrease of £10 causes a spending decrease of £2.
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makers may be more willing to increase spending when grants rise 
than to reduce spending when grants fall.(^) Such a 
differential response is shewn by line D in Diagram II. In this 
example the inpact of a positive grant change is a low rate of 
substitutions most of the extra grant is spent and little is 
used to cut local taxes. By contrast the impact of a negative 
grant change is a high rate of substitutions most of the grant 
cut is replaced by local tax revenue and the cut in spending is 
small. In this context/ it would be necessary to estimate 
separate coefficients for the impact of positive and negative 
changes in lump-sum grants. A  similar procedure might also be 
required to measure the impact of matching grants.
(b) The Mediation Of Grant Inpact by Local Financial Conditions
To test grant hypotheses HII and HIII it is necessary to measure 
the level of prior grant funding and the cost to ratepayers of 
replacing grant revenues. It is also necessary to specify how 
these variables interact with changes in grant.
The measurement of prior grant funding is straightforward. This 
variable, GRFX, is simply the percentage of total net spending 
which was funded by grants in the previous financial year. If 
hypothesis HII is valid then compliance with central policies 
should increase with GRFX. Therefore, to test the role of GRFX
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in facilitating such central 'control' it is necessary to 
identify the local behaviour which the centre desires.^®)
The aims of central policies towards local government finance in 
the 1980's have been to reduce spending and restrain rates. 
Thus the preferred impact of grant cuts is no substitution and 
the preferred impact of grant increases is complete 
substitution. If local compliance with central policies is 
influenced by GRFX, then the relationship between AGG and AEX 
should resemble the pattern in Diagram III. A  given grant cut 
will produce a greater spending cut in a high GRFX authority. 
Similarly a given grant increase will produce a smaller spending 
increase in a high GRFX authority.
An interaction term which reflects this pattern of central 
preferences can now be specified. In this variable, COMPLY, the 
size of a grant cut is magnified by GRFX and the size of a grant 
increase is deflated by GRFX:
COMPLYit = A G G it*GRFX*it-1 Equn. IV.
where GRFX* is equal to 1/GRFX if AGG is positive, and equal to 
GRFX if AGG is negative. (^9) If hypothesis HII is valid then 
the relationship between AEX and COMPLY should be closer than 
the relationship between AEX and AGG.(^®)
DIAGRAM III: THE MEDIATION OF GRANT IMPACT BY PRIOR GRANT 
FUNDING
A E X +
A g g - AGG+
B
A
A E X -
Line A represents a high GRFX authority and line B represents a 
low GRFX authority
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To test grant hypothesis HIII it is necessary to operationalise 
the concept of the gearing effect. The first step is simply to 
calculate RATE, which is the percentage rate change required to 
compensate for a change in grants. The gearing effect has 
usually been discussed in the context of grant cuts but it is 
also relevant to grant increases. If a substantial rate cut is 
permitted by extra grant then it is less likely to be used to 
boost spending.^1 ) The logic of the interaction between 
RATE and AGG is similar to the logic of COMPLY. In the 
interaction term, GEAR, the size of a grant cut is magnified 
by RATE and the size of a grant increase is deflated by RATE. 
Thus,
GEARit = &GGit • RATE*it Equn. V.
where RATE* is equal to 1/ RATE if AGG is positive and RATE 
if AGG is negative. If hypothesis HIII is valid then the 
relationship between GEAR and AEX should be closer than the 
relationship between A G G  and AEX.
(c) Party Politics
Expenditure decisions may be influenced by local party politics 
simply because parties differ in their views about the costs and 
benefits of higher spending and lower taxes. Party policies may
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be underpinned by ideological dispositions, by a pragmatic need 
to appeal to specific segments of the electorate or by the 
control of policy formulation by activists. Any of these
constraints may prevent parties converging towards the position 
of the median voter. jn this case distinctive policy
priorities will be reflected in distinctive patterns of policy 
change. Analyses of local policy variation have usually 
estimated only the additive effect of party politics on local 
policies. However, it is increasingly recognised that the role 
of politics may also be mediative, as suggested by grant 
hypothesis HVT.
Most output studies in the U.K. have found that party politics 
is an important influence on local policy variation. More 
specifically, the evidence indicates that the Labour party's 
share of council seats is positively related to the level of 
spending. However, it has been argued that the measurement of 
party politics in these studies is problematic for two 
reasons. First, the capacity to shape policy outputs
depends on outright control of the council. Therefore the 
formal power of parties should be measured not by the proportion 
of seats held, but by a dichotanous variable which indicates the 
presence or absence of control. A  second problem is that the 
focus on the power of the Labour party alone is too limited. 
This problem can be alleviated by comparing the results for
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models which are identical but for the replacement of Labour 
control by Conservative control. (^ ) However, this approach 
may still underestimate the impact of the overall pattern of 
party politics. The use of a dummy variable for either Labour 
or Conservative control implies an unnecessary loss of 
information. For example, if labour control is coded 1 then 
Conservative councils and all other councils are grouped 
together and coded 0. More information on the pattern of party 
control can be retained if a trichotomous variable is used. 
Therefore, the first measure of party politics used in this 
analysis, PARTY, is coded 1 for Conservative control, 2 for 
councils controlled by Liberals/SDP and councils in which none 
of the national parties has outright control, and 3 for Labour 
control.
Spending decisions may be influenced not only by current party 
control but also by recent changes in party control. Hie impact 
an spending m y  be particularly pronounced when either Labour or 
the Conservatives gain majority status. The change in party 
control, CHPC, can be measured on a 3 point scale where 1 
indicates change to a Labour majority, 0 indicates no change and 
- 1 indicates change to a Conservative majority. Bunce has 
shown that the impact of political change in USA state 
governments is greatest in the first budget of a new 
administration. However, Sharpe and Newton have argued
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that the full effect of a change in party control may take some 
time.(^®) This suggests that CHPC should be measured over 
several years but that more recent changes should be weighted 
more heavily. The most appropriate time span for measuring the 
change in control in U.K. local government may be the four year 
electoral cycle. Thus the weighted change in party control/ 
WCHPC/ can be calculated ass
WCHPCit = CHPCit + CHPCit_2/2 + CHPCit_^/3
+ CHPCit_ y 4  Equn. VI.
The logic of the interaction between the measures of party 
politics and grants is similar to the logic of COMPLY and 
GEAR. (^ ) For example, an increase in AGG is magnified by 
PARTY and a decrease in AGG is deflated by PARTY:
PARTYGGit = AGGi t -PARTY*it-1 Equn. VII.
Where PARTY* is equal to 1/PARTY if AGG is negative, and equal 
to PARTY if AGG is positive. Similar interaction terms can also 
be created for ASG and for WCHPC.
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(d) Needs and Tax Base
A  major formal purpose of local authorities is to respond to the 
service needs of the local population. It may therefore be 
expected that the change in service needs will influence 
spending decisions. The conceptual and practical problems of 
measuring spatial variations in the need for public services 
have been widely analysed.^®) The principal conceptual 
problem is that the definition of need is inescapably 
ideological. Thus variations in the perceived level of need 
depend not only on 'objective' local conditions but also on 
local politics. However, it is possible to compare needs across 
authorities because some features of the process of defining 
need are common to all areas. These include a national 
political culture, the shared values of professional staff and 
the statutory obligations which limit local discretion.
The principal practical problem of need measurement is the 
difficulty of obtaining data which is specific to local 
authority services and available on an annual basis. Most 
output studies in the U.K. have used general socio-economic 
indicators fran the 10 yearly census to measure need. The only 
measure of need which is constructed specially for local 
authority services and recalculated annually is central 
government's Grant Related Expenditure Assessment. Therefore, 
the annual change in this variable is used to operationalise
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the concept of the change in service needs, AND.
It has been argued that an important constraint on local 
authorities' capacity to meet service needs is the lack of 
buoyancy in the local tax b a s e . ^ 1 ) Increases in local 
rateable values persistently lag behind the rate of inflation, 
and annual increases in local tax levels are necessary simply to 
maintain the real value of rate revenue. However, not all areas 
are afflicted by this problem to the same extent. Therefore it 
may be hypothesised that there is a negative relationship 
between AEX and COST, the percentage rate increase required to 
maintain real local tax revenue. Spending decisions may be 
influenced not only by the value of the local tax base but also 
by the balance between domestic and business properties. If 
local authorities receive most of their rate revenue from 
businesses then the cost of extra spending can be shifted onto 
business ratepayers within the area.(^) Ultimately such 
costs may be shifted out of the local area onto the final 
consumers of goods and services.(53) Therefore, the 
proportion of the local tax base which consists of business 
properties, SHIFT, should be positively related to AEX.
(e) Summary of The Model
The impact of the explanatory variables on local expenditure
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change can be estimated through the following general regression 
model:
AEXit = a + b-|AGGit + b2ASGit + b3PARTYit_1 + 
b4WCHPCit-l + b5ANDit + bgCOSTit + 
b7SHIFTit-1 + eit
Equn. VIII.
where the variables are defined as above, a is a constant,
e is a random error term and the b's are the regression
coefficients for the explanatory variables. The variables
PARTY, WCHPC and SHIFT are lagged one year on AEX. It is their
value when the budget is being set rather than spent which is
relevant in this context. The other variables are measured in
the same time period as AEX. The expected signs on the
estimated coefficients ares
b1>0<l
b 2 > i
b6cO
b3, b4, b^, b7>0.
Various modifications to Equn. VIII provide for a test of
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different slopes for positive and negative changes in grants; 
and for tests of whether grant impact is mediated by prior grant 
funding, the gearing effect and local politics. The method of 
estimation is two-stage least squares employing the measure 
of A G G  derived from equations I to III.
The model is tested on the spending decisions of English local 
authorities in five financial years, from 1982/3 to 
1986/7. (^5) The model is applied to the cumulative change in 
real expenditure over the five years because the primary focus 
of the analysis is on the impact of grants.(56) it is 
inappropriate to estimate the impact of grants in single 
financial years during this period because expenditure responses 
to grant change were spread over several years.^57) For 
example, in a particular year the impact of grants may be 
obscured by running down balances or by building up special 
accounts for use in subsequent years of more severe financial 
p r e s s u r e . ) However, over a longer period all net 
expenditure must ultimately be covered by rate and grant income.
It has been argued that analyses of local policy variation in 
the U.K. have focused too heavily on urban areas and neglected 
rural areas in general and county councils in particular. (^9) 
Therefore, the validity of the model is evaluated for three 
groups of local authorities. These are the 68 'urban'
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authorities in England (the London Boroughs and Metropolitan 
Districts) and two groups of 'rural' authorities: the 39




The evidence on the validity of the model of grant impact is presented 
in Tables II-IV. Model A  shows the results for the estimation of 
equation VIII. The evidence provided by various modifications to 
equation VIII is shown in models B to G.
The overall level of statistical explanation compares favourably with 
other analyses of local policy c h a n g e .  (**0) In general the 
variables AGG and ASG contribute significantly to the explanatory 
power of the model. Thus the evidence supports Strousse and Jones' 
argument that output studies which omit grants are likely to 
underestimate the constraints on local political choice. ( )  Not 
only are AGG and ASG significant, but their effects are also 
significantly different. When AGG and ASG are constrained to have
o
equal coefficients a marked reduction in the occurs in each 
group of a u t h o r i t i e s ^ ) Therefore grant impact has probably been 
understated in studies which measured only one type of grant or used a 
single measure of 'total' grants.
(a ) Lump-Sum Grants
The hypothesis that the impact of lump-sum grants is partial 
substitution is supported by the results for the non-metropolitan 
districts and counties. The coefficients for AGG in model A  are 
significantly greater than zero and significantly less than 
one. The evidence indicates that a £1 grant cut produced a
TABLE III: TSLS REGRESSION RESULTS, NON-METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS
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TABLE IV: TSLS REGRESSION RESULTS, NON-METROPOLITAN COUNTIES

















































































































Constant 76.87 81.20 68.79 86.23 96.18 39.72
(49.1) (48.30) (48.4) (49.9) (47.8) (80.1)
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spending cut of around £0.30, or that a £1 grant increase 
produced a spending increase of around £0.30.
In the urban authorities the hypothesised impact of lump-sum 
grants is not supported by the results. The AGG coefficient in 
model A  is not significantly different fron zero. This indicates 
that the impact of AGG on AEX is not partial but complete 
substitution. Thus spending decisions in this group of 
authorities were not constrained by changes in lump-sum grants. 
The evidence suggests that local policy makers treated general 
grants and rate revenue as perfectly interchangeable sources of 
incane. This implies that grants simply served as one source of 
funding for spending decisions which were determined by other 
variables.
During the study period the cumulative change in general grants 
was negative in all the non-metropolitan counties. However, AGG 
was positive in around 15% of the non-metropolitan districts and 
urban authorities. Therefore, in these two groups model B was 
estimated to examine whether there was a differential response to 
positive and negative grant changes. The results show that in 
the non-metropolitan districts the response to grant increases 
(AGGT) and decreases (AGG4) were significantly different. (
The impact of a£l increase in general grants is a spending 
increase of around £0.77, but the impact of a U  cut in general 
grants is a spending cut of only £0.24. Thus there is little 
substitution when grants increase - most of the extra money is
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used to boost spending. However, there is a high rate of 
substitution when grants decrease - much of the grant loss is 
replaced by rate revenue. This implies that grant increases may 
'stick where they hit' but that grant decreases are much less 
likely to adhere to local budgets. The evidence provided by 
model B in the urban authorities is also indicative of a 
differential response to positive and negative grant changes. 
The difference between the AGGf and AGGi coefficients is not 
statistically s i g n i f i c a n t . However, the pattern of the 
evidence does hint that there is less substitution when grants 
increase.
The results when AGG is replaced by COMPLY are shown in model
C.(66) The level of statistical explanation is not improved 
significantly in any of the three groups of authorities. Thus 
the evidence indicates that the impact of AGG on AEX is not 
mediated by GRFX. Local spending decisions are not more 
'accountable' to central government where the prior level of 
grant funding is high. Greater grant 'dependence' does not 
produce greater compliance with central policies.(®7 ) The 
evidence shows that high GRFX authorities were just as likely as 
low GRFX authorities to increase rates to compensate for grant 
cuts, and just as likely to use extra grants to boost spending.
The effects of replacing AGG by GEAR are shown in model D. The 
modified model does not provide a significantly improved level of 
statistical explanation.(®®) Thus the impact of AGG on AEX is
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not mediated by the cost or saving to ratepayers. (  ^9) The 
results indicate that the supposed gearing effect remains 
resolutely in neutral. Despite the absence of evidence on its 
validity, the gearing effect has became a "fairly well accepted 
feature" of local government finance in the UK. ( This first 
empirical test of the gearing effect suggests that it does not 
merit this status.
The evidence provides very limited support for the hypothesis 
that the effects of lump-sum grants are mediated by party 
politics. Model E shows the consequences when AGG is replaced by 
PARTYGG. There is no significant improvement in the 
results. (^ ) Model F shows the results when AGG is mediated by 
WCHPC. There is very little change in the level of statistical 
explanation in the urban authorities and non-metropolitan 
counties. However, in the non-metropolitan districts there is a 
small but significant improvement in the r e s u l t s . T h u s  the 
evidence indicates that in this group of authorities the impact 
of AGG on AEX is modified by recent changes in party control. 
Nevertheless, the overall pattern of the evidence suggests that 
party politics makes little difference to the relationship 
between lump-sum grants and spending decisions.
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(b) Matching Grants
The hypothesised stimulative effect of matching grants is 
generally supported by the statistical evidence.
In the non-metropolitan districts and counties the estimated 
coefficients for ASG are significantly greater than one.(^) 
All the non-metropolitan districts received a cumulative increase 
in the real value of specific grants between 1981/2 and 1986/7. 
Thus in this group the ASG coefficient indicates that all 
additional specific grants were spent, and that expenditure 
funded by local taxes also increased. This need not imply that 
all the increase in spending was on services formally designated 
for specific grant support. It may be that sane of the specific 
grants leaked to other parts of the budget. (^) Nor does the 
evidence necessarily imply that the formal matching requirements 
were met in full. Precise data on the value and matching rate of 
each specific grant received by each authority would be required 
to investigate this issue.
Around one third of the non-metropolitan counties suffered a 
cumulative decline in the real value of specific grants during 
the study period. However, the response to positive and negative 
values of A S G  was uniform. Thus the ASG coefficient in
this group of authorities indicates not only that an increase in 
specific grants stimulated spending, but also that a decline in 
specific grants released funds for tax cuts.
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The hypothesised impact of matching grants is not supported by 
the results for the urban authorities. The estimated coefficient 
for ASG in model A  is not significantly different from one, ) 
which indicates that the effect of matching grants is no 
substitution. Between 1981/2 and 1986/7 the urban authorities 
suffered a cumulative decline in the real value of specific 
grants. Thus the ASG coefficient suggests that a ^ 1  cut in 
specific grants produced £ l  cut in spending but produced no 
reduction in local taxes. In the 1980's the level of fiscal 
stress has been higher in urban areas than in the remainder of 
England. ( ^ )  Therefore, the urban authorities may have 
retained the funds released by reduced matching requirements and 
transferred the money to other services.
The mediation of specific grants by PARTY is examined in model
G. The evidence indicates that the impact of ASG on AEX is not 
significantly mediated by party control. The level of 
statistical explanation was no better when ASG was mediated by 
WCHPC. It m y  be that the formal conditions attached to specific 
grants effectively prevent any party political influence on their 
relationship with spending. The absence of grant mediation by 
party politics does not mean that grants are unmediated by any 
aspect of local political systems. For example, it m y  be that 
local bureaucrats influence the relationship between grants and 
spending. However the results are not consistent with
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'budget-naximisation' which implies that all grants are allocated 
to spending and that lump-sum and matching grants have the same 
effect.( )
(c) Party Politics
Most of the evidence on the independent impact of the political 
variables is consistent with their hypothesised relationship with 
spending. The estimated coefficients for PARTY- are consistently 
positive, and are significant in the model which provides the 
best explanation of variations in AEX in each group of 
authorities. Spending decisions are influenced not only by 
current party control but also by recent changes in party 
control. In the non-metropolitan districts and counties the 
WCHPC coefficients are significantly positive. This evidence 
indicates that new Labour councils are especially likely to 
increase spending and that new Conservative councils are 
especially likely to cut spending. In the urban authorities the 
coefficient for WCHPC is not significant. This indicates that 
new councils in these areas tended to conform to the spending 
policies of established councils of the same party colour.
Thus the impact of party politics is largely additive rather than 
mediative. While there is little evidence that party control 
mediates grant impact, there is substantial evidence that party
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control has a significant independent effect on spending 
decisions. In the context of local expenditure growth and 
decline, party politics does matter.
(d) Needs and Tax Base
The evidence generally supports the hypothesis that the impact of 
service needs on spending is positive. However the AND 
coefficients are significant only in the urban authorities and 
non-metropolitan districts. The difference in the magnitude of 
the AND coefficients between these two groups may reflect 
different statutory constraints on the services for which they 
are responsible. In the non-metropolitan counties the impact 
of AND on AEX is not significant. It should not necessarily be 
inferred that expenditure decisions in these authorities are 
unresponsive to service needs. The results may simply reflect a 
lack of correspondence between central and local perceptions of 
changes in the level of need.
The evidence indicates that the lack of buoyancy in the local tax 
base is a constraint on local expenditure growth. The impact of 
COST on AEX is significantly negative, especially in the urban 
authorities and non-metropolitan counties. By contrast, none of 
the estimated coefficients for SHIFT support the hypothesis that 
the business proportion of the tax base is positively related to
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expenditure change. In the non-metropolitan counties SHIFT has 
no significant influence on AEX. In the other two groups of 
authorities the effect of SHIFT is the opposite of that 
hypothesised. The significantly negative coefficients indicate 
that spending change was lower in areas where businesses provided 
the bulk of local tax revenue. This pattern may be explained by 
the sensitivity of councils to local economic problems in the 
1980's.(79>
(e ) Summary
The statistical results cire consistent with three of the six 
grant hypotheses specified in Part I. Ihe general pattern of the 
evidence indicates that variations in grants are significantly 
related to variations in spending (HI), that the impact of 
lump-sum grants is partial substitution (HIV), and that the 
impact of matching grants is stimulation (HV). By contrast, 
grant impact is not mediated by the prior level of grant funding 
(HII) or by the gearing effect (HIII). Nor is there much 
evidence that grant impact is mediated by party politics (HVI).
Thus the results support some aspects of both political and 
economic theories of grant effects. However, a caveat must be 
entered on the validity of each theoretical perspective. First, 
recent changes in political models of central-local relations may
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have overemphasised central constraints on local policies. 
Central grants do not 'dominate' local spending decisions. 
Variations in expenditure change are far from completely 
determined by variations in grants. Party politics, service 
needs and the local tax base also have important effects on 
spending. It would be necessary to examine the evidence over a 
much longer time period to identify whether grant constraints 
have been particularly strong since 1981. However, the results 
of this analysis suggest that it is misleading to characterise 
local authorities as the 'agents' of the centre. The caveat 
concerning the economic perspective on grants is that the 
expected incane and price effects were not present in all three 
groups of authorities. The impact of lump-sum and matching 
grants was weaker in the urban areas than in the two groups of 
non-metropolitan councils. The variable pattern of the results 
lends support to the argument that it is important to test the 




The aim of this paper was to identify the impact of central grants on 
local spending decisions. Many previous analyses of local policy 
variation either emitted grants entirely or simply fired grant variables 
at policy variables on an ad-hoc basis. In this analysis the relationship 
between grants and spending was tested on the basis of political and 
economic theories of grant effects. The estimates of grant impact 
produced by previous studies were afflicted by several methodological 
problems. Therefore in this analysis the influence of grant change on 
spending change was estimated while controlling for other variables and 
correcting for simultaneity bias. The empirical evidence indicated that 
central grants are a significant constraint on expenditure decisions and 
that different types of grants have different effects.
In sum, studies which omit appropriate measures of grant impact cannot 
provide valid explanations of local policy variation. Central grants are 
an important political influence on policy outputs. Thus answers to the 
question 'does politics matter?' should be sought in the characteristics 
of both local and national political systems.
REFERENCES
1. G.A. Boyne 'Theory, Methodology and Results In
Political Science: The Case Of Output
Studies', British Journal Of Political 
Science, 15, (1985), 473-515
2. D. Rose 'National and Local Forces In State
Politics: The Implications Of Multi-Level
Policy Analysis', American Political Science 
Review, 67, (1973), 1162-73; J. Stonecash,
'Urban Policy Analysis, Systems Assumptions 
and Multiple Planes of Influence',
Publius. 7, (1977), 59-89
3. J. Strousse and P. Jones 'Federal Aid:
The Forgotten Variable In State Policy Research', 
Journal Of Politics. 36, (1974), 200-7
4. N. Boaden Urban Policy Making (Cambridge,
University Press, 1971); J. Dearlove
The Politics Of Policy In Local Government 
(Cambridge, University Press, 1973)
5. R. Rhodes 'Continuity And Change In Britain Central-
Local Relations: The Conservative Threat,
1979-83' British Journal Of Political
Science, 14, (1984), 261-83
6. 0. Hartley 'The Relationship Between Central and
Local Authorities', Public Administration.
49, (1971), 439-56
7. N. Boaden 'Central Departments and Local Authorities:
The Relationship Re-examined', Political Studies. 18, 
(1970), 175-86
8. D. Ashford 'The Effects Of Central Finance On The
British Local Government System British Journal Of 
Political Science. 4, (1974) 305-22. For a critique 
of the Boaden and Ashford studies see E. Page, 'The 
Measurement Of Central Control' Political Studies.
28, (1980), 117-20
9. J.J. Richardson and A.G. Jordan Governing Under Pressure. 
(London, Martin Robertson, 1979)
10. R. Rhodes 'Analysing Intergovernmental Relations', 
European Journal Of Political Research. 8, (1980), 
289-322; see also R. Rhodes, Control and Power In 
Central-Local Relations (Farnborough, Gower, 1980)
11. E. Page 'Fiscal Pressure And Central-Local
Relations In Britain', in M. Goldsmith and S. 
Villadsen (eds) Urban Political Theory and The 
Management Of Fiscal Stress (Aldershot, Gower, 1986)
12. Report Of The Layfield Committee Of Enquiry, Cmnd.
6453, (London, HMSO, 1976), especially Chapters 3 and 5
13. G. Jones 'Central-Local Government Relations:
Grants, Local Responsibility and Minimum Standards' in
D. Butler and A. Halsey (eds) Policy and Politics (London, 
McMillan, 1978)
14. J. Stewart 'Grant Characteristics and Central-Local 
Relations' in G. Jones (ed.) New Approaches To The Study 
Of Central-Local Relations (Farnborough, Gower, 1980)
15. H. Wolman 'Local Autonomy and Intergovernmental 
Finance In Britain and The United States',
in R . Rose and E . Page (eds), Fiscal Stress In Cities 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982);
R. Barnett ' Local Authority Expenditure Reactions 
To Grants In Aid: The Case Of The Metropolitan
District Councils' Government and Policy, 4 (1986), 131-43
16. L.J. Sharpe and K. Newton, Does Politics Matter?
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984)
17. Lucid expositions of the economics of grants
are M. Haskell, 'Federal Grants In Aid: Their
Influence On State And Local Expenditures' Canadian 
Journal Of Economics and Political Science. 20, (1964), 
585-91; and J. Wilde 'Grants In Aid: The Analytics
Of Design and Response' National Tax Journal, 24, (1971), 
143-55. For a summary of the literature see D. King, 
Fiscal Tiers (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1984)
18. See R. Inman, 'Testing Political Economy's As If
Proposition: Is The Median Income Voter Really
Decisive?', Public Choice. 33, (1978), 45-65
19. E. Gramlich 'Intergovernmental Grants: A  Review Of
The Empirical Literature', in W. Oates (ed) The Political 
Economy of Fiscal Federalism (Lexington Mass., D.C. Heath, 
1977)
20. P. Courant, E. Gramlich and D. Rubinfield,'The Stimulative 
Effects Of Intergovernmental Grants: Or Why Money Sticks
Where It Hits', in P. Mieszkowski and W. Oakland (eds) 
Fiscal Federalism and Grants In Aid (Washington, The Urban 
Institute, 1979); R. Fisher, 'Income and Grant Effects On 







Difficulties', Journal Of Urban Economics. 12, (1982),
324-45
W. Oates 'Lump-Sum Intergovernmental Grants Have 
Price Effects' in Mieskowski and Oakland,Fiscal 
Federalism And Grants In Aid
For a discussion of this balancing act see 
J. Sondheimer 'Spending Cuts Or Local Tax Increases? An 
Analysis Of Local Authority Preferences In England', 
Government and Policy, 4, (1986), 145-53
The Studies listed in Table I are: R.J. Bennett,
Central Grants To Local Governments (Cambridge, University 
Press, 1982); Boaden, Urban Policy Making: K. Cuthbertson,
J. Foreman-Peck and P. Gripaios, 'A Model Of Local Authority 
Fiscal Behaviour ' Public Finance, 36, (1981), 229-43;
J. Danziger, Making Budgets (London, Sage, 1978); C. Foster, 
R. Jackman and R. Perlman, Local Government Finance In 
A  Unitary State (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1980);
J. Gibson, 'The Block (and Target) Grant System And Local 
Authority Expenditure - Theory and Evidence', Local 
Government Studies, 8, (1982), No. 3, 15-31; R.
Greenwood, 'Fiscal Pressure And Local Government In 
England and Wales', in C. Hood and M. Wright (eds)
Big Government In Hard Tim^a (Oxford, Martin 
Robertson, 1981); R. Jackman and M. Sellars, 'Why 
Rate Poundages Differ: The Case Of Metropolitan
Districts', C.E.S. Review. (1978), 26-32; D. King,
'Why Do Local authority Rate Poundages Differ?',
Public Administration. 51, (1973), 165-73;
F. Oliver and J. Stanyer, 'Some Aspects Of The 
Financial Behaviour Of County Boroughs', Public 
Administration. 47, (1969), 169-84; E. Page, Comparing 
Local Expenditure: Lessons From A  Multinational State
(University Of Strathclyde, Centre For The Study Of 
Public Policy, Studies In Public Policy No. 60, 1980)
The exceptions are Bennett, Central Grants To Local 
Governments; Foster et a l ., Local Government Finance 
In A  Unitary State
These coefficients correspond directly to the 
slopes of the various lines shown in Diagram I.
A  positive relationship between grants and local tax 
levels indicates stimulation, an insignificant 
relationship indicates no substitution and a significant 
negative relationship indicates partial or complete 
substitution. The only studies which employ 
standardised coefficients but do not analyse rate 
poundages as well as spending are Sharpe and Newton,
Does Politics Matter? : Greenwood, 'Fiscal Pressure 
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40. If the response to positive and negative grant changes 
is significantly different then it will also be 
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applies to the mediation of grant impact by the 
gearing effect and by local politics
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(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981)
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58. Elcock and Jordan, Learning from Local Authority 
Budgeting.
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Local Government Studies. 13, (1987) No. 6, 37-49.
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It has been argued that a focus on total 
expenditure produces inflated R2 's because grants 
are included on both sides of the equation.
According to this argument the dependent 
variable should be specified as 'own-source' 
spending, that is, total expenditure minus 
grants. See E. Morss, 'Some Thoughts On The 
Determinants of State And Local Expenditures'. 
National Tax Journal, 19, (1966), 95-103.
However, it seems more appropriate to view 
local authorities as selecting a change in 
total spending rather than a change in own- 
source spending per se* Further, the 
relative size of the R 's produced by the 
alternative specifications depends on the 
relationship between grants and spending.
If the predominant impact of grants is 
complete substitution then the relationship 
with total spending will be weak but the 
relationship with own-source spending will 
be strongly negative. The results tend 
towards this pattern in the urban 
authorities and non-metropolitan counties.
Thus when the dependent variable is 
respecified as change in own-source spending 
the R 2 's rise to 87% and 82% respectively. 
Similarly, if the predominant impact of 
grants is no substitution, then the 
relationship with total spending will be 
strongly positive but the relationship with 
own-source spending will be weak. The results 
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metropolitan districts, where the re­
specification of the dependant variable as the 
change in own-source spending produces a fall 
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Strousse and Jones 'Federal Aids The 
Forgotten Variable In State ’'olicy Research'
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in the non-metropolitan counties. This is a 
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£1 of grant. By contrast, in the counties 
police grants account for 50% of costs, 
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£1 for every £1 of grant
74. J. Osman, 'The Dual Impact Of Federal Aid On 
State And Local Government Expenditures',
National Tax Journal, 19, (1966), 362-72
75. The R2 when ASG was replaced by separate 
variables for positive and negative values 
of A S G  was unchanged at 0.78. The 
coefficients for ASGt and ASG>V were 2.52 
and 2.22 respectively
76. t = 0.11
77. G.A. Boyne, 'The Extent and Impact Of Local 
Fiscal Stress', Public Policy and 
Administration. 3, (1988), 15-26
78.
79.
J.H. Beck, 'Budget-Maximising Bureaucracy 
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Expenditures' Public Finance Quarterly, 9, 
(1981) 159-82.
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The aim of this research was to measure the impact of 
political variables on local policy variation. In 
Chapter II it was argued that public policies cannot be 
produced in the absence of a political process. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to explain local policy 
variation in the context of a general political model. 
However, this leaves open the question of the 
significance of particular political variables. The 
impact of politics was examined empirically in chapters 
III to VII. In general the evidence suggested that 
median voters and bureaucrats have little influence on 
policy outputs. By contrast, the statistical results 
indicated that the impact of local political parties 
and central grants is significant.
In this final chapter the implications of the evidence 
are analysed. It is important to review the overall 
quality of the evidence before considering its 
substantive significance. Therefore, the first section 
of the chapter evaluates the validity of the 
statistical results. The second and third sections 
assess the implications of the results for the rational 
choice and party government models respectively. The
2final section considers the broader implications of the 
statistical evidence for the utility of the output 
studies approach to the explanation of public policy 
making.
31. Evaluation Of The Evidence
The criteria used in this section to evaluate the
evidence are derived from the same methodological
perspective as the empirical analyses in previous
chapters. This perspective, which has been described
(1)
as 'temperate rationalism' or 'sophisticated
(2)
falsificationism', recognises that no evidence is
definitive. Thus hypotheses cannot be conclusively
proved or disproved. This reservation applies not only
to the 'universal' validity of a hypothesis but also to
its validity in particular contexts, for example in a
specific set of local authorities at a specific time.
However, despite this irredeemable uncertainty, there
are criteria which can legitimately be used to judge
whether a hypothesis is supported or undermined. The
justification for this view is that theories which most
closely correspond with the evidence have been found to
(3)
'work' better in practice.
The general 'empiricist' criterion of the consistency 
between theories and evidence is readily applicable to 
analyses of local policy variation. The criterion 
translates into the statistical 'significance' of
4explanatory variables and the 'goodness of fit' of 
multivariate models. In chapters III to VII these 
statistical criteria were used to evaluate various 
hypothetical explanations of policy outputs, on the 
assumption that the empirical evidence was valid. The 
implicit justification for this assumption was that the 
generation of the evidence followed 'standard 
procedures' for specifying and testing statistical 
models. Questions concerning the validity of 
statistical evidence are seldom raised in published 
empirical analyses of local policy variation. However, 
conclusions can properly be drawn on the basis of 
statistical criteria only when other relevant criteria 
are met. Therefore, it is necessary to explore three 
aspects of the empirical tests in more detail. These 
are the accuracy of the data, the operationalisation of 
the concepts and the validity of the auxiliary 
assumption of c.et.eris paribus..p r p v.is p .•
The importance of analysing these aspects of the 
evidence is clearly illustrated by the results for 
median voters and bureaucrats. One interpretation of 
the results is that the effect of these political 
variables is 'genuinely' unimportant and that the
5hypotheses are invalid. Another interpretation is that
the empirical tests were defective. In this case it is
the evidence which is invalid and the validity of the
hypotheses remains unknown. Lack of support for a
hypothesis provides the most obvious cue to question
the quality of statistical results. However, it is
equally important to evaluate the empirical tests when
hypotheses are supported. It is tempting to conclude
that the favourable results for grants and parties
imply that the tests were satisfactory. However, it is
logically incorrect to argue backwards from the results
of a test to the validity of the process which produced
(4)
the evidence. The dangers of such reasoning were
highlighted in chapter I where it was shown that 
defective tests nevertheless appeared to support the 
hypothesised impact of party politics.
(a) The Accuracy Of The Data
The measurement of all the variables was based on 
survey data from published sources. It is 
necessary to check whether the evidence was 
affected by problems which are generally present 
in survey data or by the particular applications 
of the data in the empirical tests.
6Three general characteristics of survey data are
(5)
causes for concern. First, all survey data
is subject to random errors produced by problems
of interpretation, coding and transcription.
Such errors are likely to be particularly
pronounced in one-off surveys where the survey
process and questions are unfamiliar to
participants, and where external checks for
response validity are difficult. However, these
problems are minimal in the case of the survey
data used for the political and policy
variables. The surveys are conducted 
(6)
regularly and the format and content are
very stable. The regularity of the surveys also
permits checks on the validity of year on year
changes and facilitates the correction or
(7)
deletion of implausible responses. A second
characteristic of survey data which may impair 
accuracy arises from sampling problems. These 
problems may concern either the 
representativeness of the sample of local 
authorities, or sampling errors within each 
authority. However, these problems
7are of little relevance to the political and
policy variables. Virtually all the data is
available for the population of authorities and
refers to the aggregate characteristics (e.g.
spending) of each local authority. Further,
where the data refers to characteristics of
individuals or households within each area (e.g.
unemployment levels) the surveys cover the
(8)
population rather than a sample.
A third potential difficulty with survey data is
response bias. In general the political and
policy variables contain neither the motive nor
the opportunity for such bias. Many of the
variables are highly 'visible' in the local area,
for example the political composition of the
council or the rate level. However the accuracy
of the data for one of the policy variables is
likely to be affected by response bias. It has
been argued that in recent years Labour
controlled urban authorities deliberately
understated their true expenditure in an attempt
(9)
to minimise grant penalties. Thus the
measure of spending change employed in chapter
8VII may be systematically biased downwards in 
Labour controlled London boroughs and 
metropolitan districts. This data problem may be 
the reason for the difference in the results 
between the urban authorities and the two groups 
of rural authorities. For example, it may 
explain why in the urban authorities the change 
in party control was not significant, lump-sum 
grants were not substitutive and matching grants 
were not stimulative. A full exploration of this 
issue would require an analysis of the financial 
accounts in each authority. However, the extent 
of recent 'creativity' in local budgetary 
processes may mean that the detection of the 
'true' spending in each area is beyond even the 
most skilled audit.
In addition to the general problems of survey 
data, it is necessary to note a specific problem 
which concerns some of the political and policy 
variables. While the errors in any one of the 
data sources are small, a greater degree of error 
will be produced when two or more data sources 
are combined. For example, the measurement of
9annual policy change implies that errors may have 
been compounded in the construction of the 
variables from two surveys. The amount of 
cumulative error may be greatest in the median 
voter variable which was derived from 4 discrete 
measures and the bureaucratic power variable 
which was derived from 9 discrete measures. At 
the extreme, there is a danger that the variable 
which is eventually constructed will contain a 
level of 'noise' which outweighs the intended 
'signal'. However, the scope for testing the 
plausibility of annual data changes implies that 
the extent of cumulative error in the political 
and policy variables is well below this level.
Overall then, although there are some 
inaccuracies in the data and the derived 
measures, these are not sufficient to attenuate 
seriously the estimated coefficients in the 
empirical analyses. Indeed, the construction of 
the variables from a data set based on regular 
surveys implies that the measures of politics and 
policy are more reliable than the measures in 
most 'snapshot' output studies. Thus the
10
reliability of the measures contributes strongly 
to the quality of the evidence. It is necessary 
next to consider the validity of the measures, 
which depends on whether the concepts have been 
appropriately operationalised.
(b) The Operationalisation Of The Concepts
Theoretical hypotheses contain general concepts 
but empirical tests contain specific measures. 
Thus the implications of the evidence for the 
hypotheses depends on the 'correspondence' 
between the concepts and the measures.
In the literature on scientific method it has
been argued that theories are 'incommensurable'
because the same concept has different meanings
(10)
in different theories. An apparently more
mundane but equally pressing problem is the 
ambiguity of concepts even within the confines of 
a given theoretical perspective. Conceptual 
ambiguity has profound consequences for the 
interpretation of empirical evidence. An 
imperfectly defined concept cannot be 
'perfectly' operationalised, even in principle.
11
The practical response to conceptual ambiguity is
to use an empirical measure which corresponds to
the meaning of a concept in the context of the
specific hypothesis to be tested. Thus the
operationalisation of the concept of 'policy' in
chapters III to VII was constrained by the
hypotheses for the political variables. Measures
of rates, staff and expenditure were selected
because there were good theoretical reasons to
expect the political variables to influence these
policy outputs. The context in which the policy
variables were used also determined whether they
were specified as levels or change, and the
(11)
particular measures of change. For
example, in chapter VII the monetary change in 
spending was measured to examine the magnitude of 
the substitutive or stimulative impact of grants.
The extent to which the four political concepts 
can be defined unambiguously and measured 
directly is variable. The operationalisation of 
the concept of central grants is the most 
straightforward. The concept is clearly defined 
as a flow of funds from central to local
12
government. The definition refers to a directly 
'observable' phenomenon: the transfer of a
quantity of money. Different dimensions of the 
concept are also directly measurable through the 
monetary value of lump-sum and matching grants. 
However, it may be argued that the 
operationalisation of the concept could be more 
precise. For example, in principle it would be 
possible to weight each pound of matching funding 
by the formally required matching rate. Such 
adjustments to the 'raw' grant figure may produce 
more sophisticated measures of changes in grants 
and a more complete explanation of local 
expenditure decisions.
The meaning of the concept of 'party politics' is 
open to many interpretations. However, in the 
context of local policy variation, the most 
relevant dimension of the concept concerns the 
party composition of the council. Other 
dimensions, such as legal and institutional 
arrangements, are constant across local political 
systems in the U.K. This practical constraint on 
the operationalisation of the concept leaves some
13
important issues unresolved. For example, which
parties to include in the measure and whether
seat share or outright control most closely
corresponds to the concept. There are no
definitive answers to these questions and it may
therefore be argued that the specific measures
employed in the empirical analyses were
inappropriate. However, it should be noted that
experimentation with a variety of measures of
seat share and control made little difference to
(12)
the statistical results.
The concept of median voter interests was 
operationalised through the financial cost of a 
rate increase. This measure is consistent with 
the assumption in rational-choice theory that 
political behaviour is 'self' interested.
However, the operationalisation may be too narrow 
because it focuses on only the costs of local tax 
changes. Self interest may also be defined to 
include the perceived benefit of the extra 
services provided with higher tax revenue. To 
capture this dimension of the concept of median 
voter interests it would be necessary to measure
14
the value placed on public spending by median 
voters. The test of the median voter hypothesis 
did not explicitly contain such a measure. 
However, it is likely that perceptions of the 
benefits of additional public spending are 
closely linked to local political dispositions.
In this case, the control for Labour seats in the 
median voter model may be taken to justify an 
otherwise narrow measure of median voter 
interests.
Bureaucratic power is the most difficult of the 
four political concepts to operationalise. The 
relevant dimension of the concept is not easily 
defined in principle and cannot be directly 
measured in practice. The appropriate 
operationalisation of the concept depends on the 
definition of 'self interest'. Whatever 
definition is adopted, the concept must be 
measured indirectly by isolating bureaucratic 
power from the variable which it is assumed to 
influence. The major problem with this approach 
to the operationalisation of the concept concerns 
the separation of bureaucratic power from other
15
variables. It may be that the 'purging' process 
in chapter IV stopped short of the required level 
of precision. The residual from the equation 
used to estimate bureaucratic power may have 
contained the effect of other variables on 
staffing levels. However, it is difficult to 
arrive at a judgement on this issue in the 
absence of other similar measures of bureaucratic 
power to serve as external reference points.
In sum then it makes little sense to consider the 
validity of the operationalisation of the 
concepts without considering the specific content 
of the hypotheses. It is possible that each of 
the concepts may have been defined and measured 
with greater precision. However, given the 
constraints of conceptual clarity and data 
availability, it can be concluded that the 
validity of the measures is sufficient to warrant 
confidence in the quality of the evidence.
(c) The Auxiliary Assumption of Ceteris Paribus 
Proviso
The theoretical implausibility of 'single cause'
16
explanations of policy outputs implies that all 
hypotheses concern the net impact of an 
independent variable when other influences are 
held constant. Thus a crucial auxiliary 
assumption in the interpretation of the evidence 
is that 'all other things are equal'. As argued 
in chapter I, this requires that all relevant 
explanatory variables are included in the wider 
model used to test the hypothesis. In this case 
the auxiliary assumption is valid because 
statistical control provides evidence on the 
hypothesis 'as if' all other things are equal.
If the auxiliary assumption is not valid then the 
quality of the evidence on the impact of the four 
political variables is seriously undermined. In 
this context unsupported hypotheses may be 
saved. For example, it may be argued that if all 
other things had been equal then the impact of 
median voters and bureaucrats would have been 
significant. Similarly, hypotheses which are 
apparently supported by the evidence may be 
discarded. For example, it may be argued that if
17
all other things had been equal then the impact 
of parties and grants would not have been 
signif icant.
The validity of the auxiliary assumption may be 
questioned on either theoretical or empirical 
grounds. If variables are contained in 
theoretical models but omitted from a statistical 
model then it may reasonably be argued that all 
other influences have not been controlled. The 
empirical evidence is to some extent protected 
from this criticism, because all the political 
hypotheses were tested while controlling for 
constraint variables such as needs and 
resources. Nevertheless, the multiplicity of 
theories of policy making implies that some 
potentially important variables may have been 
omitted. However, the mere possibility of this 
problem in principle does not undermine the 
evidence. In practice it is reasonable to accept 
the validity of the auxiliary assumption until 
the supposedly omitted variables are measured, 
tested and shown to produce different results.
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The validity of the auxiliary assumption may also
be criticised for empirical reasons. If it is
assumed that the influences on policy outputs are
largely 'systematic' rather than 'random', then
it should be possible to obtain a high level of
statistical explanation. Thus a substantially
incomplete statistical explanation would suggest
that not all relevant variables have been
controlled, even if the identity of such
variables is unknown. In some of the empirical
analyses in chapters III to VII less than half of
the variation in policy outputs was accounted for
by the multivariate models (see Table VIII.1).
This may be taken to indicate that the auxiliary
assumption is invalid. However, it is possible
that the remaining variation is attributable to
random or ad-hoc influences. Some policy outputs
do appear to be the product of chaos and
misunderstanding. For example, a comedy of
errors in Mid Glamorgan County Council in 1986
resulted in councillors adopting a set of budget
proposals which they had intended to
(13)
reject.
Table VIII. 1 Levels of Statistical Explanation In The Empirical Analyses 














If the unexplained variation in policies is
attributable to random influences, then it may be
inferred that the estimated coefficients for the
political variables are unbiased. In this case
the impact of politics has not been artificially
inflated or suppressed by the omission of
relevant variables from the regression models.
Further, there is an indication in the evidence
that the results for the political variables are
not much altered by the level of statistical
explanation which is obtained. In chapters III
and IV the impact of median voters and
bureaucrats did not tend to be more significant
in those contexts where the multivariate models
2
yielded a relatively high R . Similarly, in
chapters VI and VII parties and grants did not
tend to be less significant where the models
2
yielded a relatively high R .
In sum, the argument that 'all other things were 
not equal' could be used to protect all the 
unsupported hypotheses and to discard all the 
supported hypotheses. However, despite the 
potential force of this argument, its actual 
force can be determined only by further empirical
20
analysis. In this context, it is reasonable to 
interpret the evidence on the basis that the 
auxiliary assumption is valid.
(d) Summary
There are no definite yardsticks for evaluating 
the validity of empirical evidence. Nor are 
there any rules for the relative weight to be 
attached to each of the three criteria discussed 
above. Therefore, it is impossible to gauge 
precisely the quality of the tests of the 
hypotheses for the political variables. However, 
it can be concluded that the validity of the 
evidence has been established 'beyond reasonable 
doubt'. On this basis, the following sections 
proceed to discuss the implications of the 
evidence for the rational choice and party 
government models of local policy variation.
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2 . Theoretical .Implications..Qf....The..E v ilens ej Rational
Choice
The view that local outputs can be explained by 
variations in median voter interests or bureaucratic 
power was not consistent with the empirical evidence. 
Therefore it is necessary to consider possible defects 
in the hypotheses for these variables in particular and 
in rational choice theory in general.
(a) Median Voters
The statistical results in chapter III indicated
that median voter interests are not a significant
influence on local tax policies. Two possible
reasons for the failure of the median voter
hypothesis can be identified. First, it may be
that local politicians realise that their policy
decisions are, at best, a marginal influence on
local electoral behaviour. Any attempt to buy
votes by targeting policies on median voter
preferences may be swamped by national trends in
(14)
public opinion. In this case local
politicians may prefer to pursue 'ideological'
2 2
policies rather than seek the middle ground.
This course of action is, in effect, a rational
preference of a certain policy gain over an
uncertain electoral gain. A second explanation
for the absence of policy responsiveness to
median voter interests concerns the shape of the
distribution of public opinion. In each area the
distribution of opinion of the whole public may
be unimodal, but the distribution of opinion
amongst the voting public may be bi-modal.
Turnout at local elections is generally low and
most voters may be strongly committed to
particular parties. If the distribution of
opinion amongst actual voters is bimodal then
politicians have little to gain by pursuing the
minority position of the median voter. Instead
the rational choice in this context is to match
policies to the preferences of supporters rather
than the median position in the whole
(15)
electorate.
The median voter hypothesis may therefore be 
valid only when local electoral behaviour is
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dominated by looal issues and when the 
distribution of opinion amongst actual voters is 
unimodal. There is little evidence that either 
of these conditions is fulfilled in the U.K. 
local government system. Even if the median 
voter hypothesis proves to be valid in such 
circumstances, its theoretical status would be 
that of an interesting special case rather than a 
general explanation of local policy variation.
Thus, the median voter model does not explain 
variations in policy outputs. The key political 
influence on local authority decisions is not the
preferences of median voters as policy
'consumers'. Therefore, it is inappropriate to
view local political systems as analagous to
perfectly competitive economic markets.
(b) Bureaucratic Power
The empirical evidence in chapter IV indicated 
that bureaucratic power is not a significant 
influence on local staffing policies. The lack 
of support for the bureaucratic power hypothesis
2 4
suggests that it, too, may be valid only under
special circumstances. A possible explanation
for the failure of the hypothesis is that
bureaucratic preferences are closely matched to
local political dispositions. It has been noted
that councils tend to attract and recruit senior
staff whose views are compatible with the
prevailing political ethos in the
(16)
authority. Thus bureaucrats may have
little distinctive influence on the broad thrust
of council policies. In this case separate
bureaucratic effects on policy outputs may occur
only in the period between a change of party
control and the appointment of new staff with
'suitable' attitudes. However, it has been
argued that officials may find it most difficult
to outmanoeuvre politicians with a new electoral
(17)
mandate. Even in the special context of
political change, then, bureaucrats may have 
little influence on policies.
Another explanation for the absence of 
bureaucratic effects is that bureaucratic 
preferences are not stable but alter when
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constraints alter. Thus it may be that local 
bureaucrats preferred to use discretionary income 
for staff maximisation in the 1970's. However, 
it is possible their preferences changed in the 
face of new financial and political constraints 
in the 1980's. In this case the 'staffing' 
measure of bureaucratic power may have been 
unrelated to subsequent changes in staffing 
because bureaucrats turned their attention 
elsewhere. This argument assumes that 
bureaucrats have the ingenuity to reorder their 
preferences and the freedom to change their 
behaviour accordingly. If bureaucrats can 
reallocate discretionary funding in this way, 
then their influence on policies will remain 
undetectable unless the change in preferences can 
be predicted. Thus considerable theoretical 
development is required to save the bureaucratic 
power hypothesis by this route. It would be 
necessary to specify and test a model of changes 
in bureaucratic preferences and a model of 
constraints on bureaucratic behaviour.
In sum then, the bureaucratic power model does
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not provide a satisfactory explanation of policy 
outputs. The preferences of bureaucrats as 
policy 'producers' are not a key determinant of 
local policy variation. Thus the analogy of a 
monopolistic economic market sheds little light 
on the operation of local political systems.
(c) Rational Choice and Self Interest
The general characteristic of rational choice
theory which underlies both the median voter and
bureaucratic power hypotheses is the 'self
interest' assumption. Thus the crucial defect in
rational choice models may be that policy makers
are not primarily motivated by narrow self
interest. In response, the rational choice
theorist may claim that the 'realism' of the
self-interest assumption is irrelevant. Niskanen
and Downs have both argued that the only
criterion for evaluating a hypothesis is its
(18)
'predictive power'. Their arguments draw
directly on Friedman's 'methodology of positive
(19)
economics'. However, this methodological
perspective is not appropriate to the aim of
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output studies. Friedman's argument concerns
(20)
models of statistical prediction, but
output studies are concerned with substantive 
explanation. Even if the 'irrelevance of 
assumptions' thesis is accepted, another problem 
remains. It may be permissible to accept 
simplistic assumptions if models with high levels 
of statistical explanation are thereby 
generated. However, in the context of local 
policy variation, rational choice theory appears 
to combine simplistic assumptions with low levels 
of explanation.
It may be argued that in principle rational
choice models can be improved if the self
interest assumption is abandoned. However, in
practice, alternative motivational assumptions
tend to be vague and ad-hoc. For example, Goodin
has argued that bureaucrats are motivated by
(21)
'mission commitment' , and Dunleavy has
argued that the principal aim of senior public
(22)
officials is 'bureau shaping'. These
notions seem to amount to little more than the 
argument that 'bureaucratic power is as
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bureaucratic power does'. This removes the
cutting edge from rational choice theory. As
Laver has argued, such formulations are "very
convenient but rather unsatisfying, since
rational choice theory becomes little more than
(23)
the rationalisation of choice".
(d) Summary
The operationalisation of a general political 
theory of local policy variation requires the 
selection of specific political variables. One 
potentially relevant set of variables is 
identified by rational choice theory. However, 
the evidence indicates that the concepts of 
median voter and bureaucratic preferences add 
little to an understanding of the politics of 
policy outputs. It is important to remember that 
this is the first application of rational choice 
theory within the field of output studies. These 
variables may subsequently be found to influence 
policies other than those analysed here. Even if 
further empirical tests fail to support the 
hypotheses it may be argued that 'tenacity' is
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the required response in the face of apparently 
adverse results. However, if repeated tests of 
good quality fail to uncover the effects of 
median voters and bureaucrats, then the 
determinants of local policy variation 
must rationally be sought elsewhere.
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3. Theoretical Implications O f T he.Kv.i-dfince; Party 
Government
The view that local policy outputs can be explained by
the ideological disposition of ruling parties was
generally supported by the empirical evidence. Thus
the results corroborate Sharpe and Newton's argument
that parties “are a much more potent factor in
influencing governmental outputs than much of previous
(24)
output research has recognised” .
(a) Local Party Politics
i
The analysis in chapter IV did not support the 
'disaggregation' hypothesis. The impact of 
politics is no stronger on sub-services than on 
aggregate services. This pattern was common to 
various aspects of the personal social services 
and education. The pattern was also common to 
evidence derived from several studies. Thus, 
output disaggregation does not appear to be a 
promising path towards the discovery of party 
effects.
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The reason why the disaggregation hypothesis was 
not supported can be found in the results for 
party effects in chapters VI and VII. The 
evidence in chapter VI supported the hypothesis 
that party politics is a significant influence on 
economic development policies. Similarly, the 
evidence in chapter VII supported the hypothesis 
that the impact of parties on total spending 
policies is significant. Thus aggregate service 
expenditure and total expenditure are not 
'accounting abstractions' devoid of political 
conflict, but are subject to substantial party 
effects.
The empirical evidence in chapters VI and VII has 
two important general implications for the party 
government model. First, the formal mechanisms 
of representative democracy do matter. To the 
extent that parties have different priorities, it 
is possible to impress such differences on 
policy outputs. The evidence indicates that the 
scope for implementing distinctive policies is 
circumscribed by other political variables, 
service needs and financial resources. However,
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local party programmes are neither entirely 
rhetoric nor entirely bound by such limits. 
Further, parties are not pulled to a common 
policy position by the weight of median voter 
preferences. Thus, the replacement of one set of 
elected politicians by another set does make a 
difference to the formal commitment of resources 
by local authorities. This is not to argue that 
the policies produced by local political systems 
will correspond precisely or even closely to the 
expectations of the electorate. However, the 
broad direction of policy, as reflected in 
spending decisions, is partly predictable on the 
basis of the party voted into office. This 
conclusion may allow political scientists reduced 
to 'near panic' by previous output studies 
results to regain some composure.
A second implication of the results for the party 
government model concerns the additive and 
mediative roles of local politics. The evidence 
in chapter VI indicated that the effect of 
parties on economic development policies is 
mediative. By contrast, the evidence in chapter
33
VII indicated that effect of parties on the 
change in total spending is largely additive.
The general Easton model offers no guidance on 
the circumstances in which each type of party 
effect is most likely to occur. However, the 
pattern of the evidence suggests that mediative 
effects are more likely when local politicians 
have discretion in responding to conditions or 
inputs. Thus mediative effects may be 
facilitated if statutory constraints are weak, as 
in the case of economic development expenditure. 
Similarly, mediative effects may be prevented if 
formal constraints are strong, as in the case of 
the expenditure requirements of matching grants. 
However, it is unlikely that any theoretical 
formulation of the role of parties will be so 
precise as to rule out either additive or 
mediative effects on an a priori basis. 
Therefore, in practice it will be necessary to 
continue to test both effects. Ultimately, if a 
sufficient body of evidence is produced, it may 
be possible to clarify when each type of effect 
is most likely to occur.
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Thus, the evidence in chapters VI and VII 
supports a clear conclusion: local politics
matters. It is possible to identify two reasons 
why this evidence differs from the bulk of the 
evidence summarised in chapter I. The difference 
may reflect either the time periods studied or 
the methodologies employed.
Two countervailing forces are at work on the 
relationship between parties and policies in the 
1980's. Party effects may be stronger than in 
the 1960's or 1970's because party conflict is 
more pronounced. However, the sharpness of party 
conflict in local authorities is to some extent a 
reaction to central attempts to curb the 
influence of local parties. Such central 
policies may have produced weaker party effects 
in the 1980's than in the 1960's and 1970's. It 
is difficult to gauge the net result of these 
countervailing forces. However, unless the 
balance is substantially towards stronger party 
effects, the contrast between this evidence and 
earlier evidence can be attributed in part to 
different methodologies. Previous studies of
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local policy variation might also have uncovered 
significant party effects if tests had been 
conducted on an explicit theoretical basis, if 
variables had been appropriately operationalised, 
and if relevant lag structures had been used.
(b) Central Grants
The absence of good empirical evidence has
facilitated widely differing interpretations of
the impact of central grants on local spending
decisions. Grant effects were believed to be
weak in the 1960's, on little basis other than
the mere existence of local spending
(25)
variations. Similarly, grant effects in
(26)
the 1980's are believed to be strong, 
largely on the basis that central government has 
sought control of local expenditure. The 
empirical evidence in chapter VII suggests that 
the actual impact of grants is somewhere between 
these two positions. The distribution of grants 
allows central government to influence, but not 
to control, local spending decisions. Over time, 
the magnitude of estimated grant coefficients may 
be used to gauge changes in central influence.
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The evidence on grant impact has implications for 
the general conceptualisation of local political 
systems and for the role of central funding in 
models of local policy variation.
The effect of grants on spending suggests that 
local political systems are appropriately 
conceptualised as 'open' systems. Early 
political explanations of policy outputs focused 
on the internal characteristics of local 
political systems. After Dawson and Robinson, 
the theoretical perspective was broadened to 
include the influence of local environmental 
conditions. In the Easton model the environment 
also includes other levels of government, but the 
emphasis in models of local policy variation has 
remained largely local. The explanation of 
policy outputs may benefit from attention to 
several aspects of inter-governmental 
relationships. These include not only inputs 
from central government, but also inputs from 
other local authorities and from supra-national 
governments, such as funding from the E.C. A 
model which integrates political variables from
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several levels of government may well provide a 
more complete explanation of policies than 
conventional 'local' models.
Analyses of the financial relationship between 
central and local government have largely 
stressed the 'dependence' of local authorities on 
grant funding. The empirical evidence suggests 
that this conceptualisation is inappropriate. 
First, the focus on 'dependence' is misleading 
because the level of central funding in itself 
does not influence local responses to grants. 
Second, the single dimension of dependence masks 
the variety of grant effects. For example, the 
impact of grants on spending depends on whether 
grants are lump-sum:or matching. Thus, not only 
is it necessary for theories of local policy 
variation to encompass intergovernmental 
relationships, but it is also necessary to take 




In contrast to the rational choice perspective, 
the party government model contributes 
significantly to an understanding of why 
different local authorities adopt different 
policies. At-local level, an important 
characteristic of party government is the 
disposition of the ruling group on the council.
At national level, party government influences 
policy outputs through the allocation of 
financial resources to local authorities. Thus 
it can be concluded that the role of elected 
politicians must be a key element in a political 
theory of policy determination. Politicians do 
have some autonomy from external constraints, and 
this autonomy is used to adopt policies which 
correspond broadly to their stated ideological 
preferences.
39
Implications For Further Research
The final issue to be considered is the implication of 
the evidence for the utility of the output studies 
approach to the analysis of local policy variation. 
Given the aim of discovering the causes of public 
policies, is it worth persevering with output studies 
or should some other approach be tried?
As noted in Chapter II, output studies have been widely
criticised on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
For example, Danziger has argued that output studies
typically lack a theory of how the independent
variables influence policy outputs and often posess
(27)
"minimal explanatory power". Many studies of
local policy variation are culpable on both of these 
counts. However, this research has demonstrated that 
such problems are not inherent characteristics of 
output studies. The multivariate models often provided 
a good level of statistical explanation, and provided 
good substantive explanations because the variables 
were tested on the basis of explicit hypotheses. Thus 
the models worked in theory as well as in practice.
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The best performance of the statistical models was for 
policies on economic development and total spending. 
These results are especially noteworthy because the 
output studies approach has not generally worked well 
for small categories of spending or for policy change. 
Therefore, if appropriate theoretical and 
methodological principles applied, policy outputs which 
have not previously proved tractable may be explained 
successfully by output studies.
The success of the models for economic development and 
total spending provides substantial support for the 
utility of output studies. However, the models for 
rate? and staffing generally performed much less well. 
Two broad responses are possible when the output 
studies approach produces such results. ' Either the 
approach must be rejected or the statistical models 
must be improved. Each of these responses is evaluated 
in turn.
If output studies are to be replaced by an alternative 
mode of policy analysis then two conditions must be 
fulfilled. It is necessary to show that an alternative 
exists in principle, and to provide some justification
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for the belief that it will work better than output 
studies in practice.
The major alternative to statistical modelling of 
policy outputs is the qualitative case study. The aims 
of an individual case study and an individual output 
study clearly differ. A single case study seeks to 
identify detailed influences on policy in a particular 
local authority, whereas an output study seeks to 
identify general influences on policy across a set of 
authorities. However, the ultimate aim of both methods 
is to identify the causes of public policies. It is 
therefore possible to compare their relative merits 
directly. There are three reasons why the case study 
approach is inferior to output studies.
First, it is impossible to tell whether case studies
yield results which are representative and therefore
generalisable. By contrast, comparative statistical
analysis yields results which can be used to draw
conclusions about the population of local political
systems from which the sample is drawn, by following
the conventions of statistical inference. The criteria
of statistical significance can be altered to reflect




Second, case studies cannot estimate the net effect of
a political variable on policies while controlling for
other influences. By contrast, this is possible
through comparative statistical analysis. Commenting
on case studies of legislative behaviour, Downs states
that "case studies have traditionally been concerned
with the behaviour of 'actors' in what often amounts to
a narrowly defined closed system ... Unfortunately, the
larger societal forces that constrain and motivate the
behaviour of legislators (by determining the nature and
definition of problems and the resources available to
deal with them) are frequently difficult or impossible
(29)
to detect when doing a single case study".
Awareness of such 'larger societal forces' is certainly
present in case studies of British local 
(30)
authorities. However, the case study method
cannot estimate with any precision the unique influence
of local actors independent of such forces. This
inherent problem is compounded in actual case studies
by the failure to state initial hypotheses and criteria
of relevant evidence. It has been argued that the
typical case study "lacks rigour, lacks a definite
logical structure, ... is all too easy to verify and
virtually impossible to falsify. It is, or can be,




The final reason why the comparative statistical method 
is superior to the case study method is also the most 
fundamental. It concerns not the capacity to yield 
evidence on specific hypotheses, but the capacity of 
the two approaches to provide evidence which challenges 
their own general validity.
The rationale of output studies is that political and 
enviornmental characteristics which vary systematically 
across local authorities have a significant impact on 
public policies. However, the approach can and does 
yield evidence which, by the canons of statistical 
significance, flatly contradicts this assumption. Some 
output studies explain literally none of the variation 
in local policies. Thus the evidence produced by 
comparative statistical^analysis can undermine not only 
specific hypotheses but the whole research strategy 
itself. By contrast, case studies of the policy 
process are never seen to fail. The underlying 
rationale of the approach is that 'idiosyncratic' 
factors, such as the action and interaction of 
individuals and groups in specific circumstances, 
independently affect policy outputs. Given that policy 
decisions are an inescapably human activity, case 
studies of the local policy process are preconditioned 
to find something which is apparently 'significant'.
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None of these criticisms should be taken to imply that 
case studies are of no value in the explanation of 
policy variations. For example, case studies may be 
useful as a base for the development of a formal model, 
as in the analysis of economic development policies in 
chapter VI. However, the case study method is more 
properly viewed as an adjunct to statistical modelling 
rather than an alternative general research strategy.
In the absence of a convincing alternative, the most
appropriate response if the output studies approach
performs poorly is to modify the specific model rather
than reject the 'paradigm'. Indeed there is
considerable scope for 'normal science' within the
(32)
output studies tradition. Potential improvements
in models of local policy variation include wider and 
more refined measures of both political variables and 
constraint variables. Indeed, if more comprehensive 
explanations of local policy outputs are to be achieved 
it is essential to develop better multidisciplinary 
models. However, it will be necessary not only to be 
aware of the potential importance of variables 
emphasised by disciplines other than political science, 
but also to be sceptical of the specific indicators 
which such disciplines have conventionally employed.
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In conclusion, this research has analysed the reasons 
why different local authorities adopt different 
policies. The spec fie focus has been on the impact of 
four main political variables on policy outputs. The 
empirical evidence showed that neither median voters 
nor bureaucrats make a significant difference to local 
policies, but that the impact of party politics and 
central grants is important. Thus the politics of 
local policy variation is better represented by the 
party government model than by rational choice models.
The empirical evidence also showed that the output 
studies approach is capable of providing explanations 
of local policy variation which are theoretically 
coherent and statistically successful. There is 
considerable correspondence between the empirical 
evidence and the conceptualisation of policies as the 
result of constrained political choice. Much work 
within output studies remains to be done. However, 
further developments will never generate 'complete' 
explanations of policy outputs. The practical success 
of the output studies approach is inherently limited by 
problems such as conceptual ambiguity and data accuracy 
and by the presence of random influences on policies.
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Nevertheless, it will be possible for output studies to 
produce evidence of high quality on the impact of 
politics. And it may yet be possible to explain most 
of the variation in local policies most of the time.
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